1. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps it is too demanding to claim that it is always irrational to accept a proposition on the basis of insufficient evidence, but it sounds plausible that accepting transparently contradictory propositions is irrational. Therefore, it would be irrational to believe that an act one has committed does not have any moral costs and at the same time to feel guilty of the act. This would be to accept two contradictory propositions, the proposition that one is not guilty and the proposition that one is guilty – if feeling guilty entails that one accepts that one is guilty.
Consider the strange case described by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1972, p. 482). A person raised in a religious family may have been taught that going to the theater is not allowed, and even if he has rejected this taboo years ago, he still feels guilty when attending theater. These kinds of cases may not be rare – after all, people feel guilty of all kinds of acts they know to be acceptable – but they certainly are strange. Indeed, one may wonder how they are even possible. This is why an explanation is needed.
2. RAWLS’ SOLUTION
The point is that since persons will not apologize nor change their behavior in cases of irrational guilt, they do not have proper guilt feelings either. Theyhaveonly“whatonemaycallresidueguilt feelings” (Rawls, 1972, p. 482). The question Rawls’ claim raises is, of course, whether it is true that (proper) guilt feelings imply a disposition to apologize one’s conduct or to do something else that would indicate that a person condemns his under takings. The answer seemsevident. Although Rawls is right in pointing out that guilt is often associated with certain behavioral symptoms, there are many phenomena that prove that one may well feel guilt without having anydisposition to apol¨ oogize or to do any other of those actions that people typically do when they blame themselves.
Consider survival guilt, which is felt by those who have survived catastrophes that others have not. Survival guilt denotes to guilt experienced through the mere fact of having survived, and people who feel survival guilt do not accuse themselves of anything (see e.g. Velleman, 2003; Greenspan, 1992). But still they feel guilty, that is, they ascribe guilt to them even if it is clear that they do not believe that they have done anything morally blameworthy, and therefore, for instance, they will not apologize to the victims’ families for the accident. Thus, it seems that Rawls is wrong in supposing that guilt feelings are always accompanied by the actions that indicate condemnation of one’s conduct. We are able to identify guilt with out its typical behavioral manifestations, such as apologies.3 Sometimes a person who feels guilty merely says that he is stupid. This may happen in cases of irrational guilt, when a person feels guilty of his act which he knows to be perfectly acceptable.
3. THE MORAL COST APPROACH
The moral cost approach to irrational guilt is interesting, and its basic idea is clear enough. As the debate on moral dilemmas has shown, people often have guilt feelings of the tragic decisions they make, and one may add that a decision need not be “tragic” in order to cause guilt feelings (see e.g. Gowans, 1994). For instance, a person may feel (not only regret but) guilt of his decision to hire the best applicant, if he thinks that an other applicant is now without a job because of his (right) decision. If the moral cost approach is acceptable, it certainly demystifies irrational guilt. The question here, of course, is whether the moral cost approach gives a correct description of cases of irrational guilt. The problem is that it does not.
7. PUGMIRE’S OBJECTION
Beliefs are not necessary for emotions.
But there is a reason to attribute an unconscious impression to a person who feels irrational guilt– whether or not he is able to see his impression himself. This reason is the fact that emotions are intentional. Love is love only insofar as it is love of something or someone. Anger is anger only insofar as it is anger about something or at someone (see e.g. Solomon, 1998, p. 282). Without attributing an impression (or a construal or a thought) to a person who feels guilty we are unable to make justice to the inherent intentionality of emotions. One cannot feel guilty of nothing. This is a conceptual necessity, although it is possible that a person is unable to explain specifically why he feels guilty. A soldier, for instance, may feel guilty and have many things in mind that could ground his emotion.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Naturally, there are many ways to criticize cognitive theories of emo tions. The most common strategies include the following two. Firstly, it seems that cognitive theories imply that animals and small children do not have emotions. This is because they (probably) do not have proposi tional beliefs or thoughts. But, contrary to this implication, it seems clear that animals and small children do have emotions (see e.g. Deigh, 1994, pp. 847–849). Secondly, it sounds strange to claim, as many cognitive the ories do, that beliefs can be both the causes and constituents of emotions (Green, 1992, pp. 44–49). For this is to say that a part of an event can be its own cause. But how could this be possible? These criticisms may be serious, and it is far beyond the task of this article to try to evaluate them. Those who wish to defend cognitive theories might argue, firstly, that ani mals andbabiescanhaveperceptual states which are enough for emotions, and secondly, that there is nothing strange in part-whole-causation, which is a rather common phenomenon after all. Needless to say, there are many other obviousstrategiestodefendcognitivismagainsttheobjectionsabove. Perhaps animals and babies do not have emotions proper. Perhaps cogni tive elements are only constituents of emotions, not their causes in a strict sense.