Aristotle (2024) Nicomachean Ethics 1.8

Aristotle (2024). Nicomachean Ethics. Second Edition. Translated With Introduction and Notes By C. D. C. Reeve Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company

 

1.8 The function argument defended

We must investigate happiness, however, not only in accord with the con clusions and premises of our argument but also in accord with the things that are said about it; for all the facts are in tune with a true view, while the truth soon clashes with a false one.77

Goods, then, have been divided into three sorts, with some said to be external, some relating to the soul, and some to the body.78 The goods relat ing to soul are most fully such, and, we say, are goods to the highest degree, and we take the actions and activities of the soul to be goods relating to soul. So what we have said is correct, according to this view at least, which is of long standing and agreed to by philosophers.79

It is correct even in saying that actions and activities of some sort are the end; for that way the end turns out to be one of the goods relating to soul, and not one of the external ones.

The saying that the one who is happy both lives well and does well is also in tune with our argument; for happiness has been pretty much defined as a sort of living well and doing well.

Again, all the things that are looked for where happiness is concerned apparently hold of what we have said it is. For to some it seems to be vir tue, to others practical wisdom, to others some sort of theoretical wisdom, while to others it seems to be these, or one of these, involving pleasure or not without pleasure. Other people include external prosperity as well. Some of these views are held by many and are of long standing, while oth ers are held by a few reputable men. And it is not reasonable to suppose that either group is entirely wrong, but rather that they are correct on one point at least or even on most.80

With those who say that happiness is virtue or a certain sort of virtue, our argument is in tune; for activity in accord with virtue is characteristic of virtue.81 But it makes no small difference, presumably, whether we sup pose the best good to consist in virtue’s possession or in its use—that is, in the state or in the activity.82 For it is possible for the state to exist while accomplishing nothing good—for example, for the person who is sleeping or out of action in some other way. But the same will not hold of the activ ity; for he will necessarily be doing an action and doing it well. And just as in the Olympic Games it is not the noblest and strongest who get the victory crown but the competitors (for it is among these that the ones who win are found), so also among the noble and good aspects of life it is those who act correctly who win the prizes.

Further, their life is intrinsically pleasant. For being pleased is among the things that belong to soul, and to each person the pleasant is that by reference to which he is said to be a lover of such-and-such—as, for example, a horse in the case of a lover of horses, and a play in that of a lover of plays. In the same way, just things are pleasant to a lover of justice and the things in accord with virtue as a whole are pleasant to a lover of virtue.

The things that are pleasant to ordinary people, however, are in conflict because they are not by nature pleasant, while it is the things by nature pleasant that are pleasant to lovers of what is noble. And actions in accord with virtue are like this, so that they are pleasant both to such people and intrinsically.

Their life, then, has no need of a pleasure that is superadded to it, like some sort of appendage, but has the pleasure within itself. For besides what we have already said, the person who does not enjoy doing noble actions is not good; for no one would call a person “just” who did not enjoy doing just actions, or generous if he did not enjoy doing generous ones, and simi larly as regards the others.

If that is so, however, actions in accord with virtue would be intrinsically pleasant. But they are also good, of course, and noble as well. Further, they are each of these things to the highest degree, if indeed an excellent person judges them correctly—and he judges them in the way we have said.83

Therefore, happiness is what is best, noblest, and most pleasant. And these qualities are not distinguished in the way the Delian inscription says:

The noblest thing is the most just; the best to be healthy; Most pleasant of all, however, is to get what one loves.84

For the best activities possess them all. And it is these—or the one among them that is best—that we say happiness is.

Nonetheless, it apparently needs external goods to be added, as we said; for it is impossible or not easy to do noble actions without supplies; for just as we perform many actions by means of instruments, we perform many by means of friends, wealth, and political capacity.85 Then again, there are some whose deprivation disfigures blessedness, such as good breeding, good children, and noble looks; for we scarcely have the stamp of happi ness if we are extremely ugly in appearance, ill-bred, living a solitary life, or childless, and have it even less, presumably, if our children or friends are totally bad or were good but have died.86

Just as we said, then, happiness does seem to need this sort of prosperity to be added.87 That is what leads some people to identify good luck with happiness and others to identify virtue with happiness.88