소요의 철학 아카이브

Susan Stryker (2006). (De)Subjugated Knowledges An Introduction to Transgender Studies. Most broadly conceived, the fi eld of transgender studies is concerned with anything that disrupts, denaturalizes, rearticulates, and makes visible the normative linkages we generally assume to exist between the biological specifi city of the sexually diff erentiated human body, the social roles and sta tuses..

Lakey, Heather (2020). The Many, the Wise, and the Marginalized: The Endoxic Method and The Second Sex. Hypatia 35 (2):317-335.In this article I argue that The Second Sex (Beauvoir 1949/2011) instantiates a version of the endoxic method, a philosophical strategy most commonly attributed to Aristotle (see, for example, Barnes 1980; Nussbaum 1986; Scott 2015; Shields 2016; Davia 2017). Simply put,..

Bettcher, Talia Mae (2019). What Is Trans Philosophy? Hypatia 34 (4):644-667.The question “What is trans philosophy?” is therefore timely. This article considers it from a place of long-standing engagement, of seeing some things change and others stay the same. The article has a historical sensibility as well as a practical, political one as I see the increased visibility of trans philosophy in ..

Saba Bazargan-Forward (2022) Authority, Cooperation, and Accountability. Oxford University Press. At its most basic level practical agency can be divided broadly into deliberative [심의하는] and executory [실행상의] functions. The former is the process by which candidate options are evaluated and selected, and the latter the process by which the selected candidate options are implemented.deliberative fu..

Chiara Lepora and Robert Goodin. On Complicity and Compromise (2013).  Ch. 5 Responsibility for Complicity A Minimum Threshold In this chapter we will address fundamental philosophical issues concerning what is required, by way of action and intention, in order to vest someone with moral responsibility. In the language of the law, ‘actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea’: ‘an action does not ma..

Isaacs, Tracy (2011). Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 5. Collective Obligation, Individual Obligation, and Individual Moral ResponsibilityI turn my attention to a more forward-looking relative of responsibility, namely, obligation.Even if they are the result of the cumulative impact of human behavior, these harms are not the products of collective ac..

2025-1 Seminar Ethics Individual Responsibility for (and in) Collective Wrongs 1. The Overview of Chapter 4So far, Isaacs has developed accounts of collective moral responsibility, according to which there are irreducible collective notions, such as collective intention, action, agent, and guilt. From this consideration, she has made a distinction between responsibility at the individual level a..

Isaacs, Tracy (2011). Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 4. Individual Responsibility for (and in) Collective WrongsThe view developed so far—that collective intention, collective action, and collective moral responsibility operate at the level of collectives—suggests that individuals are not responsible for collective actions as such. Specifically, it ..

Isaacs, Tracy (2011). Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 3. Collective Guilt If collectives are the sorts of things that can be morally responsible, then there is a sense in which they can be guilty, too.“Guilt” is an ambiguous term, so let me begin by stating that I understand guilt as blameworthy moral responsibility. An agent is guilty when she or he..

Isaacs, Tracy (2011). Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  2 Collective Moral Responsibility In the previous chapter, I distinguished between two kinds of collectives capable of intentional action—organizations and goal-oriented collectives. I gave an account of their respective intentional structures as a means of giving substance to the claim that coll..