On the Tractarian Concept of 'nonsense (Unsinn)'

2024-1 Wittgenstein

 

#2) Nonsense (Unsinn) (OR sometimes translate “Unsinn” as “senseless”)

As mentioned above, nonsense can be defined as the result of failing to comply with the rules of logical syntax (3.325). Unlike a proposition with a sense, nonsense cannot depict (abbilden) any reality, nor can it represent (darstellen) the possibility of reality (2.06, 2.17, 2.201). Since “a proposition is a picture of reality” (4.01), nonsense cannot be considered a picture at all. Because “the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity” (2.222), nonsense can be neither true nor false. Thus, strictly speaking, it is not even a proposition (Satz), notwithstanding that it can still be regarded as a sentence (Satz); Wittgenstein sometimes calls it a pseudo-proposition for this reason (e.g., 4.1272).

When accepting this interpretation, ‘nonsense’ appears to be interchangeable with the word ‘gibberish.’ Like “piggly wiggle tiggle,” it cannot convey any sense (Diamond 2000: 151). The only difference between “piggly wiggle tiggle” and philosophical nonsense is that the latter only seems to make sense. But what really happened in such cases is that “we have failed to give a meaning to some of its constituents (even if we think that we have done so.)” (5.4733). This is because our ordinary language disguises this fact by making philosophical nonsense seem superficially similar to a proposition with a sense. Accordingly, Wittgenstein holds that our ordinary usage of language is the origin of all the confusion that has occurred in philosophy. We must use a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar (logical syntax) to avoid such an illusion (3.325). He said:

Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical.  Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language (4.0003).

Several scholars, like Ayer and Carnap, defended and developed this account, claiming that the Tractatus essentially represents the anti-metaphysical view. However, regarding nonsense merely as a product of confusion not only oversimplifies Wittgenstein’s thoughts but can also lead to a distortion of them.

The distinction between metaphysical propositions and metaphysical truths may shed light on what he thought about philosophical nonsense. Hacker presents “numerous truths that seemingly cannot be stated, but which are nevertheless apparently asserted in the course of the Tractatus," organizing them into ten categories (Hacker 2000: 353-355). In fact, Wittgenstein has never argued that such truths do not exist and are mere illusions. What he considered an illusion is the thought that we can speak about such truths. For instance, what Russell tried to say by suggesting the theory of types is “exactly what one can’t say” (Wittgenstein 2008: 99). Moreover, we cannot use formal concepts such as ‘complex’, ‘fact’, ‘function’, ‘number’ in a proposition with a sense, for they are represented in conceptual notation by variables (4.1272). Namely, the fact that there are two objects is expressed by ‘(∃x, y)’, not by the pseudo-proposition, “there are two objects” (4.1272).

Thus, based on this understanding, the pseudo-proposition “there are two objects” is not just the same as “piggly wiggle tiggle.” Such a proposition can be better characterized as the residual product of a failed attempt to say the ineffable. In this regard, Hacker encapsulates the fundamental idea of the Tractatus as the doctrine “that the necessary truths of logic are senseless, and that all other putatively necessary truths cannot be said but can only be shown” (Hacker 2000: 370).

 

References

Diamond, C. (2000), “Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus”, in: A. Crary and R. Read, eds., The New Wittgenstein, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 149-173.

Glock, H. J. (1996), A Wittgenstein Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell.

Hacker, P. M. S. (2000), “Was He Trying to Whistle It?” in: A. Crary and R. Read, eds., The New Wittgenstein, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 353-389.

Wittgenstein, L. (TLP), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, London: Routledge, 1961; Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, in: Werkausgabe Bd. 1, 23. Aufl. hrsausgegeben von J. Schulte, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2019.

Wittgenstein, L. (2008), Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents, 1911–1951, 4th Ed. edited by B. McGuinness, Oxford: Blackwell.