Higgs, McIntosh, Connelly & Mumford (2020) Self-Focused Emotions and Ethical Decision-Making: Comparing the Effects of Regulated and Unregulated Guilt, Shame, and Embarrassment

Higgs, Cory; McIntosh, Tristan ; Connelly, Shane & Mumford, Michael (2020). Self-Focused Emotions and Ethical Decision-Making: Comparing the Effects of Regulated and Unregulated Guilt, Shame, and Embarrassment. Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (1):27-63.

Guilt, Shame, and Embarrassment

When considering which emotions may be relevant in the context of ethical deci sion-making, Haidt’s (2003) moral emotions, or emotions said to be in response to a moral violation and which motivate moral behavior, are particularly relevant.

More specifically, the three emotions which have received little attention as to their relationship with ethical decision-making are those which have been termed “self-conscious” moral emotions—guilt, shame, and embarrassment (Tangney et al. 2007).

Dubbed “self-conscious” as they are thought to be designed to help individuals navigate and adapt to the complexities of being in a group, they adhere to an important consideration—ethical decisions do not occur in a vacuum, other people are always involved. Individuals making ethical decisions must often consider others’ perspectives, the consequences an action has on others, and their relationship with those others once a decision has been made (Mumford et al. 2006). By the same token, guilt, shame, and embarrassment all arise from different evaluations of a situation, and therefore may vary substantially in how they influence making ethical decisions.

Guilt, an interpersonal emotion, is characterized by the belief that one has caused harm, loss, or distress to another individual or group, and is triggered most power fully if one’s harmful actions also creates a threat to the relationship with the victim of the unethical act (Haidt 2003; Tangney and Fischer 1995). It is typically viewed as a positive moral emotion, as it involves a concern for moral standards and the welfare of others (Baumeister et al. 1994; Eisenberg 2000). Feelings of guilt are often associated with taking responsibility for one’s actions, desires to make amends, and punishing the self for the transgression (Ferguson and Stegge 1998; Tangney 1991). It is plausible that individuals who feel guilty may perform more extensive information gathering and interpretation, so as to limit the amount of harm that comes to those who may be influenced by that decision, thereby increasing ethical behavior. While an initial study conducted by Johnson and Connelly (2016) found that feel ings of guilt are positively related to making ethical decisions, evidence bearing on this conclusion is limited.

Often confused with guilt, shame is similarly characterized by the determination that one has caused harm or loss to another. However, in contrast to guilt, the act is attributed to a core defect with the self, as opposed to just an egregious act (Bab cock and Sabini 1990; Haidt 2003). The focus on the self, as opposed to a behavior, is the primary factor which distinguishes the two emotions from each other (Tang ney 1998). Individuals experiencing shame feel exposed, and wish to “undo” parts of the self (Eisenberg 2000; Niedenthal et al. 1994). Shame is associated with acts of withdrawal, aversion, and preoccupation with others’ opinions, making the individual experiencing shame unlikely to rectify a transgression so as to avoid punish ment from others (Eisenberg 2000; Haidt 2003). Bearing this in mind, it would seem feasible that individuals faced with ethical decisions while feeling shame may avoid gathering information to rectify the problem, rather avoiding the problem to escape criticism and repercussions from others. Again, while there is little evidence on the relationship between shame and ethical decision-making, it stands to reason that this pattern of appraisals may reduce effective ethical decision-making.

Finally, embarrassment is commonly held to be the least serious, and least nega tive, among the three self-conscious emotions, with only minor involvement in moral transgressions (Eisenberg 2000; Miller and Tangney 1994). Feelings of embarrassment are the result of the violation of a social norm where a surprising or unexpected event occurs, leading embarrassed individuals to attribute experienced outcomes to external forces, such as random chance, and making them less likely to make amends towards those outcomes as they do not feel personally responsible (Miller and Tangney 1994). However, particularly in the presence of someone in a position of authority of status, embarrassed individuals may feel their identity is threatened and attempt to save face by ensuring future adherence to social norms, or the embarrassed individual may even withdraw (Haidt 2003; Keltner and Buswell 1997; Miller and Leary 1992). In the context of ethical decision-making, this sug gests that those who feel embarrassed may not take steps to solve an ethical dilemma as it may be viewed as out of their immediate control, and does not involve them personally. By the same token, in certain circumstances embarrassed individuals may feel the need to save face and expend the necessary resources to right the situ ation. To our knowledge, no evidence of the influence of embarrassment on ethi cal decision-making exists, but its novel pattern of cognition is especially compel ling in the case of ethical situations.