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Strawson (1963) Freedom and Resentment

Strawson, Peter (1963). Freedom and Resentment. Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211. 2Some optimists about determinism point to the efficacy of the practices of punishment, and of moral condemnation and approval, in regulating behaviour in socially desirable ways. In the fact of their efficacy, they suggest, is an adequate basis for these practices; and this fact certainly does not sho..

RÄIKKÄ (2005) On Irrational Guilt

RÄIKKÄ, J. (2005). ON IRRATIONAL GUILT. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 7(5), 473–485. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25733597 1. INTRODUCTIONPerhaps it is too demanding to claim that it is always irrational to accept a proposition on the basis of insufficient evidence, but it sounds plausible that accepting transparently contradictory propositions is irrational. Therefore, it would be irration..

Higgs, McIntosh, Connelly & Mumford (2020) Self-Focused Emotions and Ethical Decision-Making: Comparing the Effects of Regulated and Unregulated Guilt, Shame, and Embarrassment

Higgs, Cory; McIntosh, Tristan ; Connelly, Shane & Mumford, Michael (2020). Self-Focused Emotions and Ethical Decision-Making: Comparing the Effects of Regulated and Unregulated Guilt, Shame, and Embarrassment. Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (1):27-63. Guilt, Shame, and EmbarrassmentWhen considering which emotions may be relevant in the context of ethical deci sion-making, Haidt’s (2003) mora..

Huebner, Bruno, & Sarkissian (2010) What Does the Nation of China Think About Phenomenal States?

Huebner, Bryce ; Bruno, Michael & Sarkissian, Hagop (2010). What Does the Nation of China Think About Phenomenal States? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):225-243. 1 IntroductionFor example, the question, “What is it like to be Microsoft?” seems to stand in stark contrast to the well-worn philosophical question, “What is it like to be a bat?” To put the contrast bluntly, faced with the q..

Stichter (2020) Learning from Failure: Shame and Emotion Regulation in Virtue as Skill

Stichter, Matt (2020). Learning from Failure: Shame and Emotion Regulation in Virtue as Skill. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (2):341-354. becoming more skillful requires learning from one’s failures, but that turns out to be especially challenging when dealing with moral failures. The distress prompted by the prospect of having acted wrongly can often cause defensiveness in response, rath..

Harman (2009) Guilt-free morality

Harman, Gilbert (2009). Guilt-free morality. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:203-14. 1. PROPOSED CONNECTIONS BETWEEN MORALITY AND GUILT FEELINGS guilt feelings are warranted if an agent knows that he or she has acted morally wrongly. It might be said that in such a case the agent has a strong reason to feel guilt, that the agent ought to have guilt feelings, that the agent is justified in having ..

Tollefsen (2006) The Rationality of Collective Guilt

Tollefsen, Deborah (2006). The rationality of collective guilt. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):222–239. If emotions are partly constituted by desire then they play a significant role in motivating us to act morally,and if they are perceptions, they may be responsive to values and norms that lie at the heart of our moral life (Gibbard 1990;D’Arms and Jacobson 2000).Emotions such as resentme..

Tollefsen (2003) Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility

Perron Tollefsen, D. (2003). Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility. Philosophical Explorations, 6(3), 218–234.In this paper I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in “Freedom and Resentment” (1968). In that paper Strawson at..

Szanto (2014) Do Group Persons have Emotions – or Should They?

Szanto, Thomas (2014). Do Group Persons have Emotions – or Should They? In Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl, Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 261-276. To getaninitial flavorfor the issue at stake, consider the following type of statements that we can regularly encounter i..

Ingram (2020) Guilt feelings and the intelligibility of moral duties

Ingram, Andrew Tice (2020). Guilt feelings and the intelligibility of moral duties. Ratio 33 (1):56-67.According to the dominant view in moral psychology, guilt is a deontic experience. The thought that separates guilt from other negative feelings occasioned by bad deeds, like remorse or shame, is that one has done something wrong, that one has infringed one's obligation. This view is shared by ..