Bostock (2000) Aristotle’s methods in Ethics.

Bostock, D. 2000. Aristotle’s methods in Ethics. In Aristotle’s Ethics. By D. Bostock, 214–235. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. Provides a good overview of the debate over dialectic and first principles in EN, especially the claims of Barnes 1980 and Irwin 1981.

Chapter X Aristotle’s methods in ethics

1. Dialectic

One of Aristotle’s clearest and most explicit statements of method in the Ethics is at the beginning of book VII, introducing his discussion of akrasia. The passage runs:

We must, as with other issues, first set out what appears to be the case and go through the puzzles that arise, and then demonstrate as far as is possible all the common opinions on what happens in this case, or if not then the majority of them and the most important. For if the difficulties are resolved, and the common opinions are left standing, it will have been demonstrated sufficiently. (1145°2-7)'

3. Aristotle's basic principles

A first attempt to list the basic principles of Aristotle’s ethics, the main claims which form a framework for all the rest, might yield something like this:

1. The supreme good for man is eudaimonia.
2. Eudaimonia is an activity of the rational part of the soul, performed with virtue (excellence).
3. There are two relevant kinds of virtue (i.e. virtues of the rational part), namely virtues of character and virtues of intellect.
4. Virtue of character is a disposition to feel (and to act) that is ‘in a middle relative to us’, that involves choice, and is determined by practical reason.
5. There are two (relevant)” virtues of intellect, namely the virtues of practical reason and of theoretical reason.
6. The task of practical reason is to determine what actions will achieve the supreme good for man, eudaimonia.”
7. The task of theoretical reason is to discover the necessary and eternal truths.
8. The supreme good for man, eudaimonia, is the contemplation of the truths revealed by theoretical reason.

Presumably a list of basic (or ‘first’) principles should not include those that are deduced from others. So presumably it should not include (8), since Aristotle certainly offers to deduce it. But when we consider the premisses to his deduction, it is clear that they go beyond those already listed in (1)—(7). The more important of them are these: (a) The highest virtue is that of theoretical reason. (b) Eudaimonia is the only thing pursued for its own sake, and contemplation is the only thing pursued for its own sake. (c) The good for man is special to what is really distinctive about man, and a man is his theoretical reason. (d) The gods enjoy eudaimonia, and their only activity is contemplation.