Nieuwenburg (1999) Aristotle and the appearances

Nieuwenburg, Paul (1999). Aristotle and the appearances. Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (4):551-573.

1.

One of Owen's arguments surrounding the interpretation is widely thought to remove, in a quite definite way, all doubt of the ambiguous term ta phainomena, usually rendered 'the appearances,' as it figures in one of Aristotle's reflections on 'the methods of ethics.'

Here as in other cases we must set down [tithentas] the phainomena and begin by consider- ing the difficulties [diaporgsantas], and so go on to vindicate if possible all the common conceptions [ta endoxa] about these states of mind [per/tauta tapathe'], or at any rate most of them and the most important; {for when both the difficulties are solved and the endoxa are left [kataleipgta,], it would have been proven sufficiently [dedeigmenon hikands].} (EN 1 x45be-7)

Owen argues that W. D. Ross' 'empiricist' construal of the term phainomena ('observed facts') cannot be consistently maintained in a dialectical examina- tion of beliefs on moral matters--and we shall presently see why this should be so. Indeed, the term must be systematically ambiguous, referring to 'hard' empirical data in one context (notably APr 46a~o) and to endoxa (or legomena [EN 1 145b2o] ), i.e., 'common conceptions' in the other.

As a consequence, the method outlined in this passage would look like this. First, you have to assemble and present a collection of beliefs (tithenai ta phainomena) on the relevant subject-matter. Since it is most likely that tensions will disfigure the set of encloxa you have garnered, you must, second, by way of preliminary exercise 'go through the perplexities' (diaporein) they raise, in order to pinpoint the inconsistencies and infelicities barring the way to endoxic coherence. The removal of these frictions will result in a 'maximal consistent subset' of endoxa on the matter, namely, when the perplexities (aporiai), or difficulties (duskherg), are solved. Sufficient proof has been given when all, most, or the most important (kun6tata) endoxa reappear in this final set. "And then? And then nothing: your philosophical task is over.

The intersubstitutability of 'appearances' (phainomena) and 'reputable be liefs' (as I prefer to render endoxa)5 is buttressed by a fairly general consensus in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship. Many authors assume that in the text under consideration and, in its wake, in certain other ethical contexts, both terms have the same reference, without, however, being synonymous. 6 Henceforth, I shall label this assumption (I) (for 'intersubstitutability assump- tion'), covering both Owen's conclusion and the argument leading up to it, on the obvious supposition that espousing the conclusion entails a commitment to the validity of the argument. Against all appearances, however, (I) is not as foolproof as its widespread acclaim suggests. Although extensions of (I) to other methodological contexts in Aristotle's ethical writings (in particular EE 1214b28- a ~ 15 a) prejudice a due understanding of Aristotelian ethics, the point is, I believe, worth arguing in its own right.

In what follows, I shall first lay bare a 'perplexity' latent in (I). It will emerge that its premises do not as firmly support the conclusion as it has seemed to many writers. Therefore, I shall not side with those who take for granted that it has been conclusively shown that the phainomena cannot possibly be 'observed' or 'evident facts'; which means that I shall not endorse (I). Since (I) is levelled at Ross' 'observed facts,' I pass on the onus of proof to its adherents.

 

2.

(I) goes on two legs. First, taking the verb tithenai in the expression which gives the title to his article to mean 'to set out,' Owen claims that what Aristotle actually proceeds to 'set out' are endoxa (=legomena [1145b~o]) on the subject; and these "turn out as so often to be partly matters of linguistic usage or, if you prefer, of the conceptual structure revealed by language." This pleads for the intersubstitutability of phainomena and endoxa (= legomena). As the bracketing makes clear, my chief grudge concerns the referential equation of the first two terms, and I shall leave the third in peace.

Second, both the fact that Socrates' position, to the effect that "those who act against their own conviction of what is best do so in ignorance," 'plainly contradicts' (amphisMtein) the phainomena (1145b~3-8 ) and that Aristotle even- tually retains this position (i 147b13-7) conjointly show that the phainomena cannot be 'observed facts,' but must be "what would commonly be said on the subject."8

Endoxa are the things which are believed [ta dokounta] by either all, or most, or the wise [tois sophois], and by all, most, or the most familiar [Fndnmoi] and endoxoi of those [i.e., the wise]. (Top loob21-3).

On the one hand, inclusion of SOR in the reference of endoxa throws doubt on the translation we started with. Even if we, with writers like Sidgwick, gloss 'common beliefs' as the beliefs of 'reflective' or 'educated' persons, we should point out that 'common beliefs' or 'common conceptions' are misnomers in terms of the Topics characterization?' For this perfectly allows for counterintuitive and uncommon beliefs to be endoxa, and SOR, therefore, need not meet with general acceptance, not even among the intellectual elite, to achieve this status.

Socrates' reputation in itself seems to warrant examination of his views on ethical matters. 1~ It should be recorded that Aristotle conceives of Socrates mainly as a moralphilosopher (Met 987b1-~; lo78b17-8; PA 642a28-3o ). The 'wise' (sophoi) figuring in the characterization of endoxa need not be those who have sophia in the sense of 'first philosophy' as familiar from the Metaphysics. They may be the experts, the most outstanding and sagacious representatives of their disciplines, who are 'wise' in a particular respect (kata meros). 'Wisdom' in this sense is what Aristotle calls the 'excellence of art' (aretg tekhnds) (EN a141a9-1o; Top lo4a14-5; 33-7), but it emerges that this qualification also extends to the model sciences of mathematics and geometry (EN 1142a12-8 ). So if one may be wise with respect to mathematics and sculpture, why not with respect to ethics?