소요의 철학 아카이브

2024-2 Social Ontology Segment 2 Q) According to Ritchie, there is an important distinction to be made between two types of social groups – teams, committees, clubs, bands, etc., on the one hand, and racial, gender, ethnic groups, etc., on the other. Which features, according to her, help distinguish between these two kinds of social groups? Would you change anything about her criteria?         ..

2023.12.21 - [Research/Publications] - 전기 비트겐슈타인의 철학에 나타난 바이닝거적 세계관의 극복－자살에 관한 윤리적 성찰을 중심으로－ 전기 비트겐슈타인의 철학에 나타난 바이닝거적 세계관의 극복－자살에 관한 윤리적 성찰을 중김현균. (2022). 전기 비트겐슈타인의 철학에 나타난 바이닝거적 세계관의 극복－자살에 관한 윤리적 성찰을 중심으로－. 범한철학, 104(1), 173-212.georgia15.tistory.com2장 및 3장 일부 (pp. 179-191) 1. 왜 바이닝거인가? 세기말 빈의 풍경 스케치여러 학자가 주목했듯이, 비트겐슈타인은 바이닝거에 대해 의아할 정도로 높은 평가를 남겼다. 비록 이러한 평가들이 소수의 편지와 단상, 그리고 대화에 국한되어 있어 앞선 ..

2021 건국대학교 철학과 4단계 BK21 사업팀 참여대학원생 연구계획서2023.12.21 - [Research/Publications] - 전기 비트겐슈타인의 철학에 나타난 바이닝거적 세계관의 극복－자살에 관한 윤리적 성찰을 중심으로－ 전기 비트겐슈타인의 철학에 나타난 바이닝거적 세계관의 극복－자살에 관한 윤리적 성찰을 중김현균. (2022). 전기 비트겐슈타인의 철학에 나타난 바이닝거적 세계관의 극복－자살에 관한 윤리적 성찰을 중심으로－. 범한철학, 104(1), 173-212.georgia15.tistory.com 바이닝거와 비트겐슈타인 : 가치에의 의지와 자살의 윤리  목차1. 들어가는 글 : 바이닝거의 철학은 무엇을 말하려 하였는가?2. 가치에의 의지와 가치평가의 논리3. 청년 비트겐슈타인의 가..

Vetter, Barbara (2015). Potentiality From Dispositions to Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1. ModalityThe two familiar modalities: necessity (□) and possibility (◇)Modal phenomena: (1) laws of nature, (2) essences, (3) the counterfactual conditional, (4) causation, and (5) dispositions 2. Reductive vs. Non-reductive approaches ① A reductive approach: describe all of these phenomena in a..

Vetter, Barbara (2015). Potentiality From Dispositions to Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1. The Variety of Potentiality: ① Potentiality classified as an ability: the ability to read English ② Potentiality not classified as an ability: the paper’s potential to burn ③ Dispositions: the vase’s fragility, a person’s irascibility, and an atom’s disposition to decay Potentials are often asc..

2023-2 Modal Logic (Segment 2) Q)UG, MP. E! is primitive, ∼ , ∨ are primitive and we have the usual definitions. Sketch proofs of:① ├FL (∀x)( E!x ≡ (∃y)(x = y)).② ├FL (∀y) ((∀x) ϕx ⊃ ϕy).Now consider the system FL* which is just like the above except that (∀y) ((∀x) ϕx ⊃ ϕy) replaces axiom schemas 2 and 3, and E! is dropped as a primitive sign.Sketch proofs of:③ ├FL* (∀x) (∃y)(x = y)④ ├FL* (∀x)B..

2023-2 Modal Logic (Segment 3) Q) Explain the system S1. In what sense is it the case that the “unrestricted” rules of Necessitation does not hold in S1. Does pc tautology necessitation hold in S1 ? What is the Cresswell argument (See my SS1 paper) that S1 has no theorems of the form LL(p⊃ p)? Explain the semantic system for S2 and S3 and S4 where one introduces odd vs normal worlds. Note that b..

2023-2 Modal Logic (Segment 2) Q) Use tableaux to show the difference between what we have called the A semantics and the B semantics (+ inclusion requirement) and the C-semantics for quantified modal logic. Be sure to explain by reference to the question of the validity of the Carnap-Barcan Formula (BF) and its converse. Be sure to explain the situation withAx1 (∀x) (ϕx) ⊃ ϕy, where y is free f..

2023-2 Modal Logic (Segment 1) Q) Use the technique of Modal Conjunctive Normal form to test the follow for S5 Validity and if Valid construct a proof using the technique.ML(p ⊃ LMp)M(Lp ⊃Mq)⊃ M(p⊃ q)L(p ∨ Lq) .⊃. Lp ∨ LqLMLp ⊃ Lp