Aristotle (2024) Nicomachean Ethics 3.1

Aristotle (2024). Nicomachean Ethics. Second Edition. Translated With Introduction and Notes By C. D. C. Reeve Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company

 

3.1 Voluntary and involuntary action

Since virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, then, and it is the vol untary ones that are praised and blamed, while the involuntary ones elicit sympathetic consideration and are sometimes even pitied, it is perhaps necessary for those who are investigating issues relating to virtue to make some determinations about the voluntary and the involuntary.181 This is also useful to legislators regarding honors and punishments.

The involuntary seems to be what comes about by force or because of ignorance. Also, what is forced is what has a starting-point that comes from outside, that is, the sort of starting-point where the agent, or the one being affected, contributes nothing—as, for example, if the wind or human beings with control over him took him off somewhere.

Actions done because of fear of greater evils or because of something noble—for example, if a tyrant with control over one’s parents and children ordered one to do something shameful and, if one does it, they would be saved, while, if one does not do it, they would be put to death—give rise to disputes about whether the actions are involuntary or voluntary.

The same sort of dispute also arises about cases of throwing cargo over board in a storm; for no one simply throws it overboard voluntarily, but to preserve himself and all the rest, anyone with understanding does do it.

These sorts of actions are mixed, then, although they more closely resemble voluntary ones; for they are choiceworthy at the time when they are done, and the end of the actions is in accord with the opportune moment. Both voluntary and involuntary, then, must be ascribed with reference to the time at which the agent does these actions. And the agent does do them voluntarily; for in fact the starting-point of his moving his instru mental parts in actions of this sort is internal to himself, and—because the starting-point is internal to himself—it is also up to him whether to do them or not.183 Such actions, then, are voluntary. Unconditionally, though, they are presumably involuntary; for no one would choose anything of this sort for what it intrinsically is.

People are sometimes even praised for actions of this sort, when they endure something shameful or painful in exchange for great and noble things, while if it is the reverse, they are blamed; for to endure the most shameful things for something not at all noble or only moderately so is characteristic of the base person. And in some cases it is not praise we give but sympathetic consideration, when someone does some action one should not do because of things that overstrain human nature and that no one could endure.

In some cases, however, there is presumably no being compelled. On the contrary, rather than do them one should die having suffered the most terrible things; for in fact the things that compelled Euripides’ Alcmaeon to kill his mother are evidently ridiculous.

But it is sometimes difficult to distinguish what must be chosen in exchange for what or what must be endured in exchange for what, and more difficult still to stand by what we have determined; for, as the expected consequences are for the most part painful, what we are compelled to do is shameful. That is what leads people to give praise or blame to those who are compelled or not compelled.

What sorts of things, then, must we say are forced? Or is it that things are unconditionally forced when their cause lies in external factors and the agent contributes nothing? But the ones that are intrinsically involun tary, though choiceworthy on this occasion in exchange for these things, and where the starting-point is internal to the agent—these, though intrin sically involuntary, are, on this occasion and done in exchange for these things, voluntary. But they more closely resemble voluntary ones; for the actions lie in the particulars and these particular actions are voluntary.185 But what sorts of things must be chosen for what is not easy to give an account of, since there are many differences in the particulars.

If someone were to say that pleasant things and noble things force us (for they are external and compel us), then for him everything would be forced; for everyone does every action for the sake of these. Moreover, people who are forced to act and act involuntarily find it painful, while those who act because of the pleasant or the noble do it with pleasure.

It is ridiculous, then, for the agent to hold external things responsible but not himself for being easily ensnared by such things, and to hold himself responsible for his noble actions but pleasant things responsible for his shameful ones.

What comes about by force, then, seems to be that whose starting-point is external, nothing being contributed by the one who is forced.

All of what is done because of ignorance, however, is not voluntary, although it is contra-voluntary when involving pain and regret; for the person who has done whatever it is because of ignorance, but sees noth ing repulsive in his action, has not acted voluntarily, because he did not know what he was doing.187 But neither has he acted contra-voluntarily, because he is not pained by it. Of those people, then, who act because of ignorance, the one who regrets what he did seems a contra-voluntary agent. The one who does not regret, since he is a different case, let him be a “non-voluntary” agent; for since he is different, it is better for him to have a special name.

Acting because of ignorance, however, seems to be different from act ing in ignorance; for the person who is drunk or angry does not seem to act because of ignorance but because of one of the conditions mentioned, although he does not act knowingly but in ignorance. But every depraved person is ignorant of the things one should do and the things one should abstain from, and it is because of this sort of error that unjust people—and bad people generally—come about.

But a case is not meant to be called “involuntary” if someone is ignorant of what things are advantageous; for ignorance in our deliberate choice is not a cause of something’s being involuntary but of depravity, and igno rance of the universal (for people are blamed for ignorance of this sort) is not a cause either, but ignorance of the particulars in which the action lies and with which it is concerned; for in these lie the basis for both pity and sympathetic consideration; for it is the person who is ignorant of one of these particulars who acts involuntarily.

Perhaps it is not a bad thing, then, to make some determinations about these, what they are and how many they are. When someone acts, then, we can ask, who? what? concerning what? or, in what? and sometimes, with what? (for example, with what instrument?), for the sake of what? (for example, preservation), and, in what way? (for example, weakly or intensely).

No one who is not a madman could be ignorant about all of these or, clearly, about who is doing the action; for how could he be ignorant about himself? But about what he is doing, he might be ignorant, as when people say that things just slipped out while they were talking or that they didn’t know they were a secret, as Aeschylus said about the Mysteries or that they wished to do a demonstration and it went off, as the man said about the catapult.190 Or someone might think that her son was the enemy, as Merope did, or that a spear had a guard on the point or that the stone was pum ice stone or he might give someone a drink with a view to preserving his life but end up killing him or mean to give someone a light tap (as sparring partners do) and knock him out.191

Since about all these things ignorance is possible and these are the ones in which the action lies, the person who is ignorant of one of them seems to have acted involuntarily—most of all so if he is ignorant of the ones with most control. And the ones with most control seem to be the ones in which the action lies and what it is for the sake of.192 What is called “involuntary” on the basis of this sort of ignorance, then, must also cause pain and regret.

Because the involuntary consists, then, of what comes about by force or because of ignorance, the voluntary would seem to be what has its starting-point in the agent himself, when he knows the particulars in which the action lies.

For actions done because of spirit or appetite are presumably not cor rectly said to be involuntary. For, first of all, none of the other animals will then act voluntarily and neither will children. Second, are none of the actions we do because of appetite or spirit done voluntarily, or are the noble ones voluntary and the shameful ones involuntary? Or is that certainly ridiculous, since they have a single cause? But presumably it is strange to call the things we should desire “involuntary.” And one should be angry at certain things and have an appetite for certain things—for example, health and learning. It also seems that involuntary things are painful, while those in accord with appetite are pleasant.

Further, what difference in involuntariness is there between errors made on the basis of rational calculation and those made on the basis of spirit? Both indeed are to be avoided. But the non-rational feelings seem to be no less human, so that actions resulting from spirit and appetite are no less the actions of human beings. It would be strange, then, to count them as involuntary.