Devereux (1986) Particular and Universal in Aristotle's Conception of Practical Knowledge

Devereux, Daniel T. (1986). Particular and Universal in Aristotle's Conception of Practical Knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 39 (3):483 - 504.

Aristotle thought his predecessors in general, and Plato in particular, made a serious mistake in failing to mark the boundaries separating the different sciences and branches of philosophical in quiry. All of them failed to grasp the fundamental distinction between practical and theoretical knowledge. Ethics and politics, the prime examples of practical knowledge, differ from such theoretical sciences as metaphysics and physics not only in their aims but in their methods and subject matter as well. Indeed, Aristotle thinks the differences are such that we cannot regard practical and theoretical knowledge as two species of a single genus, for there is no common definition of knowledge which applies to both.

If we look at Plato's middle dialogues, especially the Republic, from Aristotle's vantage point, it will appear that ethics and meta physics have been brought together in an unnatural union, the sci ence of "dialectic." The form of the good serves a double function: it is the first principle of ethics, and also the foundation of meta physics insofar as it is the basis of our understanding of reality as such. Platonic dialectic is a confusing blend of the practical and theoretical. Questions about value and how we ought to act are not regarded as different in kind from questions about the ultimate na ture of reality. The same method of treatment is apparently ap propriate for both types of question

"Wisdom" is the name Plato gives to this highest form of knowledge which is at once practical and theoretical. My aim in this paper is to see how Aristotle separates out of this Platonic mixture his own special concept of practical wisdom. He eventually came to believe that action is both the goal and the subject matter of practical wisdom; and since action is concerned with particulars, practical wisdom must be primarily about particulars rather than universals.

We must try to clarify what Aristotle means by these claims. But I also want to say something about how he arrived at his final position; as we shall see, his break with Plato was a gradual process. The notion of practical knowledge did not spring up all at once, fully formed; there was a time when he thought practical knowledge was much like theoretical, the only important contrast being the different aims of each.

The aim or goal of a theoretical science is simply the knowledge to be gained. Aristotle recognizes that such knowledge might have important practical applications, but to pursue it for the sake of these applications would betray a misunderstanding of the nature and value of a theoretical science. An analogous misunderstanding would be involved in the pursuit of practical knowledge for the sake of the knowledge by itself. Here the end is not knowledge, but what we can do with it: we pursue the knowledge for the sake of action.

A second, perhaps more elusive, contrast between practical and theoretical knowledge has to do with subject matter. Theoretical sciences like physics and mathematics are concerned with necessary objects, with things "whose principles cannot be other than they are."3 Practical knowledge, on the other hand, is concerned with the variable and contingent; since such knowledge is practical, it is concerned with actions in particular circumstances, and here there is "much diversity and fluctuation."4 Aristotle is fond of pointing out that actions are concerned with particulars) this means that practical knowledge, because of its focus on action, will also be char acteristically concerned with particulars. The theoretical sciences, by contrast, are confined to universals.

"Particulars" are always contrasted with "universals," but the contrast is not always the same. In some contexts Aristotle has in mind a distinction within the class of universals or types: a "par ticular" is a specific type, a "universal" is a more general type.6 In other contexts, however, the contrast is clearly between types and individuals: "particulars" are individuals, "universals" are types.7 The particulars which are the concern of practical knowledge might therefore be understood in either of these two ways. Knowledge of particulars, for example, could be understood as knowledge of the specific types of action appropriate for specific types of situation: "situations of this type call for such and such action." Or, it could be understood as knowledge of individual acts and circumstances: "this situation I find myself in calls for this particular response." Let us look at some of the relevant passages about practical knowl edge to see which of these two alternatives seems to fit best.

Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals only?it must also know particulars (ra nad' eKaara), for it is practical, and practice [action, 7rp??ts] is concerned with particulars. That is why in other fields too some who do not know (ovk eldores) are more effective in action than those who know?they (the former) have experience. For if a man knew that light meats are easy to digest and wholesome, but did not know which sorts of meat are light, he will not produce health, but the man who knows that chicken is wholesome is more likely to produce health. Now practical wisdom is practical; hence one should have both [knowl edge of universals and knowledge of particulars], or the latter even more than the former. (1)

Since actions are concerned with particulars, and practical knowledge or wisdom is practical, it must concern itself with par ticulars?even more than with universals. To support this point, Aristotle sets up a contrast between someone who knows the uni versal but not the particular (he knows that light meats are whole some but not that chicken is a light meat) and someone who knows the particular but not the universal (that chicken is wholesome but not that light meats are wholesome). The latter, he says, will be more effective in action than the former: he will be more able to produce health. As John Cooper has pointed out, the example we are given of "knowledge of a particular" here is the awareness that chicken is wholesome; in other words, the particular in question is a specific type, not an individual.9 Cooper tries to show that, in general, when Aristotle speaks of particulars (ra Kad9 enaara) in connection with action he is referring to specific types rather than individuals.10 But this general claim seems to be refuted by the following passage which comes just a page after (1)

2) An indication of the truth of what has been said is the fact that while the young can become geometers and mathematicians and wise in matters like these, it is thought that they cannot be prac tically wise. The reason is that practical wisdom is concerned [not only with universals, but] also with particulars {ra Kad' eKaara) which become known through experience, and a young person is inexperienced for experience re quires a good deal of time. . . .Further, error in deliberation may be either about the universal or about the particular (ro Kad' Kao~rov); we may fail to know either that all water that is heavy is unwholesome or that this is heavy. That practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge (eTTLo-rrjfirj) is evident; for it is concerned with the ultimate (rqv eaxarov), as has been said, since the thing to be done (ro irpaKrov) is of this nature.

What counts as universal knowledge in this passage is the knowledge that all heavy water is unwholesome; knowledge of the particular is the awareness that this (water) is heavy. The use of the demonstrative suggests that a particular sample of water is being referred to, i.e. an individual instance of heavy water rather than a specific type. But Cooper points out in defense of his view that Aristotle sometimes uses demonstrative pronouns to refer to specific types, and he argues that this is a better way of reading the passage since it makes it consistent with passage (1) where "par ticular" clearly refers to a specific type, not an individual.

According to Cooper's view, then, Aristotle's distinction between universal and particular in these passages is a distinction between generic and specific types rather than between types and individuals. However, the final sentence of passage (2) seems to pose an imme diate problem for this interpretation. Aristotle tells us that prac tical wisdom is not scientific knowledge (eirLarrj/jir]), since it is con cerned with the ultimate or particular. He is pretty clearly ap pealing to his doctrine that enLarrjprj is concerned only with universals, that there is no eTciarripri of the particular.13 And this is usually understood as the denial that we can have scientific knowledge of individuals.14 Given this doctrine, the final sentence of passage (2) will naturally be understood as the claim that practical wisdom cannot be scientific knowledge since it is concerned with individuals and there is no scientific knowledge of the individual.

So the sentence at the end of passage (2), with its appeal to the doctrine that there can be no scientific knowledge of particulars, poses a serious difficulty for Cooper's interpretation. The sentence pretty clearly indicates that Aristotle, at the very least, means to include individuals among the things he here calls "particulars."16 We find some confirmation of this conclusion in several passages outside the Ethics in which Aristotle discusses universals and par ticulars and their relationship to action. For instance, there is the well known passage at the beginning of the Metaphysics in which he distinguishes art from experience

(3) With a view to action experience seems in no way inferior to art (rexvy))> and we even see men of experience having more success than those who have theory (Xoyos) but lack experience; the reason is that experience is knowledge of particulars (yvucns roov Kad' eKaarov) while art is of universals, and actions and productions are all concerned with the particular; for the doctor does not cure man, except incidentally (Kara aviuL?e?rjKos), but rather Callias or Socrates or some other individual referred to in this way who happens to be a man.17 If, then, a man has the theory but lacks experience, and knows the universal but not the particular con tained in this, he will often fail to cure: for it is the particular (ro KaO' eKaarov) that is to be cured

The "untutored empiric," the man with experience but lacking the art of medicine, is able to cure certain individuals because of what he knows about them. What he knows, e.g. about Socrates and Callias, is not just who they are; he knows certain facts about them, and these facts are in a way general: he knows not just that Socrates was once sick with symptoms A, and a certain treatment was effective, but that this happened a number of times.19 In other words, he has noticed that there is a regular connection between symptoms A, treatment B, and recovery of health for a given indi vidual or group of individuals. It is this sort of regular connection that Aristotle apparently has in mind when he speaks of "knowledge of particulars" in this passage. The content of the knowledge is in a way general, but also particular insofar as it involves reference to one or more specific individuals. Hence it is clear that in these passages discussing the relationship of particulars to action, Aris totle is not restricting "knowledge of particulars" to knowledge of specific types.

It may be helpful at this juncture to summarize some of the points we have touched on in examining Aristotle's comparisons of medicine and practical wisdom. We have seen that theoretical knowledge may be contrasted with two different kinds of practical knowledge. A theoretical science is aimed at knowledge for its own sake, and is concerned exclusively with universals. Arts like med icine and rhetoric share with the theoretical sciences the restriction of subject matter to universals, but they are practical in that their aim is not knowledge but what can be done or produced with the knowledge. These arts form a part of the knowledge possessed by skillful doctors or rhetoricians; in addition, they will possess what Aristotle calls "knowledge of particulars," a knowledge based on experience which enables them to apply their universal knowledge to particular situations. Practical knowledge of this sort differs from both theoretical science and practical sciences or arts like medicine and rhetoric in that its subject matter is not restricted to universals; it is equally concerned-or perhaps even more con cerned-with particulars. It is like practical sciences in being aimed at action rather than knowledge, but it is also practical in the stron ger sense of being efficacious in action. Practical wisdom, in Aris totle's view, is not a practical science like medicine or rhetoric; it is more like medical or rhetorical skill: it is an instance of practical knowledge. The science of politics, of which ethics is a part, would seem to have the same relationship to practical wisdom that the science of medicine has to medical skill

The universals which form the subject matter of a theoretical science are not regarded as imprecise; on the contrary, it is the particular or individual which is indeterminate and imprecise.42 If there are discrepancies between the universals and the particulars falling under them, the defect is on the side of the particulars. In the case of practical knowledge it is just the reverse: it is the uni versals that are indeterminate and imprecise while the judgments about particular acts in particular circumstances are precise and determinate. If there is a discrepancy between the particular judg ment of the practically wise person and a universal rule which ap plies to the situation, the defect is on the side of the universal; it is the particular judgment that is authoritative.

It is also worth noting the different sorts of contribution made by experience in the theoretical and practical spheres. In a theo retical science like physics, experience has the single role of serving as the stepping stone to our grasp of universals. In practical knowl edge, experience has not only this role but also the more important one of providing a grasp of the salient features of particular situ ations in which decisions are to be made. The knowledge of partic ulars provided by experience "completes" practical knowledge, as suring that it achieves its end in action.

In the NE, there are two chief intellectual virtues instead of one: "philosophical wisdom" (aocfria), which is the theoretical knowl edge of the eternal, unchanging principles of the cosmos, and "prac tical wisdom" ((t)poP7](ns), knowledge of the good for man combined with the ability to achieve it both for individuals and for commu nities.63 Plato's single intellectual virtue of (ppoprjais has been split into two, one part theoretical and the other practical, and Aristotle uses the term (?)poP7](ns for the specifically practical part. The con ception of (t)poP7](ns which we find in the NE is clearly quite different from Plato's