Aristotle (2024) Nicomachean Ethics 1.5

Aristotle (2024). Nicomachean Ethics. Second Edition. Translated With Introduction and Notes By C. D. C. Reeve Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company

 

1.5 Three sorts of lives

But let us take up our account at the point where we digressed. For peo ple seem (which is not unreasonable) to get their suppositions about the good—that is, happiness—from their lives. Ordinary people, indeed, the most unrefined ones, suppose it to be pleasure. And that is why the life they like is the life of indulgence. For there are three lives that stand out^[각주:1]: the one we just mentioned, the political, and, third, the contemplative (theôrêtikos).^[각주:2]

Ordinary people do seem wholly slavish, because the life they delib erately choose is one that is characteristic of grazing cattle. But they get a hearing for their choice because many of those in positions of authority^[각주:3] feel the same as Sardanapalus.^[각주:4]

Sophisticated people, on the other hand, and doers of action, deliberately choose honor; for it is pretty much the end of the political life. But it is appar ently more superficial than what we are seeking; for it seems to be in the hands of the honorers more than of the honorees, while we divine that the good is something that properly belongs^[각주:5] to us and is difficult to take away. Further, people seem to pursue honor in order to be persuaded that they are good—at any rate, they seek to be honored by practically wise people, among people who know them, and for virtue.^[각주:6] It is clear, then, that according to them, at least, virtue is better.

Maybe one might even suppose that it is more the end of the politi cal life than honor is. But even virtue is apparently too incomplete [as an end]; for it seems possible to have virtue even while sleeping or being inac tive throughout life or while suffering evils and bad luck of the worst sort. Someone who was living like that, however, no one would call “happy” unless he was defending a thesis^[각주:7] at all costs. That is enough about these issues, since they have also been adequately discussed in the works that are in circulation.^[각주:8]

The third life is the contemplative one, which we will undertake to investigate in what follows.

The life of a moneymaker^[각주:9] is in a way forced^[각주:10], and it is clear that wealth is not the good we are seeking; for wealth is useful and for the sake of some thing else. Hence we might be more inclined to suppose that the things already mentioned are the end, since they are liked because of themselves. But they are apparently not the end either—indeed, many arguments have been presented against them. We may, then, set them aside.

1. There are three lives that stand out: “Various lives have been distinguished, and of these some are not among the disputants for this sort of joy, but are taken seri ously only for the sake of necessities—for example, those having to do with the unrefined crafts, and the one having to do with money-making, and the com monplace ones (by ‘unrefined’ I mean those worked at for the sake of reputation only; by ‘commonplace’ I mean the sedentary ones and wage-earning ones; by ‘wealth-acquiring’ I mean the commercial ones related to buying and selling). But because those assigned as conducive to happiness, the ones that were in fact men tioned previously as the greatest of goods for human beings, are three, namely, virtue, practical wisdom, and pleasure, we see that there are three lives that all who have the resources deliberately choose to live—political, philosophical, and that devoted to indulgence. For, of these, the philosophical life tends to be concerned with practical wisdom and theoretical knowledge concerning the truth, the politi cal one with noble actions (for these are the ones that are due to virtue), and the one of indulgence in bodily pleasures” (EE 1215a25–b5). [본문으로]
2. Contemplative: The adjective theôrêtikos is usually translated as “contemplative” when applied, as here, to a type of life or activity (1177a18) in contrast to a practical (praktikos) one or one focused on doing actions, but as “theoretical,” when applied to a type of science or thought (1139a27). While in many ways apt, this opposition is also somewhat misleading. For what makes something practical for Aristotle is that it is appropriately related to praxis or action, considered as an end choicewor thy because of itself, and not—as with our “practical”—that it is opposed to what is theoretical, speculative, or ideal. Hence theoretical activities are more practi cal than those that are widely considered to be most so: “it is not necessary, as some suppose, for practical life to be in relation to other people, nor are those thoughts alone practical that arise for the sake of the consequences of doing an action, rather, much more so are the acts of contemplation and thought that are their own ends and are engaged in for their own sake; for doing well in action (eupraxia) is the end, and so action of a sort is the end too” (Pol. 1325b16–21). If some things are practical because they are useful, effective, or feasible means to some end, others are yet more practical because they further an end by constitut ing it or being identical to it: “But since things are said to be doable in action in two ways (for both the things for whose sake we do an action and the things we do for the sake of these have a share in action—for example, we put both health and wealth among the things doable in action, and also the things we do for the sake of these, the health-producing and wealth-acquiring ones), it is clear that happiness too must be put down as the best for a human being of the things doable in action” (EE 1217a35–40). So even though theoretical wisdom is not intrinsically con cerned with “any of the things from which a human being will come to be happy” (NE 1143b19–20), because it is itself a sort of happiness (10.7), it is much more practical even than the practical wisdom that does contemplate them. [본문으로]
3. Those in positions of authority: The thought is that if powerful people—who can, presumably, live any way they like—choose the life of indulgence, then the major ity have a reason to make the same choice. The views of the powerful about what happiness is are therefore worth considering (1095a30), even if they are finally rejected (1178b33–1179a17). [본문으로]
4. Sardanapalus: An Assyrian king (669–626 BC) whose luxurious lifestyle was leg endary. Aristotle also uses him as an example of this sort at EE 1216a16–19. [본문으로]
5. Properly belongs: Oikeios derives from oikos (“household”), so that what is oikeios to someone belongs to him or is properly his own in the way his family belongs to him or is properly his own. Whether wealth is oikeios or not “depends on who has the power of its disposal, and by ‘disposal’ I mean gift or sale” (Rh. 1361a21–22). [본문으로]
6. Virtue: Anything that has a function (ergon) has a correlative aretê, which enables it to perform that function well. Thus, it is possible to speak of the aretê of thieves, scandalmongers, and other bad things that are good at doing what they do (Met. 1021b12–23), as well as of the aretê of nonliving tools and instruments. For this reason, aretê is nowadays sometimes found translated as “excellence.” One advantage of the familiar translation “virtue,” beyond the fact that it is familiar, is that it preserves the link—however tenuous or robust it may be—with so-called virtue ethics. Human virtue, for its part, is divided into two sorts: virtue of char acter and virtue of thought (NE 1103a4–5). A virtue of character is a “deliberately choosing state, which is in a mean in relation to us, one defined by a reason and the one by which a practically wise person would define it” (1106b37–1107a2). It has different degrees, levels, areas of usefulness, and sorts of activation. Degrees: Virtue of character may be natural, habituated, or full (Pol. 1332a38–b8). Full vir tue involves understanding of the correct end (NE 1144b1–14) and the posses sion of practical wisdom (1144b35–1145a2), whereas natural virtue and habitu ated virtue (1151a18–19) do not. A person with full virtue may fail to do what is virtuous “because of things that overstrain human nature and that no one could endure” (1110a25–26) without compromising his claim to such virtue. Someone with heroic virtue, on the other hand, has a degree of virtue exceeding the ordi nary (1145a18–20). By the same token, greatness of soul (4.3) seems to go beyond an ordinary degree of full virtue, since not every fully virtuous person is virtu ous enough to have it. Levels: Regardless of their degree, some virtues are appar ently at a higher level of excellence, because they are more complete than others: “the human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue and, if there are more virtues than one, then in accord with the best and most complete” (1098a16–18). Areas of usefulness: “Courage and resilience are for unleisure, phi losophy for leisure, and temperance and justice are useful during both, and par ticularly when people remain at peace and are at leisure” (Pol. 1334a22–25), while magnificence requires “great sums” in order to be exercised (NE 1107b17–19). Activations: An activation of a virtue may be unconditional or on the basis of a hypothesis: “By ‘on the basis of a hypothesis’ I mean what is necessary, by ‘uncon ditionally’ I mean those that are done nobly. For in the case of just actions, for example, just penalties and punishments spring from virtue, but are necessary, and their nobly done has the character of necessarily done. For it is a more choicewor thy situation if no man or city needs any such things. By contrast, just actions that aim at honors and prosperity are unconditionally noblest. For the former involve choosing something bad, whereas the latter are the contrary, since they establish and generate good things” (Pol. 1332a10–18). All these features apply to virtues of character regardless of who has them or what sort of constitution their possessor is situated in. But the gender and natural status of their possessor has important con sequences for the sort of virtue he or she can develop and possess in any political constitution: the virtues of men, women, and (natural) slaves are different, because their functions are different (Pol. 1.13). Nonetheless, the constitution gives a dis tinctive shape to that virtue, suiting it to its distinctive conception of happiness and the good life, since it is “by pursuing [happiness] in different ways and by different means each group of people produces different ways of life and different constitu tions” (1328a41–b2). Accessibility: How accessible the virtues of character are to a given person depends in part on the factors just mentioned. This may help explain the different things Aristotle says on the question (focally at Pol. 1332a36–b8). Sometimes he paints a somewhat bleak picture: “It makes no small difference, then, whether people are habituated in one way or in another way straight from childhood; on the contrary, it makes a huge one—or rather, all the difference” (NE 1103b23–25; also 1104b11–13). But ethical improvement, even for those less fortunate in their upbringing, seems to pretty much always be possible (Cat. 13a22–31), provided one is “not disabled in relation to virtue” (NE 1099b18–20). (2) The virtues of thought, which are focally discussed in NE 6, are practical wis dom and theoretical wisdom. The first is the virtue of the deliberative (or ratio nally calculative) sub-part of the part of the soul that has reason: it involves all the virtues of character which cannot be possessed in their full form without it (6.13). The second is the virtue of the scientific sub-part, and is (arguably) “the best and most complete” virtue referred to at 1098a17–18. (3) Virtue and vice as kinds are relatives (Cat. 6b15–16), but the particular virtues (courage, temperance) and vices (cowardice, intemperance) are qualities, as is true of states generally (11a23–32). [본문으로]
7. Thesis: The word thesis may be being used in the technical sense in which a thesis is “a supposition of some eminent philosopher that is contrary to common belief (paradoxos)” (Top. 104b19–20). [본문으로]
8. Works that are in circulation: Works, perhaps by Aristotle, which, like “external accounts,” were available outside the Lyceum. [본문으로]
9. Moneymaker: A chrêmatistês is someone whose life is devoted to accumulating wealth (chrêmata), where wealth is anything whose value is measured by money (nomisma; 1119b26–27). [본문으로]
10. In a way forced: The discussion of actions that occur by force in 1110a1–4, b1–17 requires that their cause lie outside the agent. If that is the idea here, Aristotle may be thinking of the fact that the value of money is conventional and thus lies outside the agent’s own control (Pol. 1257b10–14). Alternatively, since the life of money making is only “in a way” forced, the point may simply be that we do not freely choose money, since we choose it solely as a necessary means to other things, which (as it were) force us to choose it. [본문으로]