Aristotle (2024) Nicomachean Ethics 1.6

Aristotle (2024). Nicomachean Ethics. Second Edition. Translated With Introduction and Notes By C. D. C. Reeve Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company

 

1.6 Plato on the good

But perhaps we had better investigate the universal good and go through the puzzles concerning the way in which it is said of things, even if this sort of inquiry is an uphill one because the men who introduced the Forms were friends of ours. But perhaps it would seem better, even necessary, at any rate, when the preservation of the truth is at stake, to do away even with what is properly our own, especially so as we are philosophers; for while we love both our friends and the truth, the pious thing is to honor the truth first.

Those, then, who introduced this view did not posit Forms for things among which they spoke of prior and posterior, which is why they did not furnish a Form of the numbers.^[각주:1] But good is said of things in the categories of what-it-is^[각주:2]], quality, and relation, and what is intrinsically—that is, substance^[각주:3]—is naturally prior to relation (for a relation would seem to be an offshoot or coincidental^[각주:4] affection of what is), so that there would not be some common Form set over these.

Further, good is said of things in as many ways as being. For it is said of things in the category^[각주:5] of what-it-is (for example, the god and the understanding^[각주:6]), in that of quality (the virtues), in that of quantity (the moderate amount), in that of relation (the useful), in that of time (the opportune moment), in that of place (a livable dwelling), and so on. Therefore, it is clear that it would not be some common universal^[각주:7]— that is, a one; for then it would not be said of things in all the categories but only in one.

Further, if of things that are in accord with one Form there is also one science^[각주:8], then of all goods there would also be some one science.45 But as things stand there are many, even of goods in one category—for example, of the opportune moment (for in war it is generalship but in disease medi cine) and of the moderate amount (in nourishment it is medicine, while in physical exertion it is athletic training).

One might also raise a puzzle about what they even mean by “each thing-itself,”^[각주:9] if indeed of both human-itself and human there is a single account—that of human. For insofar as each is human, they will not differ at all, and, if this is the case, neither will they differ, insofar as each is good.

Neither will the good-itself be more good by being eternal, if indeed a long-lasting white thing is no whiter than an ephemeral one.

The Pythagoreans seem to have something more convincing to say about this, since they place the one in the column of goods—and, indeed, Speusippus seems to have followed their lead.

But let us leave these issues for another discussion.

A controversial point, however, does lie concealed in what we have said, because their arguments are not concerned with every good. The things said in accord with one Form are those pursued and liked as intrinsic goods, while those that tend to produce or safeguard these, or to prevent their contraries, are said to be good because of these and in a different way. It is clear, then, that good would be said of things in two ways, that is, of some as intrinsic goods, of others as goods because of these. Let us separate off, then, the intrinsic goods from the ones that produce a benefit, and investigate whether intrinsic goods are said to be good in accord with a single Form.

The intrinsic ones, though, what sorts of things should one suppose them to be? Or aren’t they the ones that are pursued on their own as well— for example, being wise, seeing, and certain pleasures and honors? For even if we do pursue these because of other things, we might nonetheless suppose them to belong among the intrinsic goods. Or does nothing else belong there except the Form? In that case, the Form will be pointless.^[각주:10] But if these other things belong among the intrinsic ones too, the same account of the good will have to show up in all of them, just as that of whiteness does in snow and white lead. But in fact the accounts of honor, wisdom, and pleasure differ and are at variance regarding the very way in which they are goods. Therefore, the good is not something common and in accord with a single Form.

But how, then, is it said of things? For at least it does not seem to be a case of homonymy resulting from luck.^[각주:11] Is it, then, that all goods at least derive from or are related to a single thing? Or is it more a matter of analogy? For as sight is in the case of body, so understanding is in the case of soul^[각주:12], and so on for other things in other cases.

But perhaps we must leave these questions aside for now, since an exact treatment of them more properly belongs to a different branch of philosophy. It is the same way in the case of the Form; for even if there is some single good predicated in common of all intrinsic goods, a separable^[각주:13] one that is itself an intrinsic good, it is clear that it would not be doable in action or acquirable by a human being. But that is the sort that is being sought now.

Maybe someone might think it better to get to know the Form in con nection with the goods that are acquirable and doable in action; for they might think that by having it as a paradigm, we will also better know those things that are good for us and—knowing them—aim at and hit them. This argument certainly has some plausibility, but it seems to clash with the sci ences; for each of these, though it seeks some good and looks for how to supply whatever is lacking, leaves aside knowledge of the Form. And yet for all craftsmen not to know—and not even to look for—so important an aid would hardly be reasonable.

There is a puzzle too about how a weaver or a carpenter will benefit, as regards his own craft, from knowing the good-itself or how anyone will be a better doctor or a better general from having seen the Form-itself. For the doctor appears not even to investigate health in this way, but rather that of the human being, and perhaps even more the health of this one; for he treats a particular one.

So much, then, for these issues.

1. Form of the numbers: “In such cases where there is a prior and a posterior, there is no common thing beyond these cases, and it separable. For then there would be something prior to the first thing; for what is common and separable is prior because, were the common one done away with the first would be done away with—for example, if the double is the first multiple, the multiple predicated of all of them in common cannot be separable from them; for it would then be prior to the double, if the result is that the common thing is the Form—for example, if one were to make the common thing separable” (EE 1218a1–8). [본문으로]
2. What-it-is: When we ask Ti esti A? we are asking, What is A? The correct answer defines or expresses the what-it-is of A, or—a related notion—the being (einai) for A, or—another related notion—the essence or what-it-is-to-be of A, or—yet another related notion—the substance of A. Any intrinsic being, regardless of its category, has a what-it-is: “For in fact the what-it-is signifies in one way the substance and the this something, and in another way it signifies each of the other things that are predicated—quantity, quality, and the like. . . . For we can also ask what quality is, and so quality too is something with a what-it-is” (Met. 1030a18–24). [본문으로]
3. Substance: Ousia is a noun that is perhaps formed from the present participle ousa of the verb einai (“to be”). “Substance” is the traditional translation. (1) The substance of something (the sense relevant here) is its what-it-is or essence. (2) A substance, on the other hand, is a tode ti (a “this something”)—an ultimate subject of predication, of which a particular human or a particular horse are examples. [본문으로]
4. Coincidental: A standard Aristotelian contrast is between what has an affection coincidentally or contingently (kata sumbebêkos: per accidens in Latin), making the affection a coincident of it, and what has that affection intrinsically or non contingently (kath’ hauto or per se) (Met. 1022a24–36). Affections that belong to something contingently are of no interest to a science of that thing, since they cannot be demonstrated to hold of it either universally or for the most part, and all science is demonstrative (1026b3–5). But some coincidents are demonstrable and so are of interest to science (see 1139b18n368). These are the intrinsic coin cidents or per se accidents—“the coincidents connected to the substances” (DA 402b18)—that are not parts of a thing’s substance or essence, but are demonstra ble from it, as having internal angles equal to two right angles is demonstrable from the definition of a triangle’s essence (APo. 75b1, 83b19, Met. 1025a30–32, 1078a5–9). [본문으로]
5. Category: “The things said to be intrinsically are the very ones signified by the f igures of predication (katêgorias); for the ways in which things are said [to be] are the ways in which being (to einai) signifies. So since of things predicated of a thing some signify what it is, some a quality [of it], some a quantity, some a relation, some affecting or being affected, some a where, some a when, being (to einai) signifies the same thing as each of these; for there is no difference between a human is keeping healthy and a human keeps healthy, nor between a human is walking or cutting and a human walks or cuts, and similarly in the other cases” (Met. 1017a22–30). [본문으로]
6. The god and the understanding: (1) Ho theos usually refers to the divine being that is only loosely analogous to the Christian God. He is defined as nous noêseôs noêsis (“active understanding of active understanding”), or “thought thinking itself” (Met. 1074b34–35). This being is the cause of the movement of the various heavenly spheres, also conceived of as sorts of gods, and so of the various sub lunary movements they in turn explain, including the generation of animals like ourselves (1071a13–17, 1073a22–b3). He does this, however, not by being himself in movement but by being the ultimate and unmoving object of wish and desire, which is identical to happiness (1072a26–b30): “It is not in this way [by under standing something else] that the god is in a good state [of activity]; instead, he is better than to understand something else beyond himself. And the cause of this is that for us the good is in accord with something else, while for that being he himself is the good for himself” (EE 1245b16–19). This is also the way our understanding moves us: “This is what we are seeking, namely, what the starting point of movement in the soul is. It is clear, then, that just as in the universe, so there too, [the] god moves everything. For the divine thing in us in a way moves everything” (1248a24–27). (2) Sometimes, though, ho theos refers to the human understanding, which is the divine constituent in the human soul (NE 1177b28): “Human beings possess nothing divine or blessed that is worth taking seriously except what there is in them of understanding (nous) and wisdom (phronêsis); for this alone of our possessions seems to be immortal, this alone divine. And due to being able to share in the capacity, our life, however wretched and harsh by nature, is yet managed in so sophisticated a way that a human being seems a god in comparison with other things. For ‘the understanding is the god in us’— whether it was Hermotimus or Anaxagoras who said so—and ‘mortal life has a part of some god’” (Protr. B108–110). If that is its reference here, the sense of the clause is “the god, that is, the understanding.” EE 1217b30–31 has ho nous kai ho theos, where the reversed order of the conjuncts may more strongly suggest the identity of the two. [본문으로]
7. Universal: “A universal is something common; for that thing is said to be a uni versal which naturally belongs to many things” (Met. 1038b11–12). For Platonists such a universal is a “one over many”: “[Socrates] Do you want us to begin our investigation with the following point, then, in accordance with our usual method? I mean, as you know, we usually posit some one particular Form in connection with each of the manys (hekasta ta polla) to which we apply the same name. . . . T hen, in the present case, too, let us take any of the manys you like. For example, there are surely many couches and tables. . . . But the Forms connected to these manufactured items are surely just two, one of a couch and one of a table” (Plato, Rep. 596a–b). Such Forms, they thought, were ontologically independent of or separable from the corresponding manys—a view Aristotle rejects: “No universal occurs apart from particulars and separate” (Met. 1040b26–27). [본문으로]
8. One science: In Peri Ideôn, which exists only in fragments, Aristotle cites and crit icizes three arguments the Platonists give for Forms, each of which appeals to the sciences. The second of these (79.8–11) is as follows: “The things of which there are sciences, these things are. And the sciences are of things other and beyond the particulars: for these are indefinite and indefinable, while the sciences are of defin able things. Therefore, there are some things beyond the particulars, and these things are the Forms.” [본문으로]
9. Each-thing-itself: Plato often refers to the Form of F as the F-itself (auto to F). Aristotle thinks this cloaks a fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between particulars and universals: (1) “Those who accept the Forms speak cor rectly in one way, namely, in separating them (if indeed the Forms are substances), but in another way not correctly, because they say that the one over many is a Form. And the cause of this is that they do not have [an account] to give of the substances that are of this sort—the imperishable ones that are beyond the par ticular perceptible ones. So they make them the same in form as perishable things (for these are the ones we do know), man-itself and horse-itself, adding to the per ceptible ones the word ‘itself’” (Met. 1040b27–34). (2) “[Platonists] say that there is man-itself and horse-itself and health-itself, and nothing else—like those who introduce gods, but say that they are human in form; for those people were mak ing the gods nothing but eternal human beings, and these are making the Forms nothing but eternal perceptibles” (997b8–12). [본문으로]
10. The Form will be pointless: The Form (eidos, idia) of F is what answers the ques tion, what is (ti esti) F? and thus specifies the what-it-is of F, or what F is. The point of introducing it is to explain why particular Fs are F: they are F because they participate in the Form of F. If nothing participates in the Form of the good except that very Form, this explanation would go on indefinitely and thus be pointless. Compare what makes a desire pointless at 1094a20–21. [본문으로]
11. Homonymy resulting from luck: “Things are said to be homonymous when they have only a name in common, but the account of the substance [= essence] that corresponds to the name is distinct—for example, both a human and a picture are animals. These have only a name in common and the account of the essence cor responding to the name is distinct; for if we are to say what it is for each of them to be an animal, we will give a special account to each” (Cat. 1a1–6). It is just luck that the word “bank” applies to the sides of rivers and also to financial institutions, so “bank” is a lucky or chance homonym. “Good” as applied to such apparently intrinsic goods as practical wisdom and certain pleasures, seems not to be like that. Yet “good” is not said of each of them in accord with a single Form, since they are not good in exactly the same way. Two other possibilities seem open. The stron ger is that the good of practical wisdom and that of certain pleasures derive from or are related to a single sort of good, as a healthy diet and healthy complexion are both related, although in different ways, to the single bodily condition that is health in a human being—one promoting it, the other being an indication of it. A weaker possibility is that the good of practical wisdom is at least analogous to that of certain pleasures, as sight is analogous to understanding: we see a red billiard ball and see how a mathematical proof goes. [본문으로]
12. Soul: A soul (psuchê) is “the first actualization of a natural body that has life poten tially” (DA 412a27–28). Since actualization and activity are intimately related, the soul is also “the activity of a certain sort of body” (Met. 1043a35–36). Everything alive, whether plant, animal, or divine being, has a soul. [본문으로]
13. Separable: The verb chôrizein derives from chôra (“place”), and means “to separate, part, sever, or divide” things by causing them (roughly speaking) to be in separate (or disjoint) places (Met. 998a17–19, 1068b26–27). Thus, when Aristotle describes Plato as separating the Forms from perceptible particulars (1078b30–34), the pri mary connotation is that of putting them in separate places: perceptible particulars are “here (entautha),” Forms are “over there (kakei)” (990b34–991a1). For a Form is “a particular, they say, and separable” (1040a8–9) and “place is special to particular things, which is why they are separable by place” (1092a18–19). And the reason Platonists separated the Forms is that they thought that perceptible particulars could not be objects of scientific knowledge: “The notion of Forms occurred to the people who stated it because where the truth is concerned they were persuaded by the Heraclitean arguments that all perceptible things are always flowing, so that if indeed there is to be scientific knowledge of anything and wisdom, there must be some other natures, beyond the perceptible ones, that are permanent, since there is no scientific knowledge of the flowing ones” (Met. 1078b12–32). [본문으로]