Writing Sample. 김현균 · 김도식 (2021)의 번역 (2022.11)
On the Concept of “the transcendental” in the Tractatus
-Logic and Ethics as a priori Conditions of the World-
Abstract
One of the fundamental problems, when we are trying to interpret the Tractatus, is to fathom its unfamiliar concepts that were of only peripheral interest to analytic philosophers. For instance, when Wittgenstein claims that “logic and ethics are transcendental,” what is the meaning of “the transcendental” and how can it be consistently applied to logic and ethics? I suggest that we should deal with these questions in the tradition of transcendental philosophy, and the understanding of the concepts obtained from it plays a pivotal role in the following respect: on the one hand, it is indispensable for reconstructing the whole system of the Tractatus; on the other hand, it will become a cornerstone of the elucidation of Wittgenstein’s views on ethics. Therefore, I shall first outline the Kantian approach as a framework within which the hidden theme of the Tractatus can be seen in a clearer light. Along the way, it will be corroborated that the point of the Tractatus has an inseparable relation to ethics (§2). Subsequently, I will critically analyze the orthodox interpretation of the concept of “the transcendental.” In particular, contrary to Erik Stenius, who purports that the concept has two disparate meanings and should be applied to logic and ethics, respectively, in different contexts, I will show that his contention is not tenable. Instead, I will defend that logic and ethics are homogeneous in that they are the a priori conditions of the world (§3). Finally, I will substantiate that Wittgenstein’s unprecedented views on ethics are germane to the metaphysical subject of Tractarian solipsism, i.e., a precondition of the world (§4).
Logik und Ethik aber sind im Grunde nur eins und dasselbe – Pflicht gegen sich selbst.
- Otto Weininger (Weininger 1932: 198)
1. Introduction
One of the fundamental problems, when we are trying to interpret the Tractatus, is to fathom its unfamiliar concepts that were of only peripheral interest to analytic philosophers. For instance, how can we comprehend Wittgenstein’s elliptical remarks that delineate the common attributes of logic and ethics?
Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world.
Logic is transcendental. [Die Logik ist transzendental] (TLP 6.13)
It is clear that ethics cannot be put into the world.
Ethics is transcendental. [Die Ethik ist transzendental]
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.) (TLP 6.421)
Wittgenstein claims that logic and ethics are transcendental without further exposition of that concept. Such an omission, in turn, engenders several conundrums among Tractarian readers. Firstly, the concept of “the transcendental” has long been regarded as a polysemous word, ever since its redefinition in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, in fact. Hence, readers have been on a forked road. Admittedly, this concept indicates what transcends the limits of a certain domain in terms of the conventional context. Given the context of Kantian philosophy, however, it might be possible that the concept reflects a priori conditions of all possible experience (or, for Wittgenstein, all possible factual language). Then, in the Tractatus, from which context is this concept drawn?
Secondly, it is questionable whether the concept has the same meaning when applied to logic and ethics, notwithstanding that he uses the same word. The doubt arises from, inter alia, the Tractarian doctrine that ethics cannot exist within the world. In short, whereas logic appears to be the a priori condition of the world, ethics could not be such a condition at first glance; it is, rather, transcendent in a Kantian sense. Countenancing this view, some commentators have even alleged that Wittgenstein confused the concept of “the transcendental” with “the transcendent” when he wrote the Tractatus. Then, is it tenable to say logic and ethics are transcendental in the same sense?
Settling these two questions, i.e., what is the meaning of “the transcendental” and how can it be consistently applied to logic and ethics, is the overriding task of the present paper. Inevitably, scrutinizing this subtle but overarching concept requires a novel approach beyond the philosophical tradition of Frege and Russell, for they never used it saliently. Thus, before answering the questions, I will endeavor to clarify an intellectual tradition that constitutes the substratum of the Tractatus. This is the tradition of transcendental philosophy, and the understanding of the concepts obtained from it plays a pivotal role in the following respect: on the one hand, it is indispensable for reconstructing the whole system of the Tractatus; on the other hand, it will become a cornerstone of the elucidation of Wittgenstein’s views on ethics.
Therefore, I shall first outline the Kantian approach as a framework within which the hidden theme of the Tractatus can be seen in a clearer light. Along the way, it will be corroborated that the point of the Tractatus has an inseparable relation to ethics (§2). Subsequently, I will critically analyze the orthodox interpretation of the concept of “the transcendental.” In particular, contrary to Erik Stenius, who purports that the concept has two disparate meanings and should be applied to logic and ethics, respectively, in different contexts, I will show that his contention is not tenable. Instead, I will defend that logic and ethics are homogeneous in that they are the a priori conditions of the world (§3). Finally, I will substantiate that Wittgenstein’s unprecedented views on ethics are germane to the metaphysical subject of Tractarian solipsism, i.e., a precondition of the world (§4).
2. Ethics and the limits of language
It is widely held that the Tractatus was once regarded as a representative of logical positivism, based on the readings of Ayer and Carnap. Considered the epitome of the debunking of speculative metaphysics, the Tractatus had a strong influence on both philosophers (Ayer 1985: 18). As Ayer and Carnap admitted themselves, however, it was later apparent that “in one central respect, the outlook of the Tractatus was misunderstood” (Ayer 1985: 30-31; see also Carnap 1967: 35-36). So, what is the crux of the discrepancy? True, like Ayer and Carnap, Wittgenstein states that the problems of metaphysics have been posed because the logic of language was misunderstood (TLP Preface). Moreover, he points out that philosophers are stuck in a quagmire of nonsense when they say something metaphysical (TLP 6.53). Partly galvanized by this idea, Carnap exiles metaphysics from academic disciplines through logical analysis, which “pronounces the verdict of meaninglessness on any alleged knowledge that pretends to reach above or behind experience” (Carnap 1959: 76).
Arguably, the second main idea of the Tractatus is neglected in Carnap’s pejorative accounts of metaphysics. For Carnap, there is no subject of metaphysics, because metaphysical propositions are nothing but nonsense. For Wittgenstein, metaphysical propositions are nonsense because certain sorts of truths cannot be stated in language. For instance, “what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest” (TLP 5.62; see also Hacker 2000: 353-355). Thus, it is mistaken to obscure a distinction between metaphysical pseudo-propositions and metaphysical truths. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein de facto deals with traditional topics in metaphysics, such as the substance, preconditions, and necessary nature of the world; they are all ineffable but nonetheless can be justified by the theory of what can only be shown, which is “the cardinal problem of philosophy” (Wittgenstein 2008: 98). In this regard, Hacker argues that the Tractatus carries out a sort of metaphysics, for
Its subject matter was held to be the language‐independent and thought‐independent de re necessities of the world. Moreover, the truths it strives to attain are synthetic a priori. […] They are synthetic – substantive truths concerning the world. But they are a priori – can be known independently of experience. They are established by rational argument, not by empirical observation, […] and experimental confirmation. (Hacker 2017: 209)
Then, how can we ascertain the rational arguments in the Tractatus, which elicit truths that make us run up against the boundaries of language when we try to express them? It will prove fruitful to take note of Wittgenstein’s later remark: “The limit of language manifests itself in the impossibility of describing the fact that corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence. (We are involved here with the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy)” (CV: 13; my emphasis).
By giving a novel meaning to the concept of “the transcendental” that was interchangeable with “the transcendent,” Kant differentiates his transcendental philosophy from prior metaphysics (Regenbogen und Meyer 2013: 671-672). In his definition, “only the cognition that these representations are not of empirical origin at all and the possibility that they can nevertheless be related a priori to objects of experience can be called transcendental” (CPR, A56/B81). Transcendental philosophy is thus a system of conditions (Bedingungen) that are not empirical but make every experience possible. Analyzing the system, Kant articulates the legitimate forms of discourse and criticizes illicit philosophical speculations, namely those that he calls “dogmatic” (Glock 1997: 287).
Let me now turn to Wittgenstein’s Kantian solution. According to the Tractatus, we can use a sentence (Satz) to describe a fact when they share a logical form (TLP 2.1, 2.18, 4.12). As is well-known, such a proposition (Satz) Wittgenstein calls a picture of reality (TLP 4.01). Also, it can state something, i.e., express a sense in so far as it functions as a picture (TLP 3.14, 3.142, 4.03). The logical form, as it were, has already been mirrored in the proposition when it has a sense (TLP 4.121). Appelqvist has detected a Kantian idea thereof, viz., the precondition of theoretical discourse: “I cannot describe the form of language if that form is a necessary condition for language to make sense in the first place” (Appelqvist 2016: 704). It is nonsense to say anything about the logical forms of propositions, for it would breach the legitimate forms of discourse – the rules of logical syntax (TLP 3.325). It also infringes the legitimate forms of thought, for thought is, simultaneously, a logical picture of facts and a meaningful proposition (TLP 3, 4). Instead, logical forms, as a priori conditions of all possible factual language, are shown by well-formed propositions.
In this respect, Stenius construes Tractarian logical analysis as a kind of transcendental deduction in a Kantian sense (Stenius 1960: 220). Arguing that logical analysis indicates not only the a priori and necessary conditions of theoretical discourse but also its limits, he suggests that the Tractatus could be entitled “Critique of Pure Language” (Stenius 1960: 218-220). Indeed, some Kantian remarks such as “all philosophy is a critique of language [Sprachkritik]” and “logic is transcendental” (TLP 4.0031, 6.13), bolster his reading. This ingenious conversion of the understanding of logical analysis is dramatically expressed by Stegmüller as follows: “Wittgenstein transferred Kant’s transcendental idealism from the plane of reason to the plane of language” (Stegmüller 1969: 418).
It is an impressive conclusion but somewhat hyperbolic if we impartially fathom the differences between Wittgenstein and Kant. First, Wittgenstein repudiates the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions, while Kant pronounces that those propositions not only express the conditions of empirical representations but also conform to the legitimate forms of discourse. So, Wittgenstein acknowledges that his statements are nonsense (TLP 6.54), unlike Kant, who never puts his philosophy in the same position as dogmatic metaphysics (Glock 1997: 296). Second, it is unclear whether Wittgenstein accepts Kantian idealism. The limits of language are set by the logical form’s ineffability, not by its applicability to the domain of possible experience (cf. CPR A96). The distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself seems to melt down in the Tractatus.
Hence, it is reasonable to challenge that Stegmüller’s comparison might distort Kant’s original deduction (see Hacker 2013: 43-47). Nevertheless, both Wittgenstein and Kant, in a loose sense, use a transcendental argument to deduce the conditions of the possibility of our thought and representation. It can be expressed by the forms of Modus Tollens (P, ~Q ⊂ ~P ⊦ Q) as follows:
(i) We can V (or, we do V);
(ii) Unless things are thus-and-so in reality, then we would not be able to do V;
(iii) Things are thus-and-so in reality. (Hacker 2013: 44; see also Lee 2019: 61-62)
I now make use of this transcendental argument to explain the meaning of “logic is transcendental” in two stages: First, if there are no logical forms shared by propositions and facts, then pictures cannot depict the facts, propositions cannot have a sense, and, in turn, meaningful propositions, including thought, cannot exist. But we can think. So, there are logical forms shared by propositions and facts, and in this sense, logic is the a priori condition of the possibility of thought and meaningful language (Glock 1996: 292; Hacker 2013: 44). Second, there is no fact that cannot share its logical form with a proposition, for “propositions can represent the whole of reality” (TLP 4.12). Thus, logic is also the a priori condition of the possibility of facts and the world (TLP 2.06, 2.063).
So far, so good. But we should discern which logic is transcendental before taking a further step. According to the Tractatus, the fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the logical properties of language and the world (TLP 6.12). When a suitable notation is given, however, logical propositions are superfluous because we can recognize the formal properties by merely seeing them in empirical propositions (TLP 6.122). Hence, we should distinguish logical propositions from logical forms (and properties); whereas the propositions of logic are senseless propositions that are fit for use on behalf of the suitable notation, logical forms (and properties) are the preconditions of language and the world, belonging to the category of what cannot be said but only shown. Indeed, Wittgenstein often calls the latter simply “logic,” as follows: “The logic of the world, which is shown in tautologies by the propositions of logic, is shown in equations by mathematics” (TLP 6.22). Likewise, while ethical things (or ethics) cannot be put into words but make themselves manifest (sich zeigen), the propositions of ethics are nonsensical propositions, not belonging to this category (TLP 6.421, 6.522).
Keeping the above distinction in mind, let me outline the rest of Stenius’s interpretation. He encapsulates a central theme of Kantian philosophy as a dichotomy between the provinces of theoretical and practical reason.
The error in Leibniz-Wolffian metaphysics […] was that it applied the forms of theoretical reason to questions which do not belong to the province of theoretical knowledge […] All those questions belong to the province of ‘practical reason’ and can be answered only by methods proper to it. [...] An investigation of our theoretical reason shows the limits of all possible experience and thus also what kind of questions lies outside this limit. Such an investigation Kant calls a transcendental deduction – it shows the limits of our theoretical reason. And what is ‘transcendental’ in this sense must be distinguished from what is transcendent, that is, what transcends this limit. (Stenius 1960: 215-216)
What I want to underscore here is the way Kant dichotomizes between the two provinces. According to Kant, the province of practical reason is illuminated “by circumscribing [begrenze] this field [of sensibility] and showing [zeige] that it does not include everything within itself but that there is still more beyond it” (Kant 1998: 65; my emphasis). The point that ethics can be revealed only by delimiting the domain of theoretical discourse is reiterated in Wittgenstein’s correspondence: “The point of the book is ethical. […] For the ethical is delimited [begrenzt] from within, as it were, by my book; and […] it can ONLY be delimited in this way” (Luckhardt 1979: 94-95).
Thus, Stenius holds that the province of practical reason is extant in the Tractatus (Stenius 1960: 222). However, we should first weigh the aforementioned difference to determine this area. For Kant, the transcendent province of ethics cannot be established from theoretical reason, but it is still conceivable. For Wittgenstein, on the contrary, we cannot even think of ethics at all. Still, one might argue that ethical propositions can show ethics, albeit nonsensically; but unlike well-formed propositions, they can neither say nor show anything by themselves (Hacker 2000: 356). Nonsense, as it were, is nothing but the residual product of a failed attempt to state the ineffable. Stenius thereby concludes that ethics transcends the limits of language and the world, for it can be neither shown nor said in language, and “the limits of my language mean the limits of my world” (TLP 5.6; Stenius 1960: 222). To sum up, the province of practical reason in the Tractatus seems sacrosanct, defying every attempt to theorize it. And even Wittgenstein’s theory of what can only be shown seems insufficient to deal with the problem of how we can see this area.
3. The transcendental nature of ethics
Stenius’s interpretation suggests that Kant and Wittgenstein have striking affinities, especially their views on logic and ethics. Both deem logic as the condition of theoretical discourse, and ethics as what transcends the limits of such a domain. Further, Stenius tries to demonstrate his view by citing Wittgenstein’s remarks on ethics (see Stenius 1960: 222-223). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein delineates ethics in various terms: the sense of the world, a value that does have value, what makes every contingent fact non-accidental, and, in a nutshell, the higher (TLP 6.41-6.42). And yet none of those things can exist within the world but must lie outside it (TLP 6.41). “So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. Propositions can express nothing that is higher” (TLP 6.42). If so, why does he declare that ethics is transcendental, just like logic? Stenius assumes that he might have downplayed the conceptual difference:
I think Wittgenstein would rather have said ‘Ethics is transcendent’ if he had adopted the above distinction between ‘transcendental’ and ‘transcendent’. […] we made a distinction between two kinds of things that cannot be said: that which can be shown in language but not said, and that which can be neither shown nor said in language. The mystical belongs, I think, to the latter kind of inexpressible things. (Stenius 1960: 222-223)
But this is misleading. First, as argued by Appelqvist, several anecdotes tell a different story. For example, Wittgenstein already had discussed Kantian philosophy with his friends, in 1916, and had even read the Critique of Pure Reason before publishing his book. (Appelqvist 2013: 41). So, it is difficult to believe that he was not acquainted with such a rudimentary conceptual difference.
Second, Stenius heedlessly equates two disparate expressions, i.e., “the outside of the world” with “the outside of the limit of the world.” To clarify his purport, I will begin by postulating that the meaning of “the transcendent” is “the outside of the limits of the world,” for it is the way both Kant and Stenius understand that concept. Let me recapitulate his argument as follows:
(i) Ethics must lie outside the world;
(ii) For all x, if x must lie outside the world, then x also must lie outside the limits of the world, which means that x is transcendent;
(iii) Therefore, ethics must lie outside the limits of the world, which means that ethics is transcendent.
Although the argument is valid, the hidden premise (ii) is fallacious. Let me give a counter-example presented in the Tractatus: “The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world” (TLP 5.632). In short, the subject must lie outside the world, because it does not belong to the world, but simultaneously, it cannot lie outside the limits of the world because it is a limit itself. Hence, if ethics belongs to the limits of the world like the Tractarian subject, then ethics is not transcendent, and so too, the conclusion (iii) also is untenable.
Understandably, whether ethics lies outside the limits of the world hinges on a precise and meticulous reading of the whole context, not merely the fragmentary remarks of 6.41-6.42. In particular, the discussion about the ineffable will should not be omitted. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein concisely mentions ethics and its bearer (Träger): “It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the bearer of the ethical” (TLP 6.423; translation modified). Plus, “if the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts” (TLP 6.43). Does he refer to the same will herein? We should examine the Notebooks to confirm this:
What really is the situation of the human will? I will call “will” first and foremost the bearer of good and evil.
Let us imagine a man who could use none of his limbs and hence could, in the ordinary sense, not exercise his will. He could, however, think and want and communicate his thoughts to someone else. Could therefore do good or evil through the other man. Then it is clear that […] he in the ethical sense is the bearer of a will. (NB: 76-77)
Given that his thought was flawed, I will focus on its development. First, by any means, a man who exercises his will is the bearer of the will in the ethical sense. Second, this man is indisputably the bearer of good and evil because his will carries them. Controverting the thought again, however, Wittgenstein realized an error, in that he had considered “willing” as the cause of “wishing,” as if wishing is the cause of the action (NB: 77). The wish is what he calls later the will as a phenomenon, which is confined to the subject of psychology (TLP 6.423). As expounded by Glock, it is “merely a mental phenomenon that may or may not be followed by a bodily movement” (Glock 1999: 451). Hence, if we comprehend the ineffable will as the ultimate cause of the action, it degenerates into the part of the phenomenal world, conveying neither good nor evil.
A few months later, he specified the nature of the will more elaborately: “The will is an attitude of the subject to the world. […] The subject is the willing subject. […] The act of the will is not the cause of the action but is the action itself” (NB: 87). Unlike the wish, which is the contingent cause of the action, and as such cannot make any facts non-accidental, the will is the necessary and internal aspect of the action, namely the metaphysical subject’s perspective on the world (Glock 1999: 451; Stokhof 2002: 207). Thus, we can infer that the subject is always the bearer of ethics (good and evil), for the subject, by its very nature, incessantly exercises its will – in the form of gazing into the world. In this way, good and evil enter the world as the predicates of the subject:
Good and evil only enter through the subject. And the subject is not part of the world, but a limit of the world [eine Grenze der Welt].
It would be possible to say (à la Schopenhauer): It is not the world of representation that is either good or evil; but the willing subject. […] As the subject is not a part of the world but a presupposition of its existence, so good and evil which are predicates of the subject, are not properties in the world. (NB: 79; translation slightly altered)
According to Wittgenstein, the distinct expressions (i) “A man and his will are the bearers of ethics (good or evil)” and (ii) “A man and his will are good or evil” have the same meaning. Therefore, we can now read 6.43 as follows: If the good or bad exercise of the will (the bearer of ethics) does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world (the subject’s perspective), not the facts (the phenomenal world). Consequently, ethics belongs to the limit of the world as the attribute of it. That is to say that, contrary to Stenius’s contention, ethics is not transcendent.1
Instead, I explain the meaning of “ethics is transcendental” in two stages: First, as mentioned above, the subject is not a part of the world but a presupposition (eine Voraussetzung) of its existence. Simultaneously, it is an ethical subject by its very nature. Thus, as the a priori condition of the possibility of the world and its facts, ethics (viz., good and evil, the ineffable will, and the willing subject) is transcendental. Second, if the world does not exist, a picture of reality cannot be established, because it is a fact itself (TLP 2.141). Hence, if ethics does not exist, meaningful language and thought cannot endure. To sum up, ethics and logic are transcendental in the same sense. The following remark in the Notebooks vindicates the conclusion decisively:
Ethics does not treat of the world. Ethics must be a condition of the world [eine Bedingung der Welt], like logic. (NB: 77; emphasis mine)
4. Das Anrennen gegen die Grenze der Sprache: Solipsism and ethical propositions
I now shall focus on the latent obstacle that may hamper the espousal of my novel interpretation. I take it for granted that my inference about the transcendentality of ethics is valid so long as the metaphysical subject is the precondition of the world. But why should we accept an arcane doctrine that such a subject is the sine qua non of the world? It appears to be rickety reasoning indeed, unless rational arguments underpin it. Therefore, I will reconstruct a transcendental argument concerning the metaphysical subject and clarify the role of ethical propositions along the way.
Let me briefly outline the subject of solipsism as presented in the Tractatus. First, it is a limit of the world, not belonging to contingent facts (TLP 5.632). Second, because it lies outside the physical world, Wittgenstein also calls it a metaphysical (meta-physical) subject (TLP 5.641). Third, we cannot deduce its existence from anything in the world. The relationship between the subject and the world is analogous to the eye and the visual field (TLP 5.633). Fourth, the metaphysical subject is the philosophical self (das philosophische Ich), differentiating from the self in psychology (TLP 5.641). Fifth, the philosophical self comes into philosophy when it realizes that “the world is my world,” and this truth is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world (TLP 5.62, 5.641). Finally, the truths of solipsism are ineffable. But what the solipsist means makes itself manifest (TLP 5.62).
Although Wittgenstein’s laconic explanation of solipsism seems baseless at first sight, I believe that we can ascertain the specific method he used to elicit this theory by scrutinizing the Tractatus, the Notebooks, and other writings. The most conspicuous clue that incites my curiosity is what he wrote in 5.641: “Thus there really is a sense in which philosophy can talk about the self in a non-psychological way” (TLP 5.641). This sentence evidently is a modified version of what had originally been written in the Notebooks between August 5 and 11, 1916:
The thinking subject is surely mere illusion. But the willing subject exists.
If the will did not exist, neither would there be that centre of the world, which we call the self [das Ich], and which is the bearer of ethics.
What is good and evil is essentially the self, not the world. […] The self is not an object [Das Ich ist kein Gegenstand]. […] I objectively confront every object. But not the self.
So there really is a way [eine Art und Weise] in which there can and must be mention of the self in a non-psychological sense in philosophy. (NB: 80; translation modified)
Wittgenstein’s point is twofold: (i) The ethical attributes (good and evil) and the ineffable will are the necessary conditions of the philosophical self; (ii) the self confronts every object in the world but does not confront itself. And for this reason, there is indeed a way (eine Art und Weise) in which there can be mention of the self in philosophy. Thus, this way can be derived from the fact that the self is not an object (Gegenstand), and at the same time, it is also the way whereby the ethical self can realize that “the world is my world.”
Nevertheless, the Tractatus alludes that such a way cannot be empirical like the methods implemented in general science. Let us turn to an analogy: I cannot see the eye or infer its existence from anything in the visual field if it is the necessary condition of the objects that can be seen (TLP 5.633). Likewise, I cannot experience that the world is my world, and there are no things within the world to guarantee the inference that the world is my representation, for this a priori truth is the necessary condition of the objects of all possible experience (TLP 5.634). Then, how could this truth be established? I think one possibility remains: We have already confirmed that “outside the world” is distinct from “outside the limits of the world.” In other words, the claim that we cannot deduce the metaphysical subject from anywhere within the contingent world does not exclude the possibility that the self can be inferred from its limits.
Now, I will reconstruct the transcendental argument that actualizes the possibility that has just been raised, concentrating on Wittgenstein’s lecture and dialogue recorded in 1929. Admittedly, he had renounced substantial parts of the Tractatus by this time. So, I deal with these texts in parts and to extents that are confined to their continuity with the Tractatus. As is well known, Wittgenstein gave the lecture on ethics in November and discussed the same topic with Schlick a month and a half later.
First, the Tractatus holds that ethics and aesthetics are identical (TLP 6.421). In the lecture, similarly, he uses the term “ethics” in a broad sense, including “the most essential part of what is generally called Aesthetic” (LE: 4). It is thus a kind of Meta-ethics. Instead of judging the veracity of an ethical sentence, the point is to illuminate the cause of the human tendency to use such an expression. In this respect, the innovation of Wittgenstein’s views on ethics was to disclose that the “misuse of our language runs through all ethical and religious expressions” (LE: 9).
Second, he consistently argues that ethical laws are formalized by the traditionally held expression that “Thou shalt…,” and that by using this form of expression, we are trying to state an absolute value (TLP 6.422; LE: 5-6). As noted above, he earlier called it a value that does have value (TLP 6.41). Plus, propositions or facts that convey an ethical value are analogous to “the road which everybody on seeing it would, with logical necessity, have to go” (LE: 7), for the absolute value makes every contingent fact non-accidental (TLP 6.41). But in his view, “such a state of affairs is a chimera. No state of affairs has, in itself, […] the coercive power of an absolute judge” (LE: 7; emphasis mine). So, we can see that he adheres to the contention that the absolute value (the value that does have value) must lie outside the world.
Third, he expounds on the situation in which we encounter ethical values. According to the lecture, the source of our tendency to express them is a paradoxical experience:
I believe the best way of describing it is to say that when I have it I wonder at the existence of the world. […] But it is nonsense to say that I wonder at the existence of the world, because I cannot imagine it not existing. (LE: 8-9)
But when I say they are experiences [that appear to have an intrinsic, absolute value], surely, they are facts; they have taken place then and there, lasted a certain definite time and consequently are describable. […] And I will make my point still more acute by saying “It is the paradox that an experience, a fact, should seem to have supernatural value.” (LE: 10)
Arguably, this is not a pioneering idea that emerged after the Tractatus. On the contrary, he had already distinguished the paradoxical experience of being from every mundane, contingent experience. In the Tractatus, it was held to be an ineffable prerequisite for understanding logic:
The ‘experience’ that we need in order to understand logic is not that something or other is the state of things, but that something is: that, however, is not an experience.
Logic is prior to every experience—that something is so.
It is prior to the question ‘How?’, not prior to the question ‘What?’ (TLP 5.552)
The “experience” of “something exists” is pertinent to what things are, unlike the experience concerning how things are, which can be described by propositions (TLP 3.221). Significantly, it is paradoxical. On the one hand, it is an “experience” – we must encounter it before applying logic (TLP 5.5521). But it is a priori – it cannot be an experience, according to the general definition. This paradox is based on the fact that we cannot state the existence of objects or the world.
According to the Tractatus, “the application of logic decides what elementary propositions there are” (TLP 5.557). Also, an elementary proposition and the names arranged in it cannot respectively have a sense and meaning unless the simple objects exist (TLP 3.22, 3.3). Hence, the Tractatus offers a transcendental conceptual system: An empirical proposition that describes the state of affairs presupposes (i) the possibility of the arrangement of the objects (i.e., a logical form) and (ii) their existence (TLP 2.031-2.033). In short, both are the a priori conditions of mundane experience. However, it is nonsense to say whether the object exists, like the statements about logical forms. If “this object does not exist” is true, then it cannot have any sense at all, and thus “this object exists,” which must have the opposite sense, is also nonsensical (TLP 4.0621).
Likewise, the fact that “the world exists” is neither conceivable nor expressible (TLP 5.61). “A state of affairs is thinkable,” Wittgenstein comments, “what this means is that we can picture it to ourselves” (TLP 3.001). But no one can imagine the opposite situation, “the world does not exist.” That “the world exists” is thus a pseudo-proposition – it does not have bipolarity and falls into nonsense, notwithstanding that it appears to be an undisputed fact. Wittgenstein therefore claims that the human tendency to state the absolute value derived from the paradox is nothing but running against the boundaries of language (LE: 11-12). He gave a more detailed explanation to Schlick as follows:
To be sure, I can imagine what Heidegger means by being and anxiety. Man feels the urge to run up against the limits of language. Think for example of the astonishment that anything at all exists. This astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a question, and there is also no answer whatsoever. […] Nevertheless we do run up against the limits of language. Kierkegaard too saw that there is this running up against something and he referred to it in a fairly similar way (as running up against paradox). This running up against the limits of language is ethics. […] But the inclination, the running up against something, indicates something [deutet auf etwas hin]. (WVC: 68-69)
As mentioned above, what the solipsist means makes itself manifest (zeigt sich). And the way the self is deduced in philosophy relies on the fact that the self is not an object (Das Ich ist kein Gegenstand). Because an object is defined as a thing that stands opposite (Gegen-stand) to the subject, the self cannot be an object. Hence, the inference might be as follows: The self that uses an ethical sentence makes itself manifest by running up against the limits of language. From such a collision, I can infer that there must be something standing opposed to the limits. In this way, running up against the limits of language indicates (hindeuten) the willing subject. It is thus a transcendental argument expressed as follows:
(i) If the self does not exist, we cannot run up against the limits of language;
(ii) We can run up against the limits of language;
(iii) Therefore, the self exists.
Premise (ii) amounts to having a “desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable” (LE: 12), in the forms of ethical, aesthetical, and religious expressions. So, ethical attributes and their bearer (the ineffable will) are the necessary conditions of premise (ii). And as a corollary, the self is revealed as an ethical subject.
Finally, the self that is deduced from this transcendental argument entails solipsism. Namely, we can recognize that this world is my world (my eye’s visual field) because the existence of the observer (the eye) who gazes into the world (the visual field) can be inferred. Nevertheless, we cannot know whether other observers gaze into the world. Thus, the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world, and from this fact, that the world is my world makes itself manifest. Consequently, the self is revealed as the presupposition of the world, for the conception of “my world” is meaningless, unless the self exists.
5. Conclusion
I shall summarize this paper by answering, as clearly as possible, the questions that have been raised in the Introduction. First, in Wittgenstein’s claim that logic and ethics are transcendental, logic and ethics indicate logical and ethical things, respectively. However, logical and ethical propositions should be excluded from these lists. Second, logical things include logical forms and properties of language and of the world, and ethical things include good and evil, the ineffable will, and the willing subject. Third, logical and ethical propositions are pertinent to the showing of logic and ethics. For instance, the fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows (zeigen) the logical properties of language and the world. Similarly, ethical things make themselves manifest (sich zeigen) by the fact that the subject who uses the propositions of ethics runs up against the limits of language. In a nutshell, ethical propositions are the residual products of such a collision and as such as indicative of the willing subject. Fourth, both transcendental logic and ethics are ineffable. Therefore, the synthetic a priori truths concerning them cannot be said but only shown. Fifth, their existence can be justified by transcendental arguments, as they are the conditions of the possibility of the world and of meaningful language. Consequently, Wittgenstein’s concept of “the transcendental” reflects the a priori conditions of the world, and logic and ethics are transcendental in the same sense.
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- True, Wittgenstein once used the concept of “the transcendent” to describe the nature of ethics in the Notebooks: “What is the objective mark of the happy, harmonious life? Here it is again clear that there cannot be any such mark, that can be described. This mark cannot be a physical one but only a metaphysical one, a transcendent one. Ethics is transcendent” (NB: 78-79; translation slightly altered). But the meaning of this concept amounts to nothing but saying that ethics lies outside the physical world (meta-physical), not its limits, like the metaphysical subject. He later explained this hallmark of ethics in “A Lecture on Ethics”: “Our words used as we use them in science, are vessels capable only of containing and conveying meaning and sense, natural meaning and sense. Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural” (LE: 7). Both passages aver that ethics is ineffable because it does not exist within the world, as presented in 6.41-6.42. But, as I argued above, it does not follow that ethics lies outside the limits of the world. [본문으로]