Metzinger on the No-Self Alternative

2023-2 Metaphysics of the Self Segment 1 (T. Metzinger, "The No-Self Alternative")

 

Q) What is Metzinger’s primarily target of Ontologicial anti-realism

Metzinger suggests the ontological anti-realism about the self (ARSO), which claims the self is not a substance. In other words, selves are not self-subsistent entities. The target of this claim is to reveal that there is no solid basis for assuming the existence of selves in folk-phenomenological discourse. Although Metzinger admits that selves are phenomenological everyday objects, there are no empirical evidences and plausible approaches (e.g. classical scientific realism, the haecceity approach, and bundle theory) to support the metaphysics of objecthood of selves.

 

Q) Metzinger pointed out that we have no empirical evidence and no truly convincing conceptual argument that supports the actual existence of 'a' self. Is his view plausible?

Metzinger’s metaphysical world-view is based on his bundle theory (dynamical self-organization), which considers selves as collections of properties, relations, and experiences. However, bundle theory has several defects; the most traditional objection to the bundle theory is that it leads us to skepticism. If selves reduce to experience, we cannot guarantee any certainty of knowledge including logic and mathematics. Another challenge can be raised by pointing out that the sense of self is often associated with the unity of consciousness. Metzinger doesn’t explain how we can perceive ourselves as a unified entity as the subject of experience.