2025년 117

Tollefsen (2003) Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility

Perron Tollefsen, D. (2003). Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility. Philosophical Explorations, 6(3), 218–234.In this paper I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in “Freedom and Resentment” (1968). In that paper Strawson at..

Ingram (2020) Guilt feelings and the intelligibility of moral duties

Ingram, Andrew Tice (2020). Guilt feelings and the intelligibility of moral duties. Ratio 33 (1):56-67.According to the dominant view in moral psychology, guilt is a deontic experience. The thought that separates guilt from other negative feelings occasioned by bad deeds, like remorse or shame, is that one has done something wrong, that one has infringed one's obligation. This view is shared by ..

Value Thoery/Ethcis 2025.05.12

Björnsson, Gunn & Hess (2017). Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298.

Björnsson, Gunnar & Hess, Kendy (2017). Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298. 1. IntroductionThere is a growing literature arguing that certain entities embodied by groups of agents—certain “collectives”—themselves qualify as agents; even, some say, as moral agents.1 These are ambitious claims. To be age..

Value Thoery/Ethcis 2025.05.12

Bokek-Cohen, Marey-Sarwan and Tarabeih (2024) Deontological Guilt and Moral Distress as Diametrically Opposite Phenomena: A Case Study of Three Clinicians

Bokek-Cohen, Y. ; Marey-Sarwan, I. & Tarabeih, M. (2024). Deontological Guilt and Moral Distress as Diametrically Opposite Phenomena: A Case Study of Three Clinicians. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 21 (3):449-459. IntroductionThere are a great variety of definitions of the concept of guilt in the professional psychological literature (Tilghman-Osborne, Cole, and Felton 2010), and it can be argue..

Value Thoery/Ethcis 2025.05.12

Collins (2023) Organizations as Wrongdoers. From Ontology to Morality Ch. 4

Collins, Stephanie (2023). Organizations as Wrongdoers. From Ontology to Morality. Oxford: Oxford University. Varieties of Organizational Blameworthiness4.1 IntroductionThis book is titled Organizations as Wrongdoers. So far, I’ve said a lot about organizations, but not much about wrongdoing. The rest of the book changes that.The present chapter defends organizations’ blameworthiness through thr..

Value Thoery/Ethcis 2025.05.07