Pritzl (1994) Opinions as Appearances: Endoxa in Aristotle

Kurt Pritzl (1994) Opinions as Appearances: Endoxa in Aristotle. Ancient Philosophy 14.

 

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With respect to endoxa, those 'reputable' views, that is, those opinions held by all, most, or the wise, Burnyeat 1986, 11 notes: 'Aristotle is unique among ancient philosophers in his respect for people's opinions: both the opinions of other philosophers and the opinions of the ordinary man. He does not defend a "common sense" philosophy in the manner of G.E. Moore, but if something is believed by absolutely everyone, then, he holds, it must be true. Aristotle also does something that a 20th-century philosopher like Moore could never have dared. He establishes sci ence on the basis of the opinions of "the majority" and of "the wise". This is a remarkable authority to recognize in a class of opinions, however widely or elitely held, and Aristotle's thoroughgoing commitment to it is worth Burnyeat's attention.

Burnyeat fails to emphasize, however, a principal way in which Aristotle expresses the authority of endoxa. He ranks them along with sense perceptions as phainomena or appearances, another remarkable fact to which G.E.L. Owen (1961) draws considerable attention. Aristotle claims that phainomena are 'witnesses and paradigms' for inquiry, both with regard to theory construction and confinnation (EE 1216b26-28). In recognition of this authority of phainomena, W.D. Ross in the original Oxford Translation frequently renders the word by the phrase 'observed facts'. This translation commits Aristotle to a factual and objective character for endoxa as phainomena, an ascription that on the face ofit suits the authority which Aristotle seems to see in them.

The rendering 'observed facts' does not survive revision, however. Barnes replaces it with the English 'phenomena', perhaps to make the rendering. more litera!. Yet, it may not be a coincidence that Barnes and many others find no fac tual eharaeter in endoxa speeifieally or phainomena generally. Barnes in an arti eIe ehampioning his new translation of endoxon deseribes phainomena as 'the things that seem to be the ease', explieitly stipulating against a 'phenomenologi ca!' or 'veridieal' sense.4 This stipulation is based on Barnes' views about the nature ofAristotle's eritieal method regarding endoxa, not on a study ofinstanees ('And indeed, the methodwhieh Aristotle outlines would make little sense on the supposition that ta phainomena were established facts.' [1980, 491]). Others besides Barnes think this eritieal method a proeess of testing or eertifieation of endoxa. C.C.W. Taylor (1990, 131) gives typieal expression to this view of 'a method of eritieal inquiry, exemplified by Aristotle's own proeedure, whieh seeks to identify the most plausible prineiples and to establish their credentials by as far as possible removing objeetions and eliminating apparent ineonsisten eies between them' (emphasis added). Thus endoxa, as phainomena that estab lish seience, must themselves be established.

I shall argue against penurious endoxa in need of approbation by a critieal method. Indeed, how can they be so when Aristotle in so many places accords to phainomena or appearanees, including endoxa, an authority for rational inquiry appropriate to the factual: phainomena are what must be accounted for by investigation and what confirm or refute theories? The interpretation offered here reeognizes in Aristotelian phainomena, including endoxa, what Ross reeognizes-a factual or objcetive charaeter. This interpretation also appreciates, however, the approach to Aristotelian endoxa opened up by Barnes' translation of endoxon as 'reputable', a translation based on the glory, eminence, and good repute of a person, which the adjective endoxon denotes in its ordinary usage (1980, 499).

There is no denying, however, the countervailing considerations that seem to indicate a merely tentative and provisional character for endoxa incompatible with what counts as factual or objective. Endoxa are opinions. They are the start ing-points of dialectic, not demonstration (Top. 100a29-b21, 105b30-31; Meta. 995b23-24; APr. 65a35-37; APo. 72a5-11, 81bI8-23; SE 175a31-33; Ge 318b27-28; Rhet. 1355aI7-18, 1365a37-b1). They can be false and can be more or less endoxic (APr. 70b4-6; APo. 81b18-23; Top. 161b28, b37, 162b27, 160a13-14; SE 181a16-17, 183a38). Aristotle's methodological remarks some times sound inquisitorial [캐묻는] and in practice Aristotle's actual method often seems to disrespect the plain meaning of the subject endoxa, whether common opinions or expert ones. These countervailing considerations mean for many interpreters devalued endoxa and phainomena, even perceptual phainomena.

The present study aims (1) to accept at face value what Aristotle says about the weight and authority of endoxa as phainonzena, and (2) to argue that generally Aristotelian endoxa as phainomena have an objective factual character appropriate to this authority. This project includes (1) affirming the general reputability of endoxa by accounting for the occasional or limited defectibility or default of endoxa, and of phainomena generally, that Aristotle acknowledges when he remarks on false endoxa, endoxa marked by degrees, perceptual error, and so on; and (2) clarifying the nature of the critical method(s) that Aristotle discusses and applies to endoxa in order to articulate rather than establish them. If this project is successful, it shows how Aristotle considers both sense perceptions and certain opinions equally to be phainomema-that is, appearances as displays of the real-without conflating them.

 

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(3) The partial or obscure truth of endoxa requires articulation or explication through a critical process of supplying a 8to'tt; but articulation or explication is not verification or certification. (4) The partial or obscure truth of unarticulated or unexplicated endoxa accounts for the many apparent inconsistencies, puzzles, and problems which the endoxa relevant to a topic occasion. (5) The ö'tt-Öto'tt distinction is flexibly used by Aristotle. The ö'tt can designate phainomena quite different in kind ranging from sense perceptions, to common opinions, to expert opinions, for which the 8to'tt can be found in correspondingly different ways. (6) Aristotle is not a skeptic regarding sense perception. Sense perception does not have to earn its credibility, though it can lose it and does so in individual anomalous cases. Analogously, endoxa need not earn but can lose credibility in particular cases.

In Topics i 1 Aristotle contrasts endoxa with the true and primary starting points of demonstrative syllogisms. The point of this contrast, as Alexander of Aphrodisias confirms, has to do with the primary character of demonstrative principles, and not with their truth (1891, 18.10-19.27, especially 19.22-23, cf. Suidae lexicon 1931, 274). What Aristotle specifically chooses to say about demonstrative principles in the passage (a passage where the kinds of deduction are introduced 'in order to grasp dialectical deduction', 100a22-23) indicates this. He explains that it is not necessary to seek a 'why' for demonstrative principles, and the implication is that seeking a 'why' is necessary for endoxa ('for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why and wherefore of them', 100bI9-21).

The possibility of determining a reason or cause for endoxa distinguishes them from the starting points of demonstration, but the 'that' of endoxa is not at issue. Later in Topics i Aristotle notes that one who doubts the truth that the gods are to be honored or that parents are to be loved needs castigation, not argument, just as one who doubts the truth that snow is white needs perception, not argument (105a5-7).

These three phainomena, two of which are endoxa and one of which is a perceptual phainomenon, are not subject to dispute at the level of 'that'. That each is the case is a matter for moral discernment, whose lack calls for chastisement, or a matter for sense perception, whose lack cannot be supplied in any other way.

신을 경배해야 한다는 것
부모를 사랑해야 한다는 것 (엔독사)
눈이 희다는 것 (감각적 phainomenon)
이 세 가지는 각각 도덕적 분별(moral discernment)이나 감각 지각(sense perception)의 대상이며, 그 결여는 단순한 논증으로 보완될 수 없다. 여기서 중요한 점은 이 세 가지 파이노메나(phainomena)—두 개의 엔독사와 하나의 감각적 파이노메나—모두 "그것이 그러하다(τὸ ὅτι)"는 점에서는 논쟁의 대상이 아니라는 것이다.

Why each is the case, however, is a distinct matter and a compelling one, when, for example, honoring the gods seems to conflict with loving one's parents.

 

Endoxa, as the opening of the Topics reveals, present that which is the case, but that which is the case is given in a way such that a reason, cause, or how can be sought for it. Endoxa, in other words, have a depth to them, a background. Aris tode makes this very point when he discusses the difference between eristic and dialectic (Top. 100b23-101a4). One type of eristic [논쟁의] reasoning begins from apparent but not real or genuine endoxa. The difference between a genuine endoxon and an apparent but not genuine endoxon does not pertain to truth and falsity. It pertains, rather, to whether the phantasia (100b27-28) or presentation that constitutes the endoxon in question is exhausted or not when it is beheld or entertained.

Genuine endoxa carry an import or meaning, a 'why and wherefore', that is not given in their own presentation. The why and how can be sought. The merely apparent endoxon, however, is not a real endoxon because it lacks this depth. The revised Oxford translation puts the cruciallines (100b26-29) in this way: 'For none of the opinions which we call reputable show their character (phantasia) entirely on the surface, as happens in the case of the principles of contentious arguments'.

One need only grant that genuine endoxa are sometimes true, to see that the phantasia of a genuine endoxon is not in every case an 'illusion' or 'illusory appearance', but a character or presentation. This description of the character of endoxa associates them with the ött or 'that' in relation to a ÖtOtt or 'why' in the holding of them, a why that can be sought. It is a description that conforms to Aristotle's actual use of endoxa in the corpus.

A good number of instances can be cited where endoxa are explicitly or implicitly correlated with the 'that', and where, in the same passage, Aoyot or arguments relevant to these endoxa are alluded to or given.11 One of the func tions ofdialectical 't01tot is to provide means for discerning the why or how ofan endoxon, and to set forth the way in which the endoxon is true.12 This aspect of dialectical practice in Aristotle is not far removed from Socratic dialectical prac tice. In Republic i Socrates examines with Polemarchus a saying ofSimonides in order to discover not whether the saying is true but first what it truly means and then why it is true (331d-335e). Aristotle treats endoxa in the same way. They are taken as true, that is, as the facts of the matter, but the sense of their truth may need to be discovered and the reason for it shown. At Nicomachean Ethics i 4.1095a30-b13 Aristotle alludes to the Platonic distinction between arguments from and to the first principles. He notes that ethical studies begin from what is familiar to the student, that is, from the 'facts' (to ött, 1095b5), that the properly habituated student already possesses in independence of the reasons (tou Ötott) that may be offered for them.

Aristotle permits much in seeking the 'why' of an endoxon. In league with his association of endoxa with the Ött in Ött-Ötott settings is his doctrine of partial or obscure truth. Aristotle holds that what is partially true, vaguely true, or obscurely true is, nevertheless, true. The search for the 'why' extracts the how and what ofthe truth ofthe endoxon. The results ofthis extraction may even sur prise those who hold the endoxon in question. In many cases when Aristotle explains the way in which a sage's maxim or an endoxon of the many is true, he provides an account that the many or even the sage might not recognize or acknowledge.This is fair play, and in this respect Aristotle's account does not require, as common sense philosophies do, that the common sense understanding of the endoxon be maintained (Madden 1983, 24). Theories or explanations that destroy the endoxa, however, are unacceptable. The endoxa, however vague or obscure, abide at the level ofthe 'that' as a check on theory.

Many accounts of Aristotle's method of endoxa miss this point. Barnes 1980, 491-493, 502-505, for example, interprets methodological passages like Nico machean Ethics 1145b2-7 as mandating a critical process ofemendation and sub stitution from an originally given set ofobscure endoxa relevant to a study. Such an approach faBs to recognize the ött-OtÜ'tt relationship between endoxa, on the one hand, and the process of explicating them, on the other, and it gives up the crucial feature that the original endoxa persist as witnesses to what theories say about them. As Cooper 1988, 546-547 points out, Aristotle 'insists that philo sophical theory must ultimately be answerable to [endoxa] (in some way or other)'. For instance, the endoxon ofthe many that the happy life is caught up in pleasure is common in the perjorative sense of the word, but however base this endoxon may be, any theoretical account of happiness that excludes pleasure must be false. How expert accounts ofhappiness incorporate pleasure may differ considerably, but that it must be accommodated is not at issue (EN 1095b33 1096a2).

After Aristotle discusses the problems and perplexities arising from the endoxa on weakness of will he states that '[o]f some such kind are the difficulties that arise; some of these points must be refuted and the others left in possession of the field; the solution ofthe difficulty is the discovery ofthe truth' (1146b6-8). Some take this passage to indicate that endoxa are indeed tested for their truth and either refuted or established. The text does not necessarily say, however, that endoxa are refuted or left standing. As Gauthier and Jolif point out, the sense is that the difficulties, not the endoxa, are resolved or are left standing unresolved.18 This passage is not an unambiguous statement by Aristotle that endoxa are refuted, and this passage along with the opening methodological remarks in Nicomachean Ethics vii 1 do not imply that refutation of endoxa is an ordinary feature of the method based on endoxa.

Aristotle allows that it may not be possible to prove or show all the endoxa in this way and to leave all of them standing. In the context of all other relevant phainomena an inability to find a Ötott for an endoxon would be grounds for rejecting it. In On Divination in Sleep, for instance, Aristotle allows weight to the endoxon ofthe many that dreams have prophetie power, and yet he also acknowl edges that the evidence ofmany other phainomena and ofmuch scientific theory weighs against this and asserts that if a reason or cause cannot be found for this endoxon ofthe many, then it may be rejected (462b18-28). He manages to find a reason or cause for a form ofprophetie power through dreams, that preserves the endoxon in a highly specialized and naturalistic sense

In cases, however, where comprehensive 'proving' ofthe relevant phainomena fails, the greater number and the most authoritative are to be maintained. This prescription is no different from that which applies in cases of anomalous sense perception. Endoxa, like perceptual phainomena, are to be considered reliable unless they are established to be otherwise.

Just as sense perception does not need to earn its credibility, though in instances it can lose it, so endoxa need not earn their credibility, though in instances they can be discredited.

Aristotle can maintain this analogous situation between perceptual phainomena and endoxa because of his recognition that what is partially or vaguely true is true and by his application of the ött-ÖtOtt distinction to endoxa and their reasons. Thus various dialectical topoi can display the way in which a partial, obscure, or vague truth is true.

As Aristotle points out, this critical method ofendoxa makes ofan inquirer an arbitrater or arbiter (Ötattllt"c;) rather than a judge (ÖtKacrt"c;). An arbitrater confers with others and makes all possible distinctions in judgment to assure an equitable consideration ofall sides ofan issue. A judge ought not to do this but to issue an unqualified verdict of yes or no, true or false (Rhet. 1374b20-23; Pol. 1268b4-22). Aristotle cites this arbitration explicitly at Physics iii 6 as he consid ers the conflicting phainomena regarding the existence ofthe infinite. He writes that 'an arbiter must be called in; and clearly there is a sense in which the infinite exists and another in which it does not' (206a12-14). Doing justice to Aris totelian endoxa and all phainomena is a matter ofequity through arbitration.

The case presented here for a factual or objective character for phainomena in general and endoxa in particular-for 'observed facts' as Ross puts it-has not considered any deeper justification that Aristotle might have for such a position. Thus it says nothing about (1) why endoxa tend to be true and (2) why what is true tends to give itself to humans in perception and some forms ofbelief. To show that this is the case for Aristotle is enough showing for now.