Irwin (2000) Ethics as an inexact science: Aristotle's ambitions for moral theory (1)

Irwin, Terence H. (2000). Ethics as an inexact science: Aristotle's ambitions for moral theory. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral particularism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 100-29.

 

1. Modesty in Ethical Theory

At the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics,' (hereafter EN), Aristotle warns that we must not demand too much exactness in ethical inquiry (1094b11-14). The difficulty of finding an exact account in ethics results not from our lack of diligence, but from an ineliminable feature of the sub ject matter. The variability of fine, just, and good things makes it impossi ble to reach necessary and universal principles; we must say something `roughly and in outline, contenting ourselves with 'usual' (or 'for the most part': hos epi to polu) rather than necessary principles (1094b14-27).

Some readers take these passages about the inexactness of universal claims about ethics to support a 'particularist' interpretation. According to a particularist view, Aristotle does not regard general rules as prescriptive guides to action, and does not seek general principles that will guide agents in deciding that one course of action is morally right and another is wrong.

Some of Aristotle's later remarks have been taken to support particular ism. In his view, what we can say about particular cases is even less exact than what we can say in universal accounts; particular cases must be decided by the agents themselves, who must consider what is opportune (1103b34-1104a2). We cannot be expected to give a full account of particulars. Though we make our account more complete and exact by provid ing the sorts of details that specify the doctrine of the mean, we cannot make it altogether exact (1109b12-23). The gap that is left open by advice stated in general terms has to be filled by 'perception' (1109b12-23, 1126a35—b4; cf. 1112b34-1113a1).

This role for perception reappears in Aristotle's account of prudence (phronêsis). When he claims that prudence is concerned with the 'last thing, namely the particular, he takes it to include some perceptual element (1142a23-30). He connects a perceptual capacity with prudence in his contrast between practical and theoretical understanding (nous) (1143a32—b5). Since prudence does not confine itself to the sorts of general remarks that Aristotle offered in Book II, it must advise us about the par ticular situations that are difficult to capture in a general account. Since particulars are the province of perception, prudence must include the sort of perception that allows us to make the appropriate judgements about particular cases.

According to a particularist view, these passages imply that particular perceptual judgements are the foundation of moral virtue, and that they neither need nor allow any further defence that appeals to general principles. Generalizations, then, are simply incomplete summaries of the con siderations that the virtuous person recognizes.

Aristotle's accounts of the individual virtues may appear to confirm these claims about perception. He provides a series of sketches of people with the different virtues and vices. These sketches do not include the detailed instructions that we might expect if we thought we were being given a set of general rules for achieving the mean. But in the light of Aristotle's claims about inexactness, these sketches are (according to a par ticularist) all we ought to expect. 2 If we want to understand the virtues, we need to grasp what the virtuous person grasps in particular perceptual judgements. We cannot grasp that by learning generalizations that are only incomplete summaries of what the virtuous person grasps. We learn to identify roughly the people who are recognized as virtuous, and we learn from them by imitation, so that we eventually acquire the same perceptual capacity that they possess.

If we argue in this way, we attribute a 'particularist' view to Aristotle, in so far as we claim that, in his view, perceptual judgements about particular situations are normatively prior to general rules. Martha Nussbaum, 3 John McDowell,4 and Jonathan Dancy,5 among others, have defended this posi- tion—both as an account of Aristotle and as the truth, and in speaking of particularist views I have their views primarily in mind.

`Normative priority' is difficult to describe clearly, but it seems to cap ture one significant issue. For particularists need not deny that there are true, even useful, general principles in ethics. Nor need `universalists' deny that the trained perception of the virtuous agent is useful, even indispens able, for acting rightly and living well. The dispute seems to be about pri ority—not about temporal priority in learning, but about theoretical normative priority. Are the true principles true to the extent that they sum marize the particular perceptual judgements of virtuous agents, or are the particular judgements correct in so far as they conform to true general principles?

Critics who have presented the most careful and detailed case for treat ing Aristotle as a particularist are also particularists themselves. It is some times difficult to tell whether they are actually ascribing an argument for particularism to Aristotle himself, or offering their own arguments for Aristotle's conclusions. This difficulty is especially acute when one reads McDowell, who is committed to particularism on the strength of more general Wittgensteinian arguments that are difficult (for those who lack the appropriate perceptual capacity) to see in Aristotle.' It is hardly surprising that my own doubts about the truth of particularism influence me in doubting whether it is to be found in Aristotle.

Still, we can raise a question about Aristotle's view that is distinct from any question we might raise about the truth of particularism. We refute the case for regarding Aristotle as a particularist if we show that we have no good reason to believe that he regards perception of particulars as prior to acceptance of general principles.

To show this, it is not necessary to show Aristotle is a 'universalist' or a `generalist' rather than a particularist; that is to say, he might deny priority to particulars without assigning it to general principles. As I understand particularism and universalism, they are mutually exclusive, but not exhaustive. If we decide that Aristotle is not a particularist, we may then consider whether he is a universalist, or he rejects both particularism and universalism. I am not trying to answer this further question; an answer to it would require us to settle several issues that we can leave open if we are simply considering particularism.

I emphasize this point to make it clear that it would be illegitimate to argue from the moral insufficiency of general principles to the truth of par ticularism. The insufficiency of general principles might (if it is the appro priate kind of insufficiency) constitute an argument against generalism, but it is not sufficient to prove the stronger thesis of particularism, and it is this stronger thesis that I discuss.

My argument is purely exegetical; it seeks to decide whether Aristotle can be shown to be a particularist, not whether particularism is true. Still, it may have some philosophical relevance. For it is probably not an accident that particularists appeal to Aristotle. We might assume that if we accept some familiar and plausible Aristotelian claims about generalizations and perception in ethics, we ought to find particularism at least plausible and intuitively appealing. If this assumption is false, we lose some intuitive sup port for particularism.

 

2. The Inexactness of Ethics

In EN i 3 Aristotle connects the inexactness of ethics with the 'usual' char acter of ethical generalizations. 9 He intends this discussion for the audience at his lectures; his hearers are to recognize inexactness in the theoretical claims and generalizations that he puts forward (1094b19-1095a13). He is not directly concerned, in these remarks in Book 1, with all moral agents or with the generalizations that should be presented to them when they face particular choices in particular situations.

In saying that ethical generalizations are not exact, Aristotle means that (1) they are not about subject matter that allows the truth of unqualified generalizations, and that (2) they are not sufficiently qualified to take account of all the relevant exceptions to unqualified generalizations. This second feature, however, still raises a question. When Aristotle says 'we would not seek the same degree of exactness in all sorts of arguments alike, any more than in the products of different crafts, we might understand him to make either of two claims: (a) The material we are dealing with simply does not allow exact treatment. (b) Even if we could treat it exactly, exact treatment would be inappropriate.

Aristotle gives some examples to clarify his claim that ethical generaliza tions are inexact and merely usual (1094b14-19). He mentions difference and variation in fine and just things, and notices that some people have inferred from this difference and variation that things are just and fine merely by convention. 

Aristotle answers the inference from variation to convention by pointing out that goods are also subject to variation. It would be quite implausible to claim that since some goods sometimes result in harm to their posses sor, what is good for someone is simply a matter of convention. The fact that wealth or bravery sometimes results in harm does not make it a mat ter of convention that it is good for us on some occasions and in some cir cumstances. Similarly, if food is sometimes bad for us, it is not therefore simply a matter of convention whether food is ever good for us. Variation does not support conventionalism." Though ethical generalizations are usual and inexact, they are neither useless nor unimportant.

 

3. The Usual

To see what Aristotle might mean by saying that ethical generalizations are usual, we must distinguish two kinds of regularities that he calls 'usual. I will call these 'frequencies' and 'norms, resulting in 'frequent' and 'normal' regularities. 12 (1) Sometimes, when Aristotle says that F is usually G, he means simply that Fs are Gs more frequently than they are not-G. Human beings, for instance, usually acquire grey hair as they age. This does not happen in every case, but it happens more often than not (APr (Prior Analytics), 32b4-10). (2) Sometimes, however, 'F is usually G' indicates that the natural way for F to be is G, though sometimes F fails to be G. This is why nature includes the usual as well as the necessary and invariable ( GA (De Generatione Animalium), 770b9-17, 777a16-21, Met. (Metaphysics), 1027a8-15). In a given species organs and limbs are formed and work together for the good of the organism. The teleological regularities apply ing to these organs and limbs are the basis for understanding the behaviour of the species, and indeed for counting particular things as members of the species. In this case exceptions to the general rule are 'freaks' (terata) or `deformities' (pêro mata), or at least 'against nature' (GA 770b13-27), since they lack something that belongs to the proper interconnection of limbs, organs, and vital processes.

The difference between these two sorts of usual regularities is important; for only variation from the natural norm implies contrariety to nature. If some people live longer than usual, or their hair falls out before it goes grey, that does not mean that any of the teleological regularities specifying their natural course of behaviour has failed; Aristotle does not limit the natural so strictly that every variation from the most frequent counts as a freak or a deformity.'

The generalizations that express these different sorts of regularities are differently related to observation of particular instances. The generaliza tion that people go grey more often than not must simply be established (let us suppose) by observation; nothing in our general theory about human nature or the functions of human organs makes grey hair especially suitable. By contrast, our view that a human being normally has lungs allowing the appropriate sort of breathing does not rest on mere observa tion of particular instances; it rests on a more general conception of a human being as a goal-directed organism and of the contribution of lungs to a goal-directed system. The claim that this is the normal human condi tion would not be falsified even if it happened that most people lived in polluted air and suffered from diseases of the lungs. Since some of Aristotle's usual generalizations have this normative component, they are not simply the result of observation of statistical frequencies.

The sacrifice of exactness resulting from an appeal to the usual is quite different for the two types of usual generalizations that we have distin guished. If we find only frequencies, we have no Aristotelian science. Aristotle distinguishes the scientific understanding of the explanation from the mere compilation of observed frequencies (Met. 981a12-30). If, how ever, the usual regularities that we find are normative regularities, we have the basis for a science." The teleological aspects of natural organisms are often expressed in usual regularities; nature does not invariably succeed in achieving the end that is naturally appropriate for the organism. Aristotle's recognition of this fact does not make him conclude that teleological regu larities are unimportant for the study of living organisms.

Since normal regularities, those that describe the natural situation, are more suitable than mere frequencies for scientific knowledge, it is reason able to infer that when Aristotle allows scientific knowledge of the usual, he has normal and natural regularities primarily in mind.