Barnes (1980) Aristotle and the methods of ethics

Barnes, Jonathan (1980). Aristotle and the methods of ethics. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 34 (3):490.

2.

In EN H 1 Aristotle speaks specifically of άχρασία ; but the method he sketches is meant to have a broader application ; for in the case of άχρασία we must proceed ώσπερ επί των άλλων. There can be no doubt that τά άλλα include other issues in practical philosophy : does the method extend further than that ?

In the course of his discussion of τόπος in Pliysics Δ, Aristotle makes a methodological remark similar in tone to the passage in EN H 1 :

δεί δέ πειρ&σθαι τήν σκέφιν ούτω ποιείσθαι 'όπως το τί εστίν άποδοθήσεται, ώστε τά τε άπορούμενα λύεσθαι χαί τά δοχοϋντα ύπάρχειν τω τόπω υπάρχοντα εσται, χαί ετι τό της δοσχολίας αϊτών χαί των περί αυτόν άπορημάτων εσται φανερόν · ούτω γάρ σ.ν κάλλιστα δειχνύοιτο εχαστον (Δ 4, 21 la7)

There are différences between this passage and EN H 1. The Pliysics does not explicitly refer to the setting down of τά ένδοξα ; and it adds a new component : having resolved the difficultés which the ένδοξα present, we must also exhibit their cause (6). Again, the Pliysics only applies the method to enquiries into the définition or essence of some subject matter (σχέψιν ... 'όπως τό τί εστίν άποδοθήσεται). But from the present point of view, those différences are comparatively trivial : like EN, the Pliysics holds that when 'the puzzles are solved, and it appears that what is believed to belong to τόπος actually does belong to it', then 'we shall have given the best proof possible.

The method which Aristotle outlines in EN H 1, and which I shall call, somewhat grandiosely, the Method of 'Ένδοξα, is thus not restricted to practical philosophy : Aristotle preaches it in the Physics as well as in the Ethics. And in recent years scholars have emphasized that Aristotle practises what he preaches : the Method is no theoretical aside ; it actually governs a large part of Aristotle's philosophical researches (7). Of course, the Method of "Ενδοξα is not the only method Aristotle advocates : even in practical philosophy, he urges us to conduct our enquiries δια λόγων, [논리적 추론] and he contraste such conduct with the Method of -Ένδοξα (ΕΕ A 6, 1216b26-8) ; cf. EN A 8, 1098b9-12). But he nowhere suggests that any other method will lead to résulte which conflict with, or go beyond, the résulte achieved by the Method of Ένδοξα.

Sidgwick speaks specifically of moral philosophy ; but Aristotle's Method of "Ενδοξα spreads its net more widely, and if τα ένδοξα constitute Common Sense, it is tempting to enrol Aristotle in the ranks of Common Sense Philosophers. Such an enrolment was made by Sir William Hamilton in his history of the Common Sense movement. Hamilton, who believed that 'the doctrine of Common Sense, notwithstanding many schismatic aberrations, is the one catholic and perennial philosophy', traced the School back to the old poet Hesiod ; but its first serious alumnus was Aristotle. And Hamilton expresses the essence of Common Sense philosophy in highly Aristotelian terms : 'The first problem of Philosophy... to seek out, purify, and establish by intellectual analysis and criticism, the elementary feelings and beliefs in which are given the elementary truths of which all are in possession'. 'Seek out, purify, establish' : τιθέναι, δίαπορείν, δεικνύ ναι (π

Common Sense philosophy - and, in particular. Common Sense practical philosophy - has certain characteristic features. Thus it is descriptive in its approach : ηθέναι τά φαινόμενα is an empirical task ; and the ένδοξα that 'remain' will represent, as it were, a refined sociology of moral belief. Again, Common Sense morality will be parochial : according to Sidgwick, Aristotle is giving us a Greek morality - and, we may safely add, a morality of the fourth Century B.C. Finally, the Method of Common Sense ensures moral conserva tion : iconoclasm, or even a modest criticism of customary mores, is out of place if the answers to our practical problems are ail to be found among existing opinions.

3. 

And the first question here is a simple one : what does the adjective ',ΐνδοξος ' mean ? There are two traditional answers, both inspired by Boethius' Latin translation, in which he regularly turns 'ένδοξος ' by 'probabilis'. Some transliterate 'probabilis' and get 'probable' ; others translate it to get 'plausible' or 'credible' : τά 'ένδοξα, then, are either objective probabilities or subjective plausibilities

But neither 'probable' nor 'plausible' is either probable or plausible as a translation of 'ένδοξος ' : nothing in Aristotle indicates that 'ένδοξος ' has either of those senses in his philosophical idiolect C5) (he possesses the words 'εικός ' and 'πιστός ') ; nor does Greek usage or etymology offer support. Recognizing those facts, modern scholars prefer a différent rendition : for 'τά ένδοξα' they give 'received opinion', 'accepted opinion', or the like (16). Tà ένδοξα may be probable, and they may be plausible ; but if so, they have those properties by accident : essentially, and ex vi termini, they are accepted.

The meaning of 'ένδοξος ' in all those passages is unproblematical : "ένδοξος ' translates as 'reputable', 'of good repute' (18) ; and it is closely connected with that use of 'δόξα' in which it means 'réputation'. As such, it is strictly comparable to numerous other adjectives in '-δοξος ', where 'δόξα' is semantically effective in the sense of 'réputation' (19). Aristotle himself, in passages unconnected with τα ένδοξα, uses the word "ένδοξος ' in that ordinary Greek sens

"Ένδοξος' has an uncontroversial ordinary meaning. Aristotle no where indicates that the adjective takes on a special sense in his pharse  'τα ένδοξα (21). There is, then, no reason to suspect him of semantic innovation : 'τά 'ένδοξα means 'the reputable things' ; to collect τά 'ένδοξα is to collect the reputable views. (Boethius got it right ; for his 'probabilis no doubt means 'to be approved of). Aristotle may have been the first to apply the adjective '<'ένδοξος ', to views or tenets ; and in doing so, he may have been entertained by the pun on 'δόξα. But however that may be, in its new context, 'ένδοξος ' retains its old sense of 'reputable.

4.

It is piain, too, that the Method of "Ενδοξα cannot be used to brand Aristotle as a Common Sense philosopher. Τ à ένδοξα include all the propositions of Common Sense, if Common Sense is the sum of the beliefs held by all, or most, men. But τα ένδοξα also include minority beliefs - the opinions of sages, specialists, and savants ; and those beliefs, which may be at odds with the beliefs of hoi polloi, will hardly count as a part of Common Sense. Aristotle undertakes to defend Common Sense ; for he will defend τα ένδοξα, and τα ένδοξα encompass Common Sense. But in exactly the same way he is a defender of Uncommon Sense, of expertise and of the élite.

A proposition fails to be ένδοξον only if either no one at all believes it (in the extended sense of 'believe'), or it is believed by a group of people who include no σοφοί and do not constitute a large majority of men. Aristotle says little about such άδοξα. At Rhet A 2, 1356b36, he implies that τα ένδοξα will not include anything that φαίνεται... τοις παραλη ρούσα ; at EN A 4, 1095a28-30, he observes that : άπάσας μεν ούν εξετάζει τάς δόξας ματαιότερου ίσως εστίν, ίκανόν δέ τάς μάλιστα έπιπολαζούσας ή δοχούσας έχειν τινα λόγο

Two sorts of opinions are worth εξετάζειν (i.e. διαπορεΐν) ·. 'those which are especially prevalent', i.e. those ένδοξα which πάσι ή τοις πλεϊσ δοχεΐ ; and those which 'seem to have some reason', i.e. those ένδοξα which are accepted by οί σ

5.

It is more important to determine the sense of [3] ; and in particular, to discover the import of 'οίκεϊόν τι. At least two interprétations have been canvassed. First : 'everyone has something of his own to contribute to the truth' (38) ; i.e. each of us has managed to grasp some portion of the truth, so that the sum total of our opinions will contain a few grains of truth hidden in a mass of chaff. Compare these lines from the Metapliysics

"진리에 대한 이론은 어려운 것이고 쉬운 것이 아니다; 그 누구도 그 진리를 온전히 얻을 수 없으며, 항상 자연에 대해 무언가를 말할 수는 있지만, 모든 사람이 모여서야 비로소 그 크기가 형성된다." (α 1, 993a30-b4) (31)

'No natural philosopher has properly grasped the truth ; but each has hit upon some aspect of it ; and hence from a collection of their opinions we may expect to amass a quantity of truth'. Similar thoughts may be found in the Politics, where they provide an argument for the value of democracy : each citizen contributes something of his own to the communal feast ; and as a resuit the banquet is varied and nutritious (40

οι άνθρωποι προς το άληθές πεφύκασιν ϊκανώς και τά πλείω τυγχάνουσιν της αληθείας · διό πράς τά ένδοξα στοχαστικώς εχειν τον ομοίως έχοντος και προς την άλήθειάν εστίν (Α 1, 1355al 5-8). 'Men have a natural inclination (πεφύκασιν) towards the truth ; and that is why it is worth studying τά 'ένδοξα .

If that is Aristotle's thought in sentence [3], we must ascribe to him one of the following arguments : 'It is best if ail men agree with our results ; for everyone is naturally inclined to grasp the truth, so that dissent will be a sign of falsity' ; or : 'Men will agree with us when their opinions are purified ; for everyone has a natural aptitude for the truth, which the process of purification will reveal'.

Aristotle certainly held that men have a natural longing for the truth, and a natural disposition to attain it. The celebrated exordium to the Metaphysics (πάντες άνθρωποι, του είδέναι ορέγονται, φύσει : Α 1, 980a21) probably dérivés from the Protrepticus, where Aristotle says, more expansively, that αίρετωτέρα και τοϋ ζην εστίν ή φρόνησις (κυριωτέρα < γαρ > της αληθείας ) · ώστε πάντες άνθρωποι, τό φρονεΐν μάλιστα διώκουσιν (fr. 7 Ross = Β 77 Düring) (42). And in the ethical treatises, we find passages such as this : φύσει σοφός μεν ουδείς, γνώμην δ' εχειν και σύνεσιν και νούν · σημεϊον δ' ότι και της ηλικίας οίόμεθα άκολουθεϊν και ηδε ή ήλιχία νουν έχει και γνώμην, ώς της φύσεως αιτίας ούσης (ΕΝ Ζ 11,