Metaphysics of the Self Segment 1

2023-2 Metaphysics of the Self

 

Segment 1

 

1. What are the main features of conscious concerns Strawson’s synchronic view?

Strawson suggests that the self is a single, distinct mental thing existing at a given time synchronically and a subject of experience. He denies the claim that the self is an agent or has personality. More importantly, he holds that the core conditions of the self don’t include long-term diachronic continuity, namely it is enough to persist 2 or 3 seconds, not the whole lifetime. Such a self is often called a minimal self, or a thin self.

 

2. Biggest objection to Strawson's self.

Strawson's view doesn't explain how personal identity is maintained over time. If the self at t1 is a merely disconnected mental experiences from the self at t2, Strawson must explain the fact that we have the certain sense of a continuity between those selves. Such a certainty is too prevalent to consider it as just the result of the instinct for self-preservation. Strawson’s objection to the theory of the stream of consciousness is also fallacious. The point of James’ theory is to distinguish between the act of thinking and its objects. Even if the objects of thinking can be disconnected, the stream of consciousness can incorporate those disconnected experiences as a whole. The strength of James’ phenomenological theory is to explain clearly how the past experiences effect on the current experience, unlike Strawson’s phenomenological theory.

 

3. On Schechtman’s view ('narrative self-constitution view.'), what amounts to having a narrative?

According to Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view, having a narrative would require that a person be able, at least sometimes, to become conscious of her narrative and make it explicit. This is necessary for autonomy, moral agency, or other kinds of higher-order capacities.

 

4. Present the main difficulty for the self of Schechtman's self-constitution view

One of the main difficulties for Schechtman's self-constitution view is the obscurity of defining the boundaries of the self. If the self is constituted through a narrative, it is obscure to determine which experiences are part of self-narrative. In other words, the investigation of the self might be delegated into subjective idealism. Furthermore, Schechtman's view has a difficulty to explain the case that a person experiences amnesia or gets memory loss.

 

5. What is Metzinger’s primarily target of Ontologicial anti-realism

Metzinger suggests the ontological anti-realism about the self (ARSO), which claims the self is not a substance. In other words, selves are not self-subsistent entities. The target of this claim is to reveal that there is no solid basis for assuming the existence of selves in folk-phenomenological discourse. Although Metzinger admits that selves are phenomenological everyday objects, there are no empirical evidences and plausible approaches (e.g. classical scientific realism, the haecceity approach, and bundle theory) to support the metaphysics of objecthood of selves.

 

6. Metzinger pointed out that we have no empirical evidence and no truly convincing conceptual argument that supports the actual existence of 'a' self. Is his view plausible?

Metzinger’s metaphysical world-view is based on his bundle theory (dynamical self-organization), which considers selves as collections of properties, relations, and experiences. However, bundle theory has several defects; the most traditional objection to the bundle theory is that it leads us to skepticism. If selves reduce to experience, we cannot guarantee any certainty of knowledge including logic and mathematics. Another challenge can be raised by pointing out that the sense of self is often associated with the unity of consciousness. Metzinger doesn’t explain how we can perceive ourselves as a unified entity as the subject of experience.

 

7.  Mind-Body dualist address mind-body problem, the most common dualist view

Dualism generally divides into Substance (Cartesian) dualism and Property dualism. Both claims that the nature of consciousness and mental states is non-physical. On the one hand, Descartes as a representative of substance dualists holds that reality divides into two substances – res extensa (extended substance) and res cogitans (thinking substance). While physical substance is divisible, extended, and observable, mental substance is indivisible, not extended, and not inter-subjectively accessible (first-person access by introspection). On the other hand, property dualist claims that there is only one material substance regarding the mental state. However, the brain has distinct properties including physical and nonphysical ones. Property dualist again divides into epiphenomenalism and interactionist property dualism according to whether they admit mental properties have causal effects on the brain or not.

 

8. Present the strongest objection to two dualisms.

First, substance materialism cannot sufficiently explain how non-physical substance can interact with physical substance. This defect is crucial when we consider the fact that all known mental phenomena depend on neural system that is purely physical. Second, evolutionary history shows that we have been evolved from the simple organism and our nervous system is merely more complex more that that of simple organism in degree. Thus, it is superfluous to take any non-physical substance or property into our accounts of mental states.  

 

9. According to behaviorism / reductive materialism / functionalism / eliminate materialism, mental state having such a pain is ( )

Behaviorism: a disposition to scream, to take aspirin, and so on.

Reductive materialism (the identity theory): a physical process or state that can be fully explained and reduced to physical phenomena.

Functionalism: a function taking damage or trauma as an input and producing distress or annoyance as an output. In other words, it is a unique causal role.

Eliminate Materialism: the concept of folk-psychology that should be eliminated.

 

10. Eliminate materialism: what does eliminate mean?

The term ‘eliminate’ means that we should remove the concept of folk-psychology due to its failure. It implies that the mental state (belief, pain, desire, etc.) do not exist, the words refer to them should be eliminated, and folk-psychology should be replaced with more successful scientific program such as neuroscience

 

11. Present the difficulty of reductive materialist approach

Multiple Realization thesis: Type identity theory asserts that the same type of mental state is identical to the same type of physical state. For instance, the statement “pain A is (means) brain state A” rejects the possibility that ‘pain A is (means) brain state B or another physical state C.’ However, human and octopus have experienced same pain even though they have different organic structure and different physical state when occurring pain.     

 

12. (1) Why does the Mary argument (knowledge) threaten physicalism (2) Which premise is weakest?

The Mary argument

(1) Mary knows all the physical facts about color without seeing any color.

(2) For Mary, it is possible to experience to see color and obtain new knowledge of the qualia (or subjective character) of color.

(3) Therefore, Mary can learn a new non-physical fact.

(4) Physicalism claims that every fact in the world is physical

(5) Therefore, Physicalism is wrong and cannot explain the mental state in a complete way.  

Critics challenges that premise (3) is fallacious by arguing that what Mary learned was not the knowledge of facts but some kind of ability. Specifically, Mary acquired the ability to imagine, recognize, and remember experiences of seeing color. Such abilities can only be acquired by having the experience.

 

13. Absent qualia argument (Chinese room) how absent qualia argument threaten and possible reply in terms of functionalism.

Absent qualia arguments show that it could be the case that a system that functionally duplicates the mental states of human being has no qualia. This threaten functionalism because it holds that individual qualia are identical its functional roles. Functionalist could argue that even if a system lacks the same qualia as a human, it might still have its own unique qualia associated with its functional process (inverted qualia arguments).

 

Reading Lists

G. Strawson, "The Self"

M. Schecthman, "Stories, Lives, and Basic Survival"

T. Metzinger, "The No-Self Alternative"

P. Churchland, ch. 2 of Matter and Consciousness