2023-2 Metaphysics of the Self Segment 2 ( H. Noonan, "An Initial Survey", ch.1 of Personal Identity )
Q) State the metaphysical problem of personal identity. Are philosophers after the numerical or qualitative identity of persons through time? Make sure to briefly explain the difference between these two concepts.
Generally, identity is conceptually distinguished into (1) Qualitative identity (i.e., identity of properties) and (2) Numerical identity (i.e., identity of one and the same thing). While the former refers to the sameness of two things sharing the same qualities, properties, or characteristics (e.g., two exactly resembling billiard balls), the latter refers to the identity of one and the same thing with its possible changes of properties (e.g., Socrates is identical with himself).
Philosophers are after the numerical identity of persons through time. Thus, they seek the necessary and sufficient conditions for the diachronic numerical identity of persons. This task can be reframed as a question: “what are the criteria for person at t1 is as numerically same as person at t2.”
It is also worth noting that such criteria are metaphysical, rather than evidential. For the task is to present the nature of personal identity, not answering a question of what actually counts as evidence for personal identity. Thus, giving the criteria for the diachronic numerical identity of persons belongs to the metaphysical problem of personal identity.
Q) What are the two main approaches to personal identity that we find in the philosophical literature? Which approach are you inclined to endorse?
The two main approaches to personal identity are (1) the attempts to suggest the physical criterion of personal identity and (2) the attempts to suggest the psychological criterion of personal identity. The defenders of the former claim that personal identity is as fundamentally same as the identity of material objects in general. However, there is disagreement about what kind of material objects in our bodies are essential for maintaining personal identity. While some scholars have argued that P1 at t1 is the same person as P2 at t2 if and only if P1 and P2 share most of the same organs (Bodily Criterion), others have argued that P1 at t1 is the same person as P2 at t2 if and only if P1 and P2 have most of the same living brain (Brain Criterion).
On the other hand, the defenders of the psychological criterion hold that P1 at t1 is the same person as P2 at t2 if and only if P1 and P2 are psychologically continuous. Again, there is disagreement about what kind of psychological features and states in our mind are indispensable for sustaining personal identity. John Locke, for instance, claimed that memory is only involved in our awareness of personal identity over time. His view is thus often called the memory criterion. On the contrary, a modern and sophisticated view emphasizes that other psychological features and states such as personality, traits, beliefs, desires, and intentions also should be considered.
I espouse the psychological criterion rather than the bodily criterion. I believe that personal identity possesses a unique and qualitative characteristic that cannot be physically reduced, similar to qualia. Like the relationship between eyes and color perceptions, there is no evidence for assuming that the brain is the sufficient condition of personal identity even if it might be the necessary condition of it. Therefore, it is more reasonable to assume that their relationship can be properly explained through supervenience.
Q) State the Circularity Objection to the psychological criterion of personal identity.
The Circularity Objection states that the continuity of psychological features and states already presupposes the notion of personal identity. For instance, memories cannot be connected or disconnected with each other in the first place unless they are possessed by one and the same person.
We usually say that memory is the product of one’s past experience. And if this is the meaning of memory, personal identity, which is to be explained, is already contained in the concept of memory. Thus, it cannot be the proper creation of personal identity.
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