Metaphysics of the self Segment 3

2023-2 Metaphysics of the Self

 

Segment 3

 1. Neisser argues that five distinct kind of self-knowledge give rise to five different selves. Which ones are these? List them and briefly describe them.

According to Neisser, there are five different aspects of the self as follows:

(1)   The ecological self: the self as perceived with respect to the physical environment.

(2)   The interpersonal self: the self perceived in its interaction with others.

(3)   The extended self: the self as an entity that persists through time, having episodic memories and planning for the future.

(4)   The private self: the self as given to us through our private thoughts, intentions, beliefs, etc.

(5)   The conceptual self: the self as conceptualized by our social roles and different theories held by ourselves and/or the society we live in.

Although Neisser claims that these aspects are so distinct that they are indeed different selves, it is a superfluous presupposition because such multiplicity leads to ontological controversy.

 

2.  Do you agree that we have all five aspects of the self that Neisser lists, or do you think that some of these are not essential? Briefly explain. 

I think that the conceptual self is less fundamental than other selves; in my view, the conceptual self appears to be a subset of the ecological self and the interpersonal self. This is because our social roles and theories are heavily affected by our physical environment and interaction with others. Moreover, the conceptual self is always occurred as a n-place predicate while the extended self and the private self are occurred as individual variables. Namely, knowledge about the conceptual self is just the self-knowledge about our contingent attributes.  

 

3. According to Haslanger, in what ways are the definitions of race and gender similar?

First, both gender and race are real. Second, both race and gender are social categories. Third, neither gender nor race is chosen, but the forms they take can be resisted or mutated. Fourth, both race and gender are hierarchical in terms of privilege or subordination, but such a hierarchy are contingent. Finally, although ideologies of race and gender and the hierarchical structures they sustain are substantively different, they are intertwined.

 

4. What do you take to be the strongest objection about Haslanger’s account of gender? 

Jenkins points out that Haslanger’s gender theory is ethically problematic because its definition of woman excludes most trans women. According to Haslanger, being a woman requires that one function as a woman ‘regularly and for the most part.’ However, there are trans women who do not undergo medical surgery and are not perceived as women by those around them. Therefore, many trans women will not be categorized as women according to Haslanger’s definition.

 

5. What does M. Rae mean by gender being a self-conferred identity? What motivates this account?

The self-conferred identity account suggests that genders are socially constructed and is determined by an individual’s autobiographical identity. The self-conferred identity account is thus a realist, social constructionist, and anti-essentialist theory of gender. Its most valuable advantage is that it can offer a foundation for giving both epistemic and ethical first-person authority to people’s judgments about their own gender. Therefore, it would be a most accommodating framework for explain trans and nonbinary gender identities.

 

6. When social and autobiographical identity conflict, which one should weigh more, according to Rae?

According to Rea, there are two kinds of representational identities: autobiographical identities and social-representational identities. While an autobiographical identity is related to the self-conception, a social-representational identity is connected to the collective representation. Rea claims that one’s true gender is one’s autobiographical gender. This is because autobiographical gender is a person’s own internal interpretation of their inner experiences, and all of us are in a better position to interpret our own inner experience than anyone else will be.

 

7. Present an example of a naturalistic account of disability. What sort of objection(s) does Barnes raise against it?

The naturalistic account defines disability as a departure from normal functioning or the species norm. Barnes challenges this account by arguing that it faces issues of overgeneralization. For instance, individuals like Michael Phelps or Spiderman surely possess traits that can be considered departures from normal functioning or species norm. However, this doesn't necessarily imply that they are disabled in any sense. Furthermore, objections extend to the challenge of precisely defining 'normal functioning.' Questions arise about whether a specific threshold, such as 80% or 90%, should be established to distinguish normal from abnormal functioning.

 

8. In whay way does Barnes's account for disability? What do you take to be the biggest difficulty for her view?

According to Barnes, an individual S is considered disabled if and only if S has a specific physical condition x, and members of the disability rights movement judge that x falls within the category of physical conditions for which they aim to advocate for justice. However, Barnes's definition raises concerns as it excessively relies on the external authority of a particular group. The questions of why such a group should possess the right to define disabilities and which group holds such a right when multiple groups are involved remain unclear. Ironically, this definition excludes the right of individuals with disabilities to define themselves.

 

9. According to Coplan, there are three essential features of empathy. What are these? Describe each one.

According to Coplan, the three essential feature of empathy are:

(1)   Affective matching: affective matching occurs only if an observer’s affective states are qualitatively identical to a target’s, though they may vary in degree.

(2)   Other-oriented perspective taking: Other-oriented perspective-taking is oriented toward the other. In other-oriented perspective-taking, I imagine being the target undergoing the target’s experiences rather than imagining being myself undergoing the target’s experiences. It therefore avoids false consensus effects, personal distress, and prediction errors based on egocentric biases.

(3)   Self-other differentiation: Self–other differentiation is to hold the boundaries between the self and others. One can successfully represent a target’s situation and experiences and have the same affects as the target while failing to preserve a separate sense of self. The observer recognizes that the other is a different person and successfully adopts the other’s perspective but ends up experiencing the other’s perspective as his own. The lack of clear self–other differentiation might result in a kind of fusion or enmeshment.

 

10. What do you take to be the biggest challenge to Coplan's account of empathy?

Coplan's account presupposes the objective affective matching between the observer and the target. However, one might argue that we cannot confirm whether the matching is well established because of the nature of own's feeling; it is essentially subjective and private.

 

11. Do you believe that empathy can give us the knowledge of what it's like for someone to have a certain experience E? Explain your thinking.

If we take the notion of qualia and the private self simultaneously, empathy cannot give us the knowledge of what it's like for someone to have a certain experience. In my view, empathy is produced through simplification and generalization. Plus, a particular experience possessed by others is complex and inaccessible. This is like the qualia of sensory experiences cannot be fully captured by the description. And it is a metaphysically redundant presupposition that my experience can be identical to others.

 

Reading Lists

U. Neisser, "Five kinds of self knowledge".

S.Haslanger, "Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?"

M. Rea, "Gender as a Self-Conferred Identity"

E. Barnes, ch.1, "Constructing Disability", in The Minority Body: Theory of Disability

A. Coplan, "Understanding Empathy".

I.Ravenscroft, "Empathy and Knowing What It's Like"