Does Locke’s account of Personal Identity Include Circularity?

2024-1 Seminar Metaphysics

 

1. A Fundamental Issue in the Philosophy of the Self

One of the fundamental issues in the philosophy of the self is to elucidate what ensures the continuity of personal identity. Put differently, the specific question would be as follows: What criteria determine that a person at time t1 is numerically the same as that person at time t2? This is because (1) we perceive ourselves as existing not only at a single point in time (synchronic) but over a duration from t1 to t2 (diachronic); (2) the selves perceived in each point in time are considered not merely qualitatively identical (like two exactly resembling billiard balls), but numerically one and the same; and (3) events such as recovery from a coma or death plausibly show that personal identity is maintained only when certain criteria are met. This query leads us into a metaphysical predicament notwithstanding its phenomenological certainty.

It is worth noting that there are two main approaches to the criteria for the diachronic numerical identity of persons: (1) the physical criterion (e.g., the body or brain) and (2) the psychological criterion (e.g., memory, personality, traits, beliefs, desires, or intention). In a nutshell, the proponent of the physical criterion holds that the nature of my personal identity lies in the continuity of material objects, whereas the defender of the psychological criterion appeals to several psychological factors. Although the physical criterion has the advantage of being the simplest explanation that reconciles with physicalism, there are several notable challenges against this approach. For instance, one of such challenges to the physical criterion is the fact that nearly all the cells in our body are replaced with new ones within a year; if this is the case, how can we find the continuity of personal identity in a persistently changeable body? Furthermore, several philosophers raise additional objections in the forms of thought experiments, where the body appears unchanged, yet personal identity shifts, or vice versa. These cases not only show the defects of the physical criterion, but also strongly indicate that the psychological criterion is on the right track; for it appears that in determining whether there has been a substantial change in personal identity, we de facto consider the psychological factors (such as memory, personality, traits, etc.) that a person possesses.

2. Locke’s Memory Criterion and the Circularity Objection

As is widely known, John Locke is a pioneer in the theory of the psychological criteria for personal identity. His accounts are often referred to as the “simple memory theory of personal identity,” for it succinctly explains that “just as your pinkie finger is part of you by virtue of your being aware of it, a past act is one done by you by virtue of your being aware of it, or remembering it.” (Gideon 2007: 216) To illustrate this, Locke first clarifies the definition of ‘person’ and presents the relation between consciousness and thinking (perceiving), which are conceptually different but substantially inseparable, as follows:

This being premised, to find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive without perceiving that he does perceive. […] For since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that, which makes everyone to be, what he calls self; and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: And as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it is the same self now it was then; and 'tis by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that action was done. (Locke 1959: 448-449)

As is also well-known, Locke’s memory criterion faces a serious objection from Butler, who accuses it of resulting in a logical fallacy: circularity. According to Butler, “one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and cannot therefore constitute, personal identity any more than knowledge, in any other case, can constitute truth, which it presupposes” (Butler 1975: 100).

To comprehend the crux of Butler’s objection, it should be noted that Locke’s account is quite vague, especially the relation between consciousness and memory. As Weinberg points out, “it is not so clear […] exactly what Locke meant by ‘consciousness’ or by ‘having the same consciousness.’” (Weinberg 2011: 398) It is an open question whether Locke indeed regarded consciousness as the same as memory, or a first personal distinctive experience of the qualitative features of one’s own thinking (Weinberg 2011: 398).

From this point of view, let me briefly outline Butler’s objection as a dilemma: as Locke himself acknowledges, a person is thought to be a thinking intelligent being that can perceive that he does perceive. Therefore, if Locke’s claim amounts to saying that my consciousness is exactly the same as the totality of my perception, there would be no proper interpretation of modal operator in this sentence; for it is now interpreted as “perception can perceive that perception does perceive,” which leads to a nonsensical sentence.

On the other hand, suppose that what Locke suggests as the basis for personal identity is not synonymous with consciousness itself. Then, the continuity of psychological features and states would already presuppose the notion of personal identity. For instance, memories cannot be connected or disconnected with each other in the first place unless they are possessed by one and the same person. As Flew argues, “It is absurd to say that ‘he is the same person’ means that ‘he can remember that he is the same person’” (Flew 1951: 55). We usually say that memory is the product of one’s past experience. And if this is the meaning of memory, then personal identity, which is to be explained, is already contained in the concept of memory. Thus, Locke’s account of personal identity includes a vicious circle and, thereby, cannot be the proper criterion of personal identity.

References

Butler, J. (1975), “Of Personal Identity,” John Perry (ed.), Personal Identity, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, pp. 99-105.

Flew, A. (1951), “Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity,” Philosophy, 26 (96), pp. 53–68.

Gideon Y. (2007), “Locke on Ideas of Identity and Diversity,” Lex Newman (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 192-230.  

Locke, J (1959), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, A. C. Fraser (ed.), Garden City, NY: Dover Publications.

Weinberg, S. (2011), “Locke on Personal Identity,” Philosophy Compass 6 (6), 398–407.