Aristotle (2024) Nicomachean Ethics 1.3

Aristotle (2024). Nicomachean Ethics. Second Edition. Translated With Introduction and Notes By C. D. C. Reeve Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company

 

1.3 Exactness in ethics

Our account would be adequate if its degree of perspicuousness (saphêneia) [알기쉬움, 명료함] ^[각주:1] were in accord with its subject matter; for we must not seek the same degree of exactness^[각주:2] in all accounts (logos) ^[각주:3], any more than in all products of the crafts.

Noble (kalos) things and just things, which are what politics investigates, admit of so much difference and variability that they seem to exist by conven tional law alone and not by nature.^[각주:4] Good things seem to admit of vari ability in the same way too, because they result in harm to many people; for some have in fact been destroyed because of wealth, others because of courage. It must content us, then, in an account that concerns and is in accord with such things, to prove the truth roughly and in outline, and— in an account that concerns things that hold for the most part ^[각주:5] and is in accord with them—to reach conclusions of the same sort too. It is in the same way, then, that we must also take each of the things we say; for it is characteristic of a well-educated person^[각주:6] to look for the degree of exactness in each kind of investigation that the nature of the subject itself allows; for it is evident that accepting persuasive arguments from a mathematician is like demanding demonstrations from a rhetorician.^[각주:7]

But each person correctly judges the things he knows and is a good judge of these. Therefore, a person well educated in a given area is a good judge in that area, while a person well educated in all areas is an unconditionally ^[각주:8] good judge. That is why a young person is not a proper listener for politics; for he has no experience of the actions of life^[각주:9], and the accounts are in accord with these and concerned with these.

Further, since he tends to follow his feelings, it will be pointless and not beneficial for him to listen, since the end is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; for the deficiency is not a matter of time but is due to living and pursuing each thing in accord with feelings. For to people like that, knowledge turns out to be profitless in just the way it does to those who lack self-control.^[각주:10] To those who form their desires and do their actions in accord with reason, however, it would be of great benefit to know about these things.

So much for the prefatory remarks concerning the listener, how our dis cussion is to be received, and what we are proposing to do.

1. perspicuousness:  Perspicuousness (saphêneia) is associated with explanation, which is ultimately from starting-points: “For on the basis of what is truly but not perspicuously stated, we will make progress toward perspicuousness, always sub stituting what is better known for what is usually expressed in a confused way. In each methodical inquiry, arguments stated in a philosophical way differ from those not stated in a philosophical way. That is why even politicians should not regard as peripheral to their work the sort of theoretical knowledge that makes evident not only the that but also the why. For such is the philosophical way in each methodi cal inquiry” (EE 1216b32–40). The same point is made at NE 1098b7–8 by noting that when we have a correct definition of the starting-point of politics, much else will “at the same time become evident (sumphanê) through it.” Saphês and akribês (“exact”) are often equivalent in meaning (Top. 111a8–9). [본문으로]
2. Exactness: (1) “One science is more exact than another, and prior to it, if it is both of the fact and the explanation why, and not of the fact separately from giving the scientific knowledge of the explanation why; or if it is not said of an underlying subject and the other is said of an underlying subject (as, for example, arithmetic is more exact than harmonics); or if it proceeds from fewer things and the other from some additional posit (as, for example, arithmetic is more exact than geometry). By ‘from an additional posit’ I mean, for example, that a unit is a substance with out position and a point is a substance with position—the latter proceeds from an additional posit” (APo. 87a31–37). (2) “We should not demand the argumentative exactness of mathematics in all cases but only in the case of things that involve no matter” (Met. 995a14–16). As applied to craftsmen and their products, on the other hand, akribês means “refinement,” “finish,” or “sophistication.” Applied to percep tual capacities, such as seeing or smelling (DA 421a10), it means “discriminating.” Applied to virtue and nature, it may have more to do with accuracy—hitting a target (NE 1106b14–15)—as it may when applied to definitions (1159a3) or distinc tions (1107b15–16) or units of measurement (Met. 1053a1). [본문으로]
3. Accounts: Logos (here “account”) can refer among other things (1) to a word or organized string of words constituting a discussion, conversation, speech, explana tion, argument, definition, principle, reason, or piece of reasoning, or (2) to what such words or their utterances mean, express, or denote, such as the ratio between quantities (1131a31–32), or (3) to the capacity that enables someone to argue, give reasons, and so on (Pol. 1332b5). [본문으로]
4. The adjective kalos is often a term of vague or general commendation (“fine,” “beautiful,” “good”), with different connotations in different contexts: “The contrary of to kalon when applied to an animal is to aischron [“ugly in appear ance”], but when applied to a house it is to mochthêron [“wretched”], and so kalon is homonymous” (Top. 106a20–22). (1) Even in this general sense, however, kalos has a distinctive evaluative coloration suggestive of “order (taxis), proportion (summetria), and determinateness (hôrismenon)” (Met. 1078a36–b1), making a term with aesthetic connotation, such as “beauty,” seem a good equivalent: to bear the stamp of happiness one must have kallos (“noble looks”) as opposed to being “extremely ugly (panaischês)” (NE 1099b3–4; also Pol. 1309b23–25). Moreover, just as a thing need not have a purpose to be beautiful, a kalon thing can be contrasted with a purposeful one: a great-souled person is one “whose possessions are more kalon and profitless (akarpa) than profitable and beneficial” (NE 1125a11–12). At the same time, it seems wrong to associate kalon with beauty in general, since to be kalon a thing has to be on a certain scale: “greatness of soul requires magnitude, just as to have kallos requires a large body, while small people are elegant and well pro portioned but not kaloi” (1123b6–8); “any kalon object . . . made up of parts must not only have them properly ordered but also have a magnitude which is not ran dom. For what is kalon consists in magnitude and order (taxis)” (Po. 1450b34–37; also Pol. 1326a33–34). It is this requirement that makes “nobility” in its more aes thetic sense a closer equivalent than “beauty.” (2) In ethical or political contexts, the canonical application of kalon is to ends that are intrinsically choiceworthy and intrinsically commendable or praiseworthy (epaineton): “Of all goods, the ends are those choiceworthy for their own sake. Of these, in turn, the kalon ones are all those praiseworthy because of themselves” (EE 1248b18–20; also NE 1103a9–10). It is because ethically kalon actions are intrinsically choiceworthy ends that a good person can do virtuous actions because of the actions themselves (NE 1105a32) and for the sake of what is kalon (1115b12–13). What makes such actions choice worthy (1138a18–20) and praiseworthy (1106b24–27), however, is that they exhibit the sort of order (1180a14–18), proportionality (1104a18), and determinateness (1106b29–30, 1170a19–24) that consists in lying in a mean (meson) between two extremes. This brings us full circle, connecting what is ethically kalon to what is aesthetically noble, lending the former too an aesthetic tinge. Finally, what is ethi cally kalon includes an element of self-sacrifice that recommends “nobility,” in its more ethical sense, as a good equivalent for it as well: “It is true of an excellent person too that he does many actions for the sake of his friends and his fatherland, even dying for them if need be. For he will give up wealth, honors, and fought about goods generally, in keeping for himself what is kalon” (1169a18–22). One reason people praise a kalon agent, indeed, is that his actions benefit them: “It is necessary, though, for the greatest virtues to be those that are most useful to oth ers, if indeed virtue is a capacity productive of benefaction. Because of this, people most honor the just and the courageous, since courage is useful to others in war, and justice both in war and in peace” (Rh. 1366b3–7). But since what is kalon is a greater good than those an excellent person gives up or confers on others, there is also a strong element of self-interest in what he does: “The greater good, then, he allocates to himself” (NE 1169a28–29). An excellent person does kalon actions for their own sake, not for an ulterior motive, because it is only as done in that way that they constitute the doing well in action (eupraxia) that is happiness. [본문으로]
5. For the most part: The fact that things in an area of study hold for the most part does not preclude there being a demonstrative science of them (APr. 32b18–22, APo. 87b19–27, Met. 1027a19–21). Theorems of natural sciences hold for the most part (APr. 32b4–8), as do those of ethics or politics (NE 1137b13–19, 1164b31–33). Only strictly theoretical sciences, such as mathematics, astronomy, and theol ogy, have theorems that hold universally and with unconditional necessity (1139b18–24). [본문으로]
6. Well-educated person: (1) “Regarding every sort of theoretical knowledge and every methodical inquiry, the more humble and more estimable alike, there appear to be two ways for the state to be, one that may be well described as sci entific knowledge of the subject matter, the other a certain sort of educatedness. For it is characteristic of a well-educated person to be able to judge accurately what is well said and what is not. For we consider someone who is well educated about the whole of things to be a person of this sort, and we think that being well educated consists in having the capacity to do what was just stated. But in one case, we consider a single individual to have the capacity to judge about (one might almost say) all things, in the other case, about a definite nature; for there might be another person with the same capacity as the one we have been discuss ing but about a part. So it is clear in the case of inquiry into nature too that there must be certain defining marks by reference to which we can appraise its way of proving things, separately from the question of what the truth is, whether thus or otherwise” (PA 639a1–15). (2) “A doctor, however, may be either an ordinary practitioner of the craft, an architectonic one, or thirdly, someone well educated in the craft (for there are people of this third sort in—one might almost say—all crafts. And we assign the task of judging to well-educated people no less than to those who know the craft” (Pol. 1282a3–7). (3) “There are those who, because it seems to be characteristic of the philosopher never to speak at random but rather in accord with argument, often escape notice when they state arguments that are foreign to the thing at issue and empty (sometimes they do this through ignorance, sometimes through boastfulness). By these sorts of arguments even people of experience and clever at doing things end up getting taken in by those who neither have nor are capable of architectonic or practical thought. And they suffer this fate due to lack of educatedness; for lack of educatedness is being incapable of judging arguments proper to the thing at issue from those alien to it” (EE 1216b40–1217a10). (4) “Now, some people do not accept what someone says if it is not stated mathematically, others if it is not based on paradigm cases, while others expect to have a poet adduced as a witness. Again, some want every thing expressed exactly, while others are annoyed by what is exact, either because they cannot string all the bits together or because they regard it as nitpicking; for exactness does have something of this quality, and so just as in business trans actions so also in arguments it seems to have something unfree or ungenerous about it. That is why we should already have been well educated in what way to accept each argument, since it is absurd to look for scientific knowledge and for the way [of inquiry] characteristic of scientific knowledge at the same time—and it is not easy to get hold of either” (Met. 995a6–14). [본문으로]
7. Rhetoric’s end or goal is persuasion (Rh. 1355b26), and “the most controlling means of persuasion” is the enthymeme, which is “a demonstration of a sort” (1355a4–8) whose premises are acceptable beliefs (1355a27–28). A demonstration (apodeixis) proper, by contrast, of the sort that we find in an exact science, is a valid deduction from scientific starting-points, which are definitions of real essences, so that the predicates belong to the sub jects in every case, intrinsically, and universally (APo. 73a24–27). From a math ematician we should expect demonstrations, not persuasive arguments based on acceptable beliefs; from a rhetorician we should expect persuasive arguments, not demonstrations from scientific starting-points. [본문으로]
8. Unconditionally: The adjective haplous means “simple” or “single-fold.” The adverb haplôs thus points in two somewhat opposed directions. To speak haplôs sometimes means to put things simply or in simple terms, so that qualifications and conditions will need to be added later. Sometimes, as here, to be F haplôs means to be F in a way that allows for no ifs, ands, or buts. In this sense, what is F haplôs is F unconditionally speaking, or in the strictest, most absolute, and most unqualified way (Met. 1015b11–12). In this sense, what is unconditionally F is what is intrinsically F (NE 1151b2–3). [본문으로]
9. No experience of the actions of life: The prime time (akmê) for a man’s ser vice in the military is that of his body, which is somewhere between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, while the prime time for that of his soul or his capac ity for thought is forty-nine or fifty (Pol. 1335b32–35, Rh. 1390b9–11), and it is not until then that he has the experience required for practical wisdom (Pol. 1328b34–1329a17). [본문으로]
10. Lack of self-control (akrasia)—sometimes referred to as weakness of will or incontinence—is discussed briefly in 1.13 and more fully in 7.1–10 [본문으로]