소요의 철학 아카이브

Perron Tollefsen, D. (2003). Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility. Philosophical Explorations, 6(3), 218–234.In this paper I suggest that we can approach the metaphysical problems surrounding the issue of collective responsibility in a roundabout manner. My approach is reminiscent of that taken by P.F. Strawson in “Freedom and Resentment” (1968). In that paper Strawson at..

Szanto, Thomas (2014). Do Group Persons have Emotions – or Should They? In Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl, Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 261-276. To getaninitial flavorfor the issue at stake, consider the following type of statements that we can regularly encounter i..

Ingram, Andrew Tice (2020). Guilt feelings and the intelligibility of moral duties. Ratio 33 (1):56-67.According to the dominant view in moral psychology, guilt is a deontic experience. The thought that separates guilt from other negative feelings occasioned by bad deeds, like remorse or shame, is that one has done something wrong, that one has infringed one's obligation. This view is shared by ..

Björnsson, Gunnar & Hess, Kendy (2017). Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298. 1. IntroductionThere is a growing literature arguing that certain entities embodied by groups of agents—certain “collectives”—themselves qualify as agents; even, some say, as moral agents.1 These are ambitious claims. To be age..

Bokek-Cohen, Y. ; Marey-Sarwan, I. & Tarabeih, M. (2024). Deontological Guilt and Moral Distress as Diametrically Opposite Phenomena: A Case Study of Three Clinicians. Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 21 (3):449-459. IntroductionThere are a great variety of definitions of the concept of guilt in the professional psychological literature (Tilghman-Osborne, Cole, and Felton 2010), and it can be argue..

Collins, Stephanie (2023). Organizations as Wrongdoers. From Ontology to Morality. Oxford: Oxford University.

Collins, Stephanie (2023). Organizations as Wrongdoers. From Ontology to Morality. Oxford: Oxford University. Varieties of Organizational Blameworthiness4.1 IntroductionThis book is titled Organizations as Wrongdoers. So far, I’ve said a lot about organizations, but not much about wrongdoing. The rest of the book changes that.The present chapter defends organizations’ blameworthiness through thr..

Stephanie Collins. Organizations as Wrongdoers (2023)And what about feelings of guilt, remorse, and shame—can organ izations experience these feelings in a phenomenological sense (not just their ‘functional equivalents’)—and why does this matter for organizations’ blameworthiness? [3] In Part II (Chapters 4 and 5), I demonstrate that this metaphysical thesis yields important moral conclusions: o..

Konzelmann Ziv, Anita (2007). Collective Guilt Feeling Revisited. Dialectica, 61 (3): 467-493. Introduction While collective guilt understood as collective responsibility is a common subject in political theory, theory of law and social psychology, the problem of collective guilt feeling has not found wide attention until recently.As the term ‘guilt’ is ambiguous, denoting both factual guilt (bl..

Collins, Stephanie (2018). The Government Should Be Ashamed: On the Possibility of Organisations' Emotional Duties. Political Studies 4 (66):813-829.1. IntroductionEmotional duties are regularly attributed to organisations. Here are some examples.In 2011, a media investigation exposed the abuse of patients at Winterbourne View hospital in England. Five years later, a parent of one of the patient..