Renon (1998) Aristotle's Endoxa and Plausible Argumentation

Renon, Luis (1998). Aristotle's Endoxa and Plausible Argumentation. Argumentation 12 (1):95-113.

1. A LOOK AT THE FIELD: BACKGROUND AND PERSPECTIVES

The Aristotelian dialectical field is, generally taken, that of argument with some other discursive agent (1) from accepted or acceptable propo sitions or premises, (2) through questions and answers, (3) on any debat able question. Aristotle’s dialectic is not reduced to a matter of ‘deduction from endoxa’ as it is commonly supposed by the ‘received view’ (e.g., by Irwin, 1988; cf. Hamlyn, 1990, and Smith, 1993, for criticism of this view). But they are in a close relationship as we are told at the very beginning of Topics: ‘Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from endoxa about any subject presented to us, and also shall ourselves, when putting forward an argument, avoid saying anything contrary to it’ (100a20–23). Soon afterwards, Aristotle goes on to state the purposes for which this treatise will be useful, namely: intellectual and discursive training, casual encounters and philosophical sciences (101a25–27). Finally, he even claims that dialectic has a further use in relation to the primitive principles of the particular sciences: ‘it is through endoxa about them that these have to be discussed and this task belongs properly, or most appropiately, to dialectic; for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all enquiries’ (101a34 b4).

So, Aristotelian dialectic becomes, through the Topics, a method of skilled argument which can be applied to ordinary or philosophical ques tions, and which can proceed from endoxa or through endoxa with various purposes, e.g. gymnastic, examinative, critical. Skilled argument comes about when certain attitudinal and normative suppositions govern the inter action of the two parties (an answerer and a questioner) involved in con frontation, and when skills are acquired with which to handle differences and conflicts of opinion on any question open to discussion. In contrast to some current philosophies of dialogue and to a tendency marked among the European scholars in the field of argumentation (see Walton, 1992: xi), this Aristotelian dialectic is aimed at lucidly and reasonably coping with discrepancies between the parties involved in a controversial issue, rather than at overcoming or neutralising such conflicts for the sake of the ultimately achieving unanimous agreement or a rational consensus. Along these dialectic lines, the Topics and its appendix Sophistical Refutations teach an art of argument, i.e. an inventory of strategic warrants and infer ence patterns, along with a repertory of movements and indications in order to conduct the debate correctly and, at least, not lose it due to one’s own lack of thought or personal skill. This art also points out a discursive heuris tics and gives us several hints for testing accepted or acceptable views to discover where their strengths and weaknesses lie. Furthermore, even in the competitive and critical frameworks, there can be a co-operative explo ration of philosophical theses and a rational management of dissensions.

2. THE METHOD OF ENDOXA: OUTLINES OF AN INTERPRETATION

But Aristotle does not preach this method in his practical philosophy alone; he also does so in his natural philosopy (e.g. in Phys. 211a7–11). Besides, he also tries to put it into practice in various areas of his philosophical discourse (e.g. in De Cael. 279b4–14, 308a4–7; De An. 403b20–24; Metaphys. 995b20–24). It is therefore hardly surprising that the method of endoxa, being applied in different fields, acquires various usages and meanings, e.g. in order to enquire into definitional principles in natural phi losophy, or in order to examine and clarify key concepts in practical phi losophy, or merely so as to set out a ground of common beliefs in rhetoric (cf. EN. 1095a16–30 and Rh. 1360b4–18, about happiness). Nevertheless, the ‘programmatic’ claim at EN. 1145b2 is very general, and we may reduce the method to three main elements: (1) a doxographical starting-point, (2) a process of puzzling and testing, (3) a process of proving.

The reasons Aristotle gives in favour of this method are actually of two kinds: some are practical and methodological and have to do with efficacy and the proof cogency of the discourse (e.g.: ‘for a disputant’s refutation of what is opposed to his arguments is a proof of the argument itself’, EE. 1215a6–7; see also De Cael. 279b6–12);

others are of an epistemological nature and have to do with the dialectic elucidation of the principles and with the natural disposition towards truth (e.g.: ‘For the true and the approx imately true are apprehended by the same faculty; it may also be noted that men have a sufficient natural instinct for what is true, and usually do arrive at the truth. Hence the man who makes a good guess at truth is likely to make a good guess at what is endoxon’, Rh. 1355a15–18; see also EN. 1173a2–3, EE. 1216b31).

3. ON ENDOXON AS PLAUSIBLE

4. ON PLAUSIBLE PROPOSITIONS

Plausibility is not a semantic property, but a pragmatic relationship: it is something that has to seem so to a community, a group or some of its illustrious members. Furthermore, it is in this very pragmatic nature that its dialectical relevance lies – although Aristotle does not say much about the contexts and frames of communication, he does about the discursive interaction and other aspects (e.g. attitudes, roles, or characters of the agents involved). According to 104a4–6, ‘not every proposition nor yet every problem is to be set down as dialectical; for no one in his right senses would make a proposition of what no one holds’.

5. TOPICS AND THE ‘LOGIC’ OF PLAUSIBLE ARGUMENT