Aristotle (2024) Nicomachean Ethics 1.7

Aristotle (2024). Nicomachean Ethics. Second Edition. Translated With Introduction and Notes By C. D. C. Reeve Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company

 

1.7 Completeness, self-sufficiency, and the human function

Let us return to the good we are seeking and what exactly it could be. For it is apparently different in different actions and different crafts; for it is one thing in medicine, a different one in generalship, and likewise for the rest. What, then, is the good characteristic of each? Or isn’t it the thing for whose sake the rest of the actions are done? In medicine this is health, in generalship victory, in building a house, and in other crafts something else, and in every action and deliberate choice it is the end; for it is for the sake of the end that everyone does the rest. So if there is some end of all the things doable in action, this would be the good doable in action; and if more than one, it would be these.

Taking a different course, then, our account has reached the same con clusion.55 But we must try to make this yet more perspicuous.

Since there are evidently many ends, and we choose some of them because of something else, as we do wealth, pipes, and instruments gener ally, it is evident that not all ends are complete. But the best one is appar ently something complete.56 So if one thing alone is complete, this would be what we are seeking, but if more are, the most complete of these.

We say that what is intrinsically worth pursuing is more complete than what is worth pursuing because of something else, and that what is never choiceworthy because of something else is more complete than what is both intrinsically choiceworthy and choiceworthy because of this one, and, accordingly, that what is unconditionally complete is what is always intrinsically choiceworthy and never choiceworthy because of something else.

Happiness seems to be most like this; for it we always choose because of itself and never because of something else. But honor, pleasure, under standing, and every virtue, though we do choose them because of them selves as well (for if they had no further consequences, we would still take each of them), we also choose for the sake of happiness, supposing that through them we will be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these things or because of anything else in general.

T he same conclusion also apparently follows from self-sufficiency; for the complete good seems to be self-sufficient. By “self-sufficient,” however, we mean not self-sufficient for someone who is alone, living a solitary life, but also for parents, children, wife, and friends and fellow citizens gener ally, since a human being is by nature political.57 Of these, some defining mark must be found; for if we extend the list to ancestors and descendants and to friends’ friends, it will go on without limit.58 But we must investigate this on another occasion. In any case, we posit that the self-sufficient is what, on its own, makes a life choiceworthy and lacking in nothing, and this, we think, is what happiness is like.

Further, we think it is the most choiceworthy of all things, when not counted among them.59 But if it is counted among them, it clearly would be more choiceworthy with the addition of the least of goods; for what is added would bring about a superabundance of goods, and, of goods, the greater one is always more choiceworthy.

Happiness, then, is apparently something complete and self-sufficient, being the end of what is doable in action

But perhaps to say that happiness is the best good appears to be some thing [generally] acknowledged, and a clearer statement of what it is, is still required. Maybe, then, this would come about if the function of the human being were grasped.60 For just as for a pipe player, a sculp tor, every craftsman, and in general for whatever has some function and action, the good—the doing well—seems to lie in the function, the same also seems to hold of a human being, if indeed there is some function that is his.

Are there, then, some functions and actions of a carpenter and of a shoemaker but none at all of a human being? And is he by nature idle? Or, rather, just as of eye, hand, foot, and of each part generally there seems to be some function, may we likewise also posit some function of a human being that is beyond all these?61

What, then, could this be? For living is evidently shared with plants as well, but we are seeking what is special.62 Therefore, we must set aside the living that consists in nutrition and growth. Next in order is some sort of perceptual living.63 But this too is evidently shared with the horse, the cow, and every animal.

T here remains, then, some sort of practical living of the part that has reason. And of what has reason, one part has it due to obeying reason, the other due to having it and exercising thought.64 But living is said of things in two ways, and we must take the one in accord with activity; for this seems to be called “living” in a fuller sense.65

If, then, the function of a human being is activity of the soul in accord with reason or not without reason, and the function of a sort of thing, we say, is the same in kind as the function of an excellent thing of that sort (as in the case of a lyre player and an excellent lyre player), and this is uncondi tionally so in all cases when we add to the function the superiority that is in accord with the virtue (for it is characteristic of a lyre player to play the lyre and of an excellent one to do it well)—if all this is so, and a human being’s function is supposed to be a sort of living, and this living is supposed to be activity of the soul and actions that involve reason, and it is characteristic of an excellent man to do these well and nobly, and each is completed well when it is in accord with the virtue that properly belongs to it—if all this is so, the human good turns out to be activity of the soul in accord with virtue and, if there are more virtues than one, then in accord with the best and most complete.66 Further, in a complete life.67 For one swallow does not make a spring, neither does one day. Nor, similarly, does one day or a short time make someone blessed and happy.68

Let the good, then, be sketched in this way; for perhaps one should out line first and fill in the details later. But it would seem that anyone can develop and articulate the things in the outline that have been correctly done, and that time is a good discoverer and co-worker in such matters. This is even the source of advances in the crafts; for anyone can produce what is missing.69

We must also remember what was said previously and not seek exact ness in everything alike, but in each case one that is in accord with the subject matter and to the degree sought by the methodical inquiry that properly belongs to it.70 For in fact a carpenter and a geometer inquire differently about the right angle. A carpenter does so to the degree that is useful for his work, while a geometer inquires about what it is or what sort of thing; for he is a contemplator of the truth.71 We must do things in just the same way, then, in other cases, so that side issues do not overwhelm the works themselves.72

Neither must we demand the cause in all cases alike.73 Rather, in some cases it will be adequate if the fact that they are so has been correctly proved—as it is indeed where starting-points are concerned.74 And the that is a first thing and a starting-point.75

We get a theoretical grasp on some starting-points through induction, some through perception, some through some sort of habituation, and oth ers through other means.76 In each case one must try to pursue each sort in the way appropriate to its nature and make very serious efforts to define them correctly; for they are of great and decisive importance regarding what follows. It seems indeed that the starting-point is more than half the whole, and that many of the things we were inquiring about will become evident through it.