2024-2 Social Ontology
1. In what way do Jenkins and Webster define the notion of marginalized functioning? Present examples to illustrate this concept and the distinction between marginalized functioning and marginalization.
To develop models of disability that unify the category without sidelining the body, Jenkins and Webster introduced the notion of marginalized functioning as follows:
A subject S has marginalized functioning relative to a context, C, iff
(i) there is a set of social norms N, comprising n1, n2, … nn, each of which serves as a default for the purposes of constructing common social environments and structuring common social interactions in C; and
(ii) there is some norm in N, nx, such that S cannot physically function in a way that satisfies it.
Jenkins and Webster illustrate this with the example of the inclusion of stairs in buildings. Steps in a building, for instance, already presuppose that people use that building can normally climb stairs. The norm or expectation that people are able to walk up and down steps thus serves as a default for the purposes of constructing common social environments and structuring common social interactions. Admittedly, designers might consider including ramps or lifts in the building for people who cannot use stairs. However, this already indicates that norms regarding stairs are the default, and those who cannot physically function in a way that satisfies those norms need special provisions.
It should be noted that marginalized functioning is differentiated from marginalization. Some might have marginalized functioning without being marginalized. Jenkins and Webster present the example of Anne―who has achondroplasia―in a possible world, requiring special accommodations; however, this need does not result in stigmatization due to firmly established legal obligations. This possible world shows that marginalized functioning does not entail marginalization.
2. Which model of disability that relies on the notion of marginalized functioning is strongest, according to you? Briefly explain your reasoning.
By using the notion of marginalized functioning, Jenkins and Webster propose three models of disability. (i) The simple model simply equates disability with marginalized functioning. (ii) The social model redux aims to provide an adequate account of impairment by equating it with marginalized functioning. This approach basically follows the traditional social model―the claim that to be disabled is to be oppressed on the basis of having an impairment―while avoiding the naturalistic accounts of impairment. (iii) The restricted model―like the social model redux―equates impairment with marginalized functioning, while using a non-normative criterion to pick out a subset of cases of marginalized functioning that constitute disability.
Although the beauty of the simple model lies in its simplicity, it fails to capture our intuition that temporary impairments do not count as disabilities. The social model redux, on the other hand, could avoid equating temporary impairment with disability by arguing that the former does not entail oppression (while the latter does). But the notion of marginalized functioning is not quite helpful to show that disability―as a locus of oppression―is not necessarily bad.
I think the restricted model is the strongest one, as it can address the problem of the simple model without considering oppression as an essential component of disability. More importantly, the restricted model appropriately emphasizes the significance of lasting impairment in the definition of disability.
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