Miller (2003) An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (2)

Miller, Alexander (2003). An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Malden, MA: Polity

 

1. Moore's Strong Cognitivism and Account of 'Natural'

In chapter 1 I distinguished between two forms of strong cognitivism: naturalistic strong cognitivism and non-naturalistic strong cognitivism. We can view these theories as theories about the truth-conditions of moral statements.

Naturalistic strong cognitivism holds that the truth-conditions of moral sentences are determined by facts about the instantiation of natural properties, while non-naturalistic strong cognitivism holds that the truth-conditions of moral sentences are determined by facts about the instantiation of non-natural properties.

In Principia Ethica, Moore argues for a version of non-naturalistic strong cognitivism. His reasoning is mainly negative: he argues for non-naturalism by arguing against naturalism. He claims that all naturalistic theories of morals are flawed, because they commit a fallacy, which he labels 'The naturalistic fallacy'.

 

(1) Comment I: Moore on 'natural'

By 'nature', then, I do mean and have meant that which is the subject matter of the natural sciences and also of psychology. It may be said to include all that has existed, does exist, or will exist in time. (Moore [1903] 1993: 92)

 

'자연'에 관한 Moore의 정의: 자연과학과 심리학의 탐구 대상

This characterization has some obvious drawbacks. Firstly, we require some account of what makes a particular science 'natural', an account which begs no questions against ethical naturalism. In addition, the implication in the passage is that psychology is not, in whatever sense Moore had in mind, a 'natural' science. So why characterize the subject matter of psychology as 'natural'? This suggests that there is some deeper characterization of 'nature' such that the subject matters of both the 'natural' sciences and psychology count as part of it. So what is this more fundamental characterization?

Moore의 정의에 대한 두 가지 반론:

[1] "자연과학의 탐구대상"이란 표현 속에 이미 "자연"이 포함되어 있음. 논점 구걸의 오류.

[2] Moore는 자연과학과 심리학을 구분하고 있는데, 만약 그렇다면, 심리학의 탐구 대상을 자연적인 것이라 말할 근거는 무엇인가?

[F]or a property to be natural is for it to be causal, that is, to be such that its presence, in suitable conditions, brings about certain effects. (Baldwin 1993: xxii)

[Moore] was willing to accept a criterion for 'non-natural' which suggested that a non-natural property was one which could not be discerned by the senses. (Warnock 1960: 15)

Moore의 정의에 대한 두 가지 보완

[1] Baldwin: 자연적인 속성이란 그것의 존재가 적절한 조건 아래에서 특정한 효과를 가져오는, 즉 결과를 산출하는 원인으로서 인과적인 것임.

[2] Warnock: 비-자연적 속성을 제시하는 자연적인 것의 기준이란 감각에 의해서 식별될 수 있는지의 여부.

(2) Comment 2: Was Moore a strong cognitivist?   

Strong cognitivist의 두 가지 요건은, (a) moral judgements are truth-apt, and (b) moral judgements can be the upshot of cognitively accessing the facts which render them true. 그런데 Moore의 다음 인용문은 일견 (b)를 거부하는 것으로 보임.

I wish it to be observed that, when I call [moral] propositions 'intuitions', I mean merely to assert that they are incapable of proof; I imply nothing whatever as to the manner or origin of our cognition of them. (Moore [1903] 1993: 37)