Bolton (1990) The Epistemological Basis of Aristotelian Dialectic

Bolton, Robert (1990). The Epistemological Basis of Aristotelian Dialectic. In Daniel Devereux & Pierre Pellegrin, Biologie, Logique et Metaphysique Chez Aristote: Actes du Seminaire Cr.S.-N.S.F., 28 Juin-3 Juillet 1987. Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. pp. 185-236.

1. CONFLICTING VIEWS OF DIALECTIC

In recent accounts of the procedures which Aristotle recommends and uses in order to reach and to justify the results presented in his works reference to his method of dialectic looms large. This is in marked contrast to the approach to Aristotle's methodology offered by leading scholars only a short time ago. Ross, for example, summed up his own account of Aristotle's view of the merits of dialectic in the following way:

The discussion [of dialectic in the Topics] belongs to a bygone mode of thought; it is one of the last efforts of that movement of the Greek spirit towards a general culture, that attempt to discuss all manner of subjects without studying their appropriate first principles, Which we know as the sophistic movement. What distinguishes Aristotle from the sophists, at any rate as they are depicted both by him and by Plato, is that his motive is to aid his hearers and readers not to win either gain or glory by a false appearance of wisdom, but to discuss questions as sensibly as they can be discussed without special knowledge. But he has himself shown a better way, the way of science; it is his own Analyiics that have made his Topics out of date.1

Recent writers have taken a view of dialectic quite opposed to the one summarized by Ross. Finding little or no indication that the method for finding and laying out demonstrations described in the Analylics is actually guiding Aristotle's thought in his philosophical and scientific works, scholars have turned to his descriptions of the method of dialectic, in the Topics and elsewhere, to find the key to understanding his procedures. The following summary assessments express a widely influential current estimate of Aristotle's attitude toward dialectic as a tool for not only philosophical but also scientific inqmry:

[Aristotle] nowhere suggests that any other method will lead to results which conflict with or go beyond the results achieved by the method of endoxa [i.e. by dialectic]. [Aristotle] establishes science on the basis of the opinions of 'the majority' and 'the wise'... He announces time and again that the way to the truth is through the study of 'reputable' opinions [i.e. through dialectic].2

In place of the earlier view that the method of the Analylics supercedes and replaces the method of dialectic, the view now more dominant is that whatever other methodological procedures Aristotle may introduce none is intended in any way to supercede dialectic as the proper method of scientific or other inquiry and, in particular, as the proper method to use to discover the first principles of the sciences. By contrast, the method of searching for and setting out demonstrations which is discussed in the Analylics is commonly taken nowadays to have to do not with genuine discovery or the epistemic justification which that may involve, but only with what is required, after dialectical inquiry is completed, either to systematically display the results of inquiry, or to impart these results to learners or to deeply undersl.and these results.3

Other views of dialectic and its relation to demonstra tion than these two sharply opposed views have been taken. Some have wanted to distinguish those scientific works in which Aristotle's method is dialectical (including, typically, the scientific works we regard as most philosophical such as the Physics, De Anima and Metaphysics) from others in which he uses, or also uses, non-dialectical empirical methods. But even the defenders of this approach have commonly also claimed that for the discovery of first principles in science dialectic is the method which Aristotle recommends and regards as sufficient.• Generally speaking, then, the two sharply opposed views represent the dominant tendencies in recent scholarship and it will be helpful to concentrate on them for the exploration of the epistemological issues to be discussed here.

2. WHAT IS DIALECTIC? A FIRST APPROACH

Before considering these two views of dialectic further, it will be useful to remind ourselves in a general way of what the method of dialectic is, which has been viewed so differently by two different generations of scholars. A convenient place to begin is with the opening sentence of the Rhetoric.

Rhetoric is a partner of dialectic. For both of them are concerned with the sorts of things which it is in a certain way common to everyone to know and which require no specialized knowledge. Thus everyone in a certain way takes part in both dialectic and rhetoric. For everyone on a limited basis engages in examination and in submitting to argument; and also in defending himself and accusing others. (1354al-6).

Here Aristotle points out that dialectic, like rhetoric, is a procedure for argument or reasoning on the basis not of expert knowledge of a given science or other discipline but rather on the basis of what it is "in a certain way common to everyone to know." (1354a2-3) The remark quoted at the head of this discussion, as well as the present passage, makes it clear that, in Aristotle's view, reasoning on such a basis is a fundamental part of the rational life of people in general. In the Rhetoric he explains how this is so. "Everyone on a limited basis engages in examination [of claims] and in submitting to argument [when under examination]." (1354a4-5) We all regularly test the claims of others in deciding whether to accept them, and submit in turn to the testing of our own claims by others, in the ordinary course of life. But this mode of reasoning which everyone engages in, and not just the learned, requires a basis for argument and a method of procedure which is suitable for use by and with everyone. This is dialectic. So just as Aristotle's interest in how the rational life of people in general is best led motivates him to describe and codify the proper technique of rhetoric, which everyone engages in (1354a5-6), it equally motivates him to do the same for dialectic, which everyone also engages in.

At the beginning of his official treatise on dialectic, the Topics, Aristotle makes it clear that a leading feature of the method is a special procedure for arguing for claims and for defending claims against objection. Roughly speaking, on this procedure a claim may be said to be "dialectically justified" just in case either it follows in an appropriate way from items which belong to the existing set of noted or accredited beliefs or it is consistent with (i.e., its contradictory does not follow in an appropriate way from) items in this set of beliefs. (Topics I.I 100al8-30)' The noted or accredited beliefs, or endoxa, which make up this set Aristotle limits to "the things which are accepted by everyone, or by most people; or by the wise - either by all of them, or by most, or by the most famous and distinguished." (Topics I.I. 100b21-3) The noted or accredited beliefs which belong in this collection include not only those which concern some particular subject matter such as physics or ethics but also those which have to do with what Aristotle calls logic (logike), that is with the canons or techniques for arguing about questions of physics or ethics or anything whatever. (1.14 105b!9 ff). The Topics itself is, in fact, mainly concerned with setting out an accredited list of these canons and techniques of argument.

3. OBJECTIONS TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF DIALECTIC

First, Aristotle's method of discovery and of justification in natural science generally is empirical in important respects in which dialectic cannot be. Aristotle requires that scientific theories are reached and confirmed ultimately by reference to the data of perceptual observation by contrast with accredited beliefs or endoxa. (De Caelo IIl.4 303a20-23 with IIl.7 306a3-17: both quoted shortly below.)

In his actual practice in his scientific works he often appeals to new perceptual data which, as he sometimes explicitly claims, contradict all standing opinion; and he uses reports of observations which come from sources (such as "some experienced fishermen") which fall outside all of the sanctioned sources of endoxa.12 Put simply, the data base which science works and reasons from includes items which do not count as endoxa. So since dialectic is restricted in its data base to endoxa13 the method of science cannot simply be dialectic. This is brought out quite explicitly in a famous passage from Genera/ion of Animals III.10 (760b27-33) which concludes Aristotle's discussion of how bees reproduce.

This is the way things appear to stand concerning the genesis of bees on the basis of reasoned argument and the things which are acc�pted (ta sumbainein dokounla) about bees. But the facts have not been adequately ascertained and if they ever are to be, credence must be given more to perception than to reasoned arguments, and to reasoned arguments only if what they show is in agreement with the phainomena.

Here Aristotle explicitly cites a case where the agreement of some theory with what is "accepted," which would at least include agreement with the endoxa, is not enough. Further data he says, are required. And the primary test for the credibility of further data, and of any theorizing based on them, is not whether they become endoxa or how they fit with the endoxa but whether those data are perceptual phainomena. It cannot be claimed that this requirement is one which Aristotle invokes only for certain (empirical) sciences and not for others. In the Analylics Aristotle explicitly invokes this requirement for "any art or science whatever." (APr. 1.30 46al7 ff, quoted immediately below.)

Secondly, Aristotle makes it clear that proper scientific method must aim to secure explanations in a way that goes beyond what dialectic can achieve. This comes out most clearly if we consider the requirements for adequate definition prescribed by dialectic. Dialectic requires, and provides a method for reaching, definitions which are inferable from or at least consistent with the endoxa or an appropriate subset of the endoxa. (Topics 100al8-21. The main lines of argument (lopoi) for dealing with definitions are given in Topics VI-VII.) But adequate scientific definitions must satisfy a different requirement. They must be capable of explaining the phainomena. (De Anima I.l 402bl6-403a2, Prior Analytics 1.30 46al7-22 both quoted below.) Among these data may be items which do not count as endoxa, for reasons explained above, and the relation required between the data and the definition is stronger than mere derivability or consistency."

It does not make good sense for it to turn out [as the Platonists claim] that one element alone [earth] has no part in the transformation [of the elements into each other]. Neither is it apparent on the basis of perception; rather [on this count] all [the elements] change equally into each other. 'As a result these theorists are offering accounts which concern the phainomena while their accounts are not in agreement with the phainomena. The reason for this is that they have not proceeded in the proper manner in the positing of their first principles because they were determined to bring everything into conformity with certain fixed ideas. For surely the first principfes which concern sensible things must conform to the sensible, those which concern eternal things to the eternal _ , those which concern perishable things to the perishable: in general, principles must be conformable to their subjects. But because of their affection for their principles they have behaved like people who are set to defend their theses for the sake of argument. For holding their principles fixed as true they abide any consequence [of them] not seeing that it is necessary to judge some types of principles in the light-of their consequences, in particular of what is ultimate. The ultimate thing in the case of practical knowledge is the product, in the case of natural science it is the always authoritative perceptual phainomenon. (De Caelo lII.7 306a3 ff.)

The reader of such remarks and others like them (e.g., GC 1.2 316a5 13, HA 1.6 49la7 ff, GA III.10 760b27-33) might naturally be led, as Ross and his contemporaries were, to a view of Aristotle's theory of justification in science quite at odds with the currently standard one. In collecting the appropriate range of empirical phainomena and explaining them (in accordance with the canons of the theory of demonstration) why does the scientist need to pay any attention at all to endoxa as such? What is important is to collect the proper empirical data and explain them. Whether some or all of these data are endoxa seems irrelevant; as does the matter of whether the theories one offers to explain the data cohere with the endoxa. Looking to the body of noted or accredited belief would seem to have, at most, pragmatic utility, by serving to direct attention to possibly significant data or possibly promising theories; but no capacity to guarantee discovery and no value as such for justification. What guarantees discovery and what counts for judging the correctness of theories, it would seem, is the genuine empirical status of the data explained and the genuine explanatory power of the theories. As noted above, Aristotle invokes this require ment not simply for the natural sciences (as in De Caelo 111.7) but (in Prior Analytics 1.30) for "any art or science whatever."

We need to explain why Aristotle should give speciai status in scientific method quite generally to endoxa and to the method of dialectic which reasons from them, in view of the limitations of dialectic as a tool for discovery and justification in science. In particular, we need to understand in this connection why Aristotle should require the scientist to care at all about what people in general credit in' physics or biology, or other sciences.

4. How TO Do DIALECTIC: Some INITIAL Questions

The purpose of this study is to discover a method whereby we shall be able to reason syllogistically from endoxa about any problem which may present itself and shall be able to submit to an argument ourselves without saying anything inconsistent. (Topics I.I lOOalS-21)

There are then, according to the passage above, two primary requirements for the answerer in a dialectical discussion: (1) to submit to reasoning from endoxa and (2) to avoid inconsistency. But these requirements are, of course, in potential conflict. Suppose the endoxa on the topic under discussion are inconsistent among themselves. As we have noted, the endoxa include the views of the majority but also the views of the experts, and Aristotle is well aware that on topics worth discussion the views of these two groups tend to conflict, both with each other and among themselves. (Top. I.I I) If the answerer is required to submit to any valid reasoning from any endoxa then his task of avoiding inconsistency would seem to be impossibly difficult. By the same token, the task of the questioner would seem trivially easy. What procedure is to be followed, then, in case of conflict among the endoxa? Is each party permitted to rely on whatever consistent subset of the endoxa he may choose? Is the maximal consistent set the appropriate one for both parties?

5. DIFFERENT FORMS OF DIALECTIC

It is unjust to find fault with those who reach a true conclusion from false premises; for what is false must always be syllogistically inferred from false premises and even what is true can sometimes be syllogistically inferred from false premises. (162a8-ll; cf. 161a24 ff, 126b27)

This is not, in Aristotle's view, an unjust criticism of a dialectical argument in its own right. Dialectical arguments can be criticized or defused (luein) for having false premises (VIII.I I 161b21; 10 160b5, 23 39); and a dialectical argument with false premises is a "bad argument." (VIII.I I 161b7 with 161a24 ff) It is, sometimes, an unjust criticism of the performance of some person who has argued from premises which are, though false, as endoxon as possible on some difficult and problematic topic. (VIII.II 161b6-8 with a24 ff) But the merits of the performance do not mitigate the demerits of the argument. (b7) So this remark cannot be used, as it often has been, to show that dialectic is an unsuitable procedure to use in the search for truth. To understand how dialectic can be so used, however, our first concern must be to understand what it is for a dialectical argument to be, by the impersonal standard, as commendable as possible. That is, we want to know what it would be for a dialectical argument to be based on premises which are "most endoxon" in an absolute sense. As a prelude to this, it will be useful to consider, in more detail than is usual, how a dialectical discussion works to achieve the result that reasoning proceeds from what is most endoxon, or as endoxon as possible, at least on the subject in question. 

6. GIVE AND TAKE IN DIALECTICAL INQUIRY

Sometimes it seems to be supposed that a dialectical discussion is a very formal affair where there is little or no room for give and take. The questioner asks whether the answerer will concede certain premises and the answerer, unless perhaps he has a question about the meaning of a premise, must say simply "yes" or "no."19 Questioning proceeds until enough concessions are extracted to produce an argument which is then evaluated in isolation from other arguments and claims. Aristotle perhaps gives this impression in Topics VIII.7, but it is clear from the surrounding chapters that a dialectical discussion typically involves much more give and take than this. From the consideration of how this give and take normally goes, we can see how a dialectical discussion draws on, or comes to draw on, premises which are "most endoxon," on the subject in question.

To begin with, each of the premises necessary for the questioner's proof of his thesis is standardly introduced not simply on its own for acceptance or rejection but as the conclusion of an argument employing induction or analogy or reasoning. (VIII.I, 156a3-l l, VIII.8 160a38 9) The main exception to this is in the case of universal premises which "appear thoroughly to be so" (lian prophaneis, VIII.I 155b37; cf. VIII.2 158a3-6.)20 If a premise is apparently so beyond any doubt or question then there can be no worries that an answerer will fail to concede it. In other circumstances the situation is different. There an answerer may fail to concede a premise. But if he does so he is not simply expected to say "no." If a general premise is reached by inductive argument based on instances which are "apparently correct" (phainomena), then if it is rejected by the answerer an objection (enstasis) or counter instance must be provided by him. (VIII.8 160b3-5; cf. VIII.2 157a34 ff; b31 3) However, if the counter instance is a good one, or at least appears t be (160b2), the questioner is not required to simply abandon his general premise. Rather he should qualify it so as to exclude the cases covered by the objection (VIIl.2 157b9 ff); unless, possibly, he is able to produce other premises to defeat the objection or support his preplises. (VII I.I 156a38 ff; VII 1.3 159a4 ff) In either event, nothing prevents the answerer from then introducing new objections, which can be responded to in turn. Sometimes the questioner will aid the answerer, in order to gain his confidence, by bringing objections against some of his own premises. (VII I.I 156b 18-20)

In addition to offering counter-examples to defeat inductive arguments for a questioner's premises, an answerer can introduce independent arguments (anlepicheirein) against these premises (even after they have been granted and a damaging .conclusion has been drawn from them), in order to undermine (luein) the conclusion based on them. (VIII.8 160b5-10 with VIII.9-10) Moreover, even if this sort of lusis or undermining cannot be provided, an answerer may straightforwardly argue against a conclusion in its own right, where it conflicts appropriately with accepted opinions. (VIIl.8 160b6-IO) When he produces such arguments, against premise or conclusion, the answerer is, of course, in effect operating as a reasoner, i.e., as a questioner. Given this, there is no reason why his argument, in objection either to premise or conclusion, cannot in turn be objected to by the original questioner who at this point is operating as an answerer

What rules determine when an objection (enstasis) or an under mining (lusis) or an attempt at counter-argument (antepicheirein) is a good one in such a give and take discussion for the purpose of inquiry?

Clearly enough, the main rule will be the same one which governs all such dialectical reasoning, namely that the argument, if relevant to the matter at hand, must proceed from what is "more endoxon" than its conclusion. (VIII.5-6, see the passages quoted in the next paragraph below; 11 161b30-I)

This means that if a counter example is offered to a universal premise it must be more endoxon than that premise; if the counter-example is, in turn, objected to it must be by reference to what is more endoxon than it. If a premise or a conclusion is subjected to undermining or counter-argument it must likewise be on the basis of premises which are more endoxon than it, and any counter response to this must be based on what is more endoxon than these premises.

Thus conceived a single dialectical inquiry not only involves an attempt to establish some claim by reference to endoxical premises which are (I) more endoxon than that claim, but which are also (2) such that there is nothing more endoxon than these premises with which they conflict. Such endoxon premises will be relatively more endoxon than certain other things but not less endoxon (or more adoxon) than anything incompatible with them. In that respect these premises can be said to be dialectically undefeatable. As such they can be said to belong to what is as endoxon as possible or what is most endoxon, not simply relative to some particular conclusion drawn from them but also relative to other endoxa on the topic which they concern, including any endoxical information in any way relevant to that topic. Given the discussion in Topics VII I, there seems little doubt that Aristotle's interest in Sophistical Refutations 34 in a method for arguing from what is "as endoxon as possible" at least includes an interest in the method for achieving arguments from such premises which he spells out earlier. Nevertheless, as we have seen, Aristotle also supposes that among the dialectically undefeatable premises on different topics some will be in another respect more endoxon than others so that the most endoxon of all would be a subset of the undefeatable propositions. To see whether Aristotle has any special interest in these propositions in Sophistical Refutations 34, and to see further what the epistemological status of this special class of propositions would be, it is necessary now to turn to the crucial question of what it is for one proposition to be more endoxon than another,

7. REASONING FROM WHAT 1s MosT ENnoxoN

The one who reasons correctly [as a result of questioning] establishes his set thesis on the basis of things which are more endoxon and more intelligible [than the thesis itself]. {159b8-9)

The things which are granted [by the answerer] must all be ... more endoxon than the conclusion, if the less intelligible is to be reached through the more intelligible. {159bl3-15)

The questioner shall complete his reasoning :with all t�ose things being conceded to him which are more endoxon than his conclus1on. Those who try to reason from things which are more adoxon (discredite�) than the · conclusion cle.arly do not reason properly. Therefore, such things should not be conceded to questioners. (160a12-16)

As we have already noted, Aristotle couples here what is more endoxon with what is more intelligible (gn6rim6teron); and he claims that "if the less intelligible is to be reached through the more intelligible" then we must proceed to the less endoxon through the more endoxon. This shows that the more endoxon beliefs will always be more intelligible than the less endoxon beliefs. But more intelligible in what sense? That depends, for one thing, on the type of dialectical inquiry we are pursuing. If the discussion is ad hominem and concerns the position of some particular individual who is to be examined from his own point of view, then we are dealing, as dialectic always is, with what is endoxon, but only endoxon to that individual, and our arguments must be from what is more endoxon and hence more intelligible lo ihal individual:

If the position in question is endoxon or adoxon not simply but to the answerer then what ought to be conceded or not is judged by reference to what is held or not held by him. Or if the answerer is set to defend the opinion of someone else, it is clear that each point should be conceded,or refused with a view to that person's own mind. (159b25-29)

But dialectical argument need not be ad hominem in either of these ways. More often it is based not on the endoxa according to some individual but on the endoxa without qualification - "the things which are accepted by everyone, or by most people, or by the wise'." Here what is more endoxon and thus more intelligible must be what is so not in relation to any particular individual but somehow generally. Earlier in the Topics (as in various other places) Aristotle describes two general ways in which one thing may be more intelligible than another, in neither of which is a relationship to some special individual {or group) in question. One thing may be more intelligible than another "simply" or "to us."

Thus, simply, the prior is more intelligible than the posterior; a point, for example, than a line, a line than a plane, and a plane than a solid; just as a uniL is more intelligible than a number - since it is prior to and the basis of every number. Similarly, a letter is more intelligible than a syllable. However, to us it sometimes turns out in reverse. For a solid falls most of all under our perception and a plane more than a line and a line more than a point. For people in general come to know such things earlier, since they can be understood by the ordinary sort of intelligence, the others only by an intelligence which is exact and uncommon. (Topics VI.4 14lb5-14)

Does proper dialectical argument proceed from what is more intelligible {or what is most intelligible) simply or to us? Pretty clearly it must be the latter. As we have seen, dialectic is described in the opening sentence of the Rheloric as like rhetoric in drawing on things "which it is in a certain way common to everyone to know." {!354a 2-3) Things which are more intelligible simply, as described above, do not fit such a description. They are intelligible only to an "exact and uncommon intelligence." The things which are most intelligible simply include as paradigms the first principles of the sciences as such. {Cl. Physics I.I 184al6-23) But these cannot be as such among the most authoritative premises for dialectic. For these need not even be endoxa, much less most endoxa. They need not be in every case (or any case) known or accepted by appropriate parties. But endoxa must be things which are accepted. The implications of this last fact are most clearly brought out in a passage in Posterior Analyiics 1.19:

It is clear that those who are reasoning from the point of view of standing opinion (kaia doxan}, that is only dialectically, should only consider this, whether their argument proceeds from the most endoxa premises possible. Thus, although a term is not in truth the middle term between A and B, if it is taken (dokei) to be then one who reasons through it has reasoned dialectically. But with a view to truth it is necessary to proceed from what actually holds. (81b18)

As Aristotle makes clear here, proper dialectical reasoning, as reasoning from what is most endoxon, need not proceed (in a case where a deductive syllogistic argument is being used), though what is "in truth the middle term." Rather it need only proceed through what is accepted as the middle term.22 This is to say, however, that the explanatory relations which actually hold among things need not be reflected in a proper dialectical argument, since an argument through a true middle term is just one which gets these actual explanatory relations right. (Posterior Analylics 11.2 90a6-7) This shows that it cannot be a requirement of dialectic that its arguments proceed from premises which are more or most intelligible simply. For arguments which follow such an arrangement cannot fail to reflect the natural order of explanation, and so to exhibit true middles, when we are dealing with matters where there is such an order. (Physics I.I 184a!0-21)

Given this when Aristotle characterizes dialectical reasoning as proceeding fror:i what is more endoxon and thus more intelligible he must have in , mind what is more endoxon and more intelligible "to us." This is confirmed by a passage in Sophistical Refutations 33 where Aristotle directly equates what is "held most of all" (malista dokounta) with what is "endoxon most of all." (182b37-183a4)23

8. RANK ORDERING AMONG ENDOXA

Generally speaking then, those endoxa which are most endoxa and which, thus, have the most weight or authority are those which have the greatest level of actual (explicit or implicit)" acceptance. In case of conflict, this is the rule to be used to describe which endoxa to retain and which to reject. Given this, it seems likely that the order in which the different types of endoxa are introduced in Topics I.I 100b21-3 is not accidental. The first type introduced is "the things which are accepted by everyone." These are the things which have, in dialectic, the greatest weight. This is confirmed by the fact that Aristotle treats what is apparent to everyone as practically unchallengeable. (Topics VIII.I 155b37 with VIII.2 158al)25

What everyone holds, by way of affirmation or denial, is thus most endoxon. Does this put what everyone holds absolutely beyond challenge? Aristotle comes close to saying this but he does not ever quite say it; and clearly he should not say it. Things which everyone holds could be themselves inconsistent. Here a resolution could be reached if among the things which are acceptable to everyone some are more intelligible to everyone than others and thus more firmly held. These could count as the more endoxon (the more noted or accredited) not in extent of acceptance only but in strength of acceptance as well.

A dialectical premise (prolasis) is a proposition, introduced in the form of a question, which is endoxos (esteemed) by everyone or by most people; or by the wise - either all of them, or most, or the most famous, assuming it is not paradoxical;26 for anyone would grant what is accepted by the wise if it is not opposed to general opinion. (1.10 104a8-13)

Where there is no dominant majority view on some subject, however, the views of the wise are, as we have seen, the most authoritative just on their own. It is of interest that Aristotle gives no special weight at this juncture to the opinions of a bare majority. The opinions of most people (hoi pleisloi) or of the general community (hoi polloi) outweigh the contrary views of experts (104a8-13), but the opinions of a bare or small majority do not. This is intelligible in the light of Aristotle's general scheme. Dominant community views will be widely credited by us, but where there is a close division among community views, Aristotle supposes we are likely to credit the "wisdom" of the experts rather than the views of a small general majority

9. DIALECTIC AND PEIRASTIC IN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY

We are in a position now to raise pointedly the main question raised earlier: Why does Aristotle think it is necessary in scientific inquiry to use dialectic? Consider the recommendation he gives to the inquiring dialectician. As we can see now, in 'Offect it comes to this: Base what you say, if you can, on what everyone accepts; failing that, appeal to what the dominant majority think. If there is no dominant majority view appeal to the view of the experts. If the experts do not agree, appeal to the dominant majority of the experts. If there is no dominant majority view among experts appeal to the view of the most famous and distinguished experts. This sounds like appropriate advice for the adman trying to maximize sales or the politician trying to maximize support for his policies, but hardly for a scientist. That is to say it seems to embody a procedure for justification which is designed to be maximally effective in producing conviction when used with people in general. This is, of course, just what is to be expected since, as we have already noted, Aristotle thinks of dialectic as like rhetoric in focussing its appeal on what everyone is maximally ready to understand and accept. But the aims of science are different. The scientist's results can, Aristotle says, only be grasped by "an intelligence which is exact and uncommon." (Topics VI.4 141bl3-14) So why should science have any interest at all in procedures for justification best designed to produce maximal understanding and conviction in people in general?

10. SOME MAIN FEATURES OF PEIRASTIC

Rhetoric is a partner of dialectic. For both of them are concerned with the sorts of things which it is in . a certain way common to everyone to know and which require no specialized knowledge. Thus everyone in a certain way takes part in both dialectic and rhetoric. For everyone on a limited basis engages in examination and in submitting to argument; and also in defending himself and in accusing others. (1354al-6)

Another passage, a few paragraphs later, develops this point:

In dealing with certain people, even if we possessed the most accurate knowledge (episteme), it would not be easy to persuade them by argument base on this knowledge for argument accordning to knowledge (eptslimi}is 1nstruct1on (dtdaskalia), and this is impossible in this case. Rather it is necessary to construct our proofs and arguments by use of the common things (koina), JUSt as we said in the Topics about ordinary discussions (enteuxeis) with people in general. (1355a24-29)

What are these things different from but "consequent on" (la hepomena) the special principles of a science or other discipline such that in order to know the science or discipline you must know them as well as the special principles? In the case of a science, the answer is clear; they must be the things explained by the special principles, the objects of the "knowledge that" which precedes the "knowledge why" provided by the principles. (APo. II. 1-2) This is all that the scientist needs to know in addition to the principles to have full knowledge of the science and these things are, of course, in a very straightforward sense "consequent on" the special principles.

If this is correct then it is quite easy to see how peiraslic dialectic can play a crucial role in the process of discovery and justification in science. If the "common" things, the special set of generally known endoxa, which peirastic dialectic argues from do make up at least some of the things which must be explained by the principles of a science then one can easily see how they can be used to rule out any proposed theories which are incompatible with them and how dialectical inquiry in a given area could serve to collect them together as a necessary prelude to the search for correct explanatory theories. But, as we have seen, these common things, the things which peirastic dialectic particularly argues from, are described not only as things consequent on the special principles of a science but also, later in Sophistical Refutations 34, as things which are "most endoxon." How can it be that there is this correspondence among these classes? Why should what is most endoxon turn out to constitute at least a part of what we must be able to explain by appropriate scientific principles? And why should either of these things be what is known by any scientist or commonly known (the koina) on the topic in question and thus true?

11. DIALECTIC IN SCIENCE: A STANDARD VIEW

At this point, it will be useful to consider the few attempts which have been made in the literature to say what it is that makes dialectic suitable as a procedure for justification in science or elsewhere, to see what they may offer in answer to these questions. One approach is suggested in the influential work done by G. E. L. Owen . on Aristotle's method of dialectic. Owen did not attempt to work out many general or detailed way what the epistemological value is of the appeal to· endoxa.

But he did argue that an appeal to endoxa or legomena (the things which are said) "may be an appeal either to common belief about matters of fact (e.g. EN I.ll ll0la22-24) or to established forms of language (e.g. ibid. VII.I. l 145bl9-20; 2 !146b4-5) or to a philosophical thesis claiming the factual virtues of the first and the analytic certainty of the second (e.g. ibid. 1.8 1098bl2-18)."31

Owen did not elaborate on what the "factual virtues" of "common belief about matters of fact ,, might be for Aristotle.

But he suggests here that the epistemological value of the appeal to "established forms of language" derives from the fact that they have "analytic certainty." In the same vein, Owen argues that when, for example, Aristotle argues dialectically in the I · Ethics against the suggestion that practical wisdom can be coupled with incontinence on the ground that 'no one would say this' (l 146a6), what he is asserting is "not that it happens to be false but that given the established use of the words it is absurd." He claims further that in his discussion of incontinence, Aristotle appeals to certain endoxa in order "to show a priori that there is no use for the expression 'doing what is wrong in the full knowledge of what is right in the given circumstances'.

Owen does not elaborate on these claims at any length; and it would be easy, in the light of current doubts about the coherence of the analytic-synthetic distinction and its value for epistemology, to ignore his proposals. After all, there is no direct evidence that Aristotle recognized a class of analytic statements. He has no term for our 'analytic,' and he never explicitly attempts to justify belief in any class of statements on the ground that they hold simply in virtue of linguistic conventions which fix the meanings of terms and. so can be known a priori. But there are various reasons why the suggestion deserves consideration that appeal to endoxa is epistemically significant, in some cases at least, because the endoxa reflect established forms of language and are thereby analytic and known a priori with certainty.33 If it were the case that peirastic dialect in particular did argue from analytic premises which reflect a priori conventions of  language that would in fact explain certain things that Aristotle says about peirastic. It would explain why the premises of peirastic argument are commonly known and accepted by everyone, and also why they are true and thus capable of being used to decisively refute proposed scientific principles which are incompatible with them. However, it would not explain one other crucial claim that Aristotle makes about peirastic premises, namely that they are things which are "consequent on" and explained by the relevant scientific principles. Why should the analytic truths have this status?

It might be suggested in defense of Owen on this point that Aristotle wants to argue that the body of common or accredited opinion on a subject fixes the reference of the name of the subject in such a way that it is a logical presupposition of successful reference to that subject that most, and the most intelligible parts to us, of that body of opinion are not false of that subject or, more strongly, are explained by the basic principles of that subject.

In his own discussions of reference Aristotle does suppose that there is some most intelligible opinion which at least sometimes has this kind of reference fixing status, namely the opinion expressed in the "account of what the name signifies."" Interestingly enough, this type of opinion can play for Aristotle the role of being one which appropriate theoretical principles must explain on pain of failure of reference and hence failure of truth for those principles. To take a familiar example from Posterior Analytics II.8-10, Aristotle supposes that our belief that 'thunder is a certain noise in the clouds' serves as the belief by grasp of which our thought is fixed on to the real thing thunder in such a way that that fact must be true, and explained by the fundamental principles of meteorology. (93a21-9 with 94a7-9) A similar example from Paris of Animals II.3 explicitly employs semantic terminology.

Here Aristotle makes it clear again that in the account of what we · signify by a name a certain group of the features which we take to belong to what the name denotes will be included. He also makes it clear that the features which are included in the account of what we signify by a name may be features naturally present and whose presence is explicable. For instance, the mention of heat is included in the account of what we signify by the name 'blood,' even though heat is not ' ' ' ' ' a part of the fundamental essence of blood. Nevertheless blood is naturally heated up, particularly by the heart, in the course of its production for the sake of nourishment and growth, and it is in looking for the explanation of this that we find the real nature of blood. (650a2 ff, Juv. et Sen. 469bl2 ff)

It is however true, as Owen claims, that Aristotle does dismiss the suggestion that practical wisdom can be coupled with incontinence with the retort: "That is absurd ... not a single person would venture to say [that]." (1146a5-7) But does Aristotle think it absurd simply in view of linguistic conventions or "the established use of the words," as Owen says? Aristotle's own appeal here is in effect to the fact that absolutely everyone would reject the claim with the strongest conviction. He introduces no further qualifications. This would, however, be an adequate basis for rejecting the claim out of hand, as Aristotle does, if on the rules of the method which he is using here the strongest basis for rejecting (or accepting) some thesis is simply and without further qualification that it would be unequivocally rejected (or accepted) by everyone. This, as we have seen, is just what the rules of dialectic and peirastic require. Given this, it seems that Aristotle is here simply making a standard dialectical move without illuminating what it is that provides the ultimate epistemic backing for such a move.

12. REVISION OF THE STANDARD VIEW

As noted above, the current philosophical climate is less hospitable now than it was when Owen wrote to appeals to what is analytic and know a priori on that ground; and this has led to greater caution in attributing appeals to the analytic to historical figures. So il'is perhaps unsurprising that more recent writers working within Owen's framework have shifted ground somewhat and argued that while the force of dialectical argument does not depend ultimately on the appeal to what is analytic and in that way absolutely a priori, it may involve an appeal to what is a priori in a different way.

The suggestion has recently been made in various quarters that the value of the appeal to endoxa derives from the fact that the endoxa for Aristotle are not to be understood as a set of convictions which may or may not correspond to some belief-independent objective reality where independent evidence may be sought for their truth or falsity. "Aristotle does not make the clean separation between evidence and opinion on which this [position] presumes." The endoxa are, rather, a set of convictions which, at least when properly refined, "hang together to constitute a world" in such a way that, ultimately, the accord of any beliefs with these convictions is "criteria! of their truth."" A typical development of this approach begins with the suggestion that, for Aristotle, the endoxa are simply one sub-class of the phainomena (the appearences) where the phainomena are to be understood as constituting the world as it exists for us. The phainomena, so understood, may of course conflict but in resolving any conflicts, on this view, we must square our results with the phainomena and show that these results preserve the phainomena as true, or at least that the greatest number and the most basic are preserved.

In deciding which are most basic or authoritative, on this proposal, Aristotle considers our actual practices in justification to see, in different areas, what judges we in fact rely on. This reliance, however, does not itself require further justification for him. The reason for this is that "appearances and truth are not opposed, as Plato believed they were. We can have truth only inside the circle of appearances, because only there can we communicate, even refer, at all." This does not absolutely prohibit the introduction of new views but it does require that any new view draw on and preserve beliefs which are "deeper" than the ones which the new view forces us to give up - depper in that "the cost of giving them up would be greater, or one we are less inclined to pay."

Given this, we can see how certain endoxa, those which are deepest or most endoxon, can be in a way a priori, by being "unrevisable, relative to a certain body of knowledge" or even so basic that they "cannot significantly be questioned at all from within the appearances, that is to say the lives and practices of human beings, as long as human beings are anything like us." [N. 254]

(39) The quoted phrases are from M. Burnyeat, "Good Repute," J. McDowell, "The ' Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics" (in Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. A. Rorty, p. 372) and M. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness, p. 242. The description of the development of this position is mainly drawn from Nussbaum (pp. 240-258). A similar, t�ough . not obviously identical, development is suggested by Burnyeat and by McDowell's d1scus�1on (pp. 369-373). McDowell's remarks are, however, made in the course of reflections on Aristotle's method in ethics, and it is not clear that he would take them to appl?' in other �reas. Burnyeat and Nussbaum take the method to be universally apphca?Ie �or Aristot�e. In T. Irwin, Arislolle's First Principles, it is argued that in his later scientific works (including the Metaphysics and De Anima) Aristotle introduces a new form of "strong dialectic" which draws on endoxa which are known a priori in a Kantian sense. They are �ot . constituitive or reality but necessary preconditions of the possibility of kno"".'ledge (or s1gn1ficant thought) abo'it reality. Since Irwin, unlike other writers, is not trying to account for the role of dialectic in science, as dialectic is understood and desc�ibed in the Organon, but only as dialectic is later used (but never described), his views require separate treatment. Reasons Cor doubting that Aristotle introduces in the Melaphysics a new form of dialectic, or uses a form which appeals to this sort of a priori knowledge, are given in "Aristotle's Conception of Metaphysics as a Science" (forthco ming).

This view has many of the same advantages in accounting for what Aristotle says about dialectic and, in particular, peirastic as those listed earlier for Owen's view. If peirastic argues ultimately from premises which are constitutive of reality and impossible for us to intelligibly question, then that would explain why its premises are true and known and accepted (at least implicitly) by everyone. Moreover, these advantages are achieved on this view, without the difficulties which come with the introduction of the notion of analyticity in interpreting Aristotle. However, the view would still not account for how it is that the premises of peirastic in particular are consequent on, and explained by, the first principles of the various sciences.

In addition to this, there are reasons for doubting whethe� this is an adequate account of Aristotle's views on method quite generally. To begin with, there are the two respects noted earlier in which Aristotle's views on method in science go counter to the main rule given above. Aristotle takes it that in science the data of perception always take precedence over endoxa without reference to how widely held or how deeply entrenched those endoxa are.41 Secondly, he holds that the . re is a procedure for the justification of first principles in science which goes beyond the matter of their ability to preserve or their inferability from what is most endoxon. In general, his doctrine is that such principles must exhibit and conform to what is most intelligible s1mp . ly or by nature by contrast with what is most intelligible to us. This reqmres, as is reflected in his discussion of peirastic, that these principles must be capable of explaining the appropriate endoxa on some subject rather than simply preserving them or being coherent with or derivable from them. In addition, these principles must be capable of explaining the relevant perceptual data whether these count as endoxa or what is most endoxon or apparent to us, or not.

Given these difficulties it is apparent that we cannot use the proposal offered to try to show what the value of dialectic, and in particular of peirastic, is for Aristotle. On this proposal, Aristotle regards the appeal to what is most apparent or most endoxon as ultimately an appeal to what fixes the limits of what is intelligible for us and thus cannot intelligibly be questioned or challenged. Peirastic is based on .the appeal to what is most intelligible to us. But since we have seen that Aristotle does not in fact view even what is most intelligible to us as ever, for that reason, beyond question or challenge by reference to perceptual data or to what is less intelligible to us but more mtelhg1ble absolutely, this will not help us to see what the epistemologi cal basis of d1alect1c, or its value for science, is.

13. DIALECTIC IN SCIENCE: THE TRADITIONAL VIEW

14. DIALECTICAL JUSTIFICATION IN SCIENCE

The beginnings of an approach to this matter are to be found in Aristotle's remarks in the passage from the Eudemwn Ethics quoted above. (I.6 1216b26-35) In that passage, Aristotle introduces . an elaborate justification for a certain methodological . recommendation. The recommendation is that it is desirable to get convict10n (p1sils) ma way that relies on appeal to the phainomena or what appears so to us. His reason for that is that if we proceed in this way then our results will be in agreement with what everyone holds, either simply or "when their views are modified." The reason which he offers to explam why it is desirable to be in agreement with what everyone holds is that everyone has something to contribute to the truth to such an extent that "we must give some proof of what we say by reference to people's opinions, at least when they are properly modified.

Aristotle does not say how he supposes this "modification" should take place. But the rarely used word which he employs here (melab1badzern) is prommently used also in the Topics to describe the dialectical procedure of revising views by reference to what is "more endoxon" or "as endoxon as possible." (VIII.11 16la33-37, with b34-38 and VIII.5-6) Since the procedure which Aristotle is describing here  also involves reasomng from what enjoys the maximum consensus, it is likely that this is what he has in mind.

it is not simply a desirable or useful point of method to appeal to the common opinions, or the most common opinions, on a topic but necessary. He goes on to give the reason why this is so. His reason is that by proceeding in this way we guarantee that we move from what is correct though somehow unclear and jumbled up to what is clear and more intelligible and, so he must be supposing, it is necessary that we proceed in this way. 

I mean by what is prior and more intelligible to us what is closer to perception, by what is prior and more intelligible simply I mean what is further from perception. The things which are furtherest from perception are, most of all, universals; the things which are closest are particulars; and ·: these are opposite to each other. (APo. 1.2 72al ff)

What is most intelligible to us, Aristotle thinks, always coincides with what is not closely related to what we perceive. Elsewhere he is quite explicit that the fact that all or most people accept something "gives it credibility as something based on experience. " He specifically says in the Physics that this is why first principles must account for what is more intelligible to us.

If this is so then we can explain what the value of peirastic dialectic is for science in the following way. We have seen that peirastic dialectic is a procedure for the testing of claims by reference to what is most endoxon and most intelligible to us. As such1 in Aristotle's view, it is a procedure for the testing of claims by reference to those beliefs which we have which are most closely connected with information whi ' ch we have acquired by perception and for the rejection of whatever claims may conflict with this information. So peiraslic dialectic, in effect, turns out to be a procedure which draws on the information which we as a group are now warranted in accepting on the basis of what is most obvious to us from perception. This explains how Aristotle can describe peirastic as drawing on what everyone knows and how dialectic, in certain forms, can draw on what may reasonably be claimed to be true. This also provides a clear role for dialectic in scientific inquiry understood in the way in which Aristotle standardly understands it in passages such as Prior Analylics 1.30, namely as a procedure which starts from the data of experience and proceeds to find principles which conform to and explain such data. It enables us to coherently integrate Aristotle's remarks about the need for dialectic in science with what he says in these passages. It also shows why dialectic has the limits which we have seen it has in scientific inquiry. Peirastic draws on what is in conformity with the most empirically well-justified information that as a group we have up lo now. But further observation by the individual scientist or others may yield new empirical data which show that some theory which is most empirically well-confirmed for us now, because it offers us the best explanation for the empirical data which we have amassed up to now, is wrong. This may occur whether or not these new data are or come to he endoxa or generally known, i.e. a basis for further dialectical or peirastic argument. This explains why Aristotle can say that in science we must try to account for the endoxa but also suppose that perceptual observations take precedence over endoxa in validating theories.

 

15. THE MERITS OF PEIRASTIC JUSTIFICATION

On the account which we have now reached of the epistemological basis of peirastic dialectic that method turns out not to embody any general appeal to what is a priori. Nor does it embody, despite certain appearances to the contrary, a strong coherence procedure for the justification of belief. A belief is not justified in peirastic dialectic simply when it coheres well with the maximal consistent body of existing belief or anything of the sort. Peirastic dialectical justifica tion, for a given belief does depend on whether that belief can be ultimately defended by reference to those beliefs which are "most endoxon" i.e., most widely and firmly accepted by us. But even here it is not because those beliefs are most widely and firmly accepted by us that the belief in question is justified by reference to them. Rather it is because those beliefs bear a special relation to the data of experience. Peirastic dialectical justification, for Aristotle, like justifi cation in science simply, turns out to give special priority (though not precisely the same priority) to the evidence of experience. This does not mean, however, that perceptual judgments are, for Aristotle, incorrigible. Though this is not the place for a full treatment of his views on this subject, it is clear enough that he does not take ordinary perceptual judgments to be in principle or in general unrevisable. (De Anima JII.3 428bl8-25) This is compatible, however, with his general assignment of final epistemic authority in science to perceptual over theoretical beliefs. (De Caelo JII.7 306al3-7) In peirastic dialectic this result• also holds. It follows from the doctrine that revision must always be made by reference to what is most intelligible to us, together with the doctrine that what is most intelligible to us is always closest to perception. In this respect there is a kind of foundationalist empiricist element in Aristotle's theory of justification both in science and in peirastic dialectic generally." This result raises a number of interesting questions. Perhaps the most important are these: How would Aristotle try to show that the more widely and firmly accepted something is the more likely it is to directly embody information acquired by perception? And, how would Aristotle justify the reliance which he places in "the testimony of the senses?" To answer these questions, an.cl other related ones, would require us to go into Aristotle's rather complex views on information acquisition; and this is not the place for that. Here it must suffice for us to see that, recent claims to the contrary notwithstanding, the old cliche that Aristotle is fundamentally an empiricist is, after all, in certain respects basically right."