Barnes on Disability (2)

2024-2 Social Ontology

 

1. Barnes argues against Naturalistic Accounts of disability which appeal to departures from normal functioning, and to the lack of ability that most people have. Which counterexamples does Barnes provide to these accounts? Do you find her arguments to be compelling? Briefly explain.  

Naturalistic Accounts of Disability, also known as Normal Function Views, are prevalent in the public discourse. One way to articulate this perspective is as follows:

S is disabled, in a context C, iff:
(i) S has a pathology—that is, some part of their body performs its normal function at statistically subtypical levels;
(ii) In C, that pathology causes effects that make a difference, of kind D, to how S ought legally or morally to be treated.

As Barnes points out, the underlying assumptions here are that there is a standard of normal functioning for humans, and that deviations from that norm are disabilities (or diseases). It is considered naturalistic, as the standard of normal functioning is not set by social norms but by biological functions.

Barnes’s first counterexample to this view is that there are counterintuitive cases such as Michael Phelps or Spiderman. True, Michael Phelps, in a biological sense, departures from statistically typical functioning regarding swimming. However, no one would say that Michael Phelps is disabled.

To address this, one might offer an alternative definition such that “disabilities are negative departures from statistically typical functioning, where ‘negative’ means deviation from the organism’s design, rather than something normative or value-laden.” However, this definition is also insufficient, since certain bodily features of Phelps may augment the risk of heart problems and enhance the ability to swim simultaneously.

Barnes also considers another alternative, which defines disability as “the lack of an ability that most people have.” However, it is unclear how to specify the lack of ability that most people have in cases such as rheumatoid arthritis or achondroplasia. I believe her counterexamples are compelling and effectively challenge the belief that there are natural norms to determine the boundaries of disability.

 

2. Articulate the main features of Barnes’s Solidarity Model of disability.                              

Barnes proposes that disability is constructed through the disability rights movement, which is spontaneously formed by individuals who are disabled. Since it emphasizes social cohesion, Barnes’s definition can be called the Solidarity Model of disability.

According to her own account, a person, S, is physically disabled in a context, C, iff:
(1) S is in some bodily state;  
(2) The rules for making judgements about solidarity employed by the disability rights movement classify x in context C as among the physical conditions that they are seeking to promote justice for.

Barnes’s definition of disability is based on the sense of commonality that has been developed through solidarity among socially marginalized individuals.

The main features of Barnes’s model are as follows: first, it allows us to move away from the danger of defining disability in a naturalistic way and consider it as a social construct. In short, “disability is socially constructed from group solidarity.” Second, the definition follows the spirit of what Haslanger called “ameliorative analysis,” serving as a tool of resistance against injustice. Third, the definition allows individuals who are allegedly disabled to define disability in internal and positive ways, departing from the perspective that defines it solely in negative ways from external standpoints. This properly accounts for why some people express their disabilities as an identity with pride.

 

3. What do you take to be the strongest objection to Barnes’s account?          

I think Barnes’s definition is not free from the exclusion problem, which arises when certain accounts of disability fail to classify as disabled people who we intuitively think should be included. Although the disability rights movement might represent the experiences of some people with disabilities, it cannot encompass or understand the subjective experiences of all individuals with disabilities.

Arguably, some people with disabilities—unlike those described in Barnes’s ideal model, where people are proud of their disability—may be reluctant to express their identities at all. Others, due to various constraints, may be unable to actively participate in the struggle for justice within the disability rights movement. For instance, conditions such as Lou Gehrig’s disease or intellectual disabilities might prevent individuals from participating in—or even communicating with—the disability rights movement. As a result, the disabled community cannot sufficiently represent the experiences of such individuals.

In this context, defining disabilities without adequately considering these experiences would be arbitrary. Conversely, denying such individuals the right to define themselves as disabled deprives them of the opportunity to integrate their disabilities into their identity. Consequently, these individuals remain consistently vulnerable to injustice.