Proposal: Wittgenstein’s Reception of Fregean Context Principle

2024-1 Wittgenstein

 

As is widely known, Frege articulates the so-called context principle in the introduction to his Grundlagen and considers it one of the three fundamental principles he has kept, expressed as follows: “never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition.” Such a principle is differently (and perhaps most famously) put in § 62 as the claim that ‘it is only in the context of a proposition that words have any meaning’ („Nur in Zusammenhange eines Satzes bedeuten die Worter etwas“)

As is also well-known, Wittgenstein, in both early and late periods, appears to accept this principle and integrated it into his philosophy of language (as referred to the picture theory and the use theory for convenience). The most frequently cited passages in the Tractatus and the investigation are as follows:

Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning. („Nur der Satz hat Sinn; nur im Zusammenhang des Satzes hat ein Name Bedeutung“) TLP 3.3

§49 But what does it mean to say that we cannot explain (that is, describe) these elements, but only name them? Well, it could mean, for instance, that when in a limiting case a complex consists of only one square, its description is simply the name of the coloured square.

Here one might say -though this easily leads to all kinds of philosophical superstition - that a sign “R” or “B”, etc., may sometimes be a word and sometimes a sentence. But whether it ‘is a word or a sentence’ depends on the situation in which it is uttered or written. For instance, if A has to describe complexes of coloured squares to B, and he uses the word “R” by itself, we’ll be able to say that the word is a description - a sentence. But if he is memorizing the words and their meanings, or if he is teaching someone else the use of the words and uttering them in the course of ostensive teaching, we’ll not say that they are sentences. In this situation the word “R”, for instance, is not a description; one names an element with it —– but that is why it would be strange to say here that an element can only be named! For naming and describing do not stand on the same level: naming is a preparation for describing. Naming is not yet a move in a language-game -any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. One may say: with the mere naming of a thing, nothing has yet been done. Nor has it a name except in a game. This was what Frege meant too when he said that a word has a meaning only in the context of a sentence.

 

The main questions would be as follows:

(1) Despite significant changes in his philosophical transition from the 'Tractatus' to the 'Investigations,' it seems that Wittgenstein consistently holds the context principle. However, this does not mean that Wittgenstein accepts this principle without reinterpretation. For Frege, the context principle is necessary because without it, 'one is almost forced to take as the meanings of words mental pictures or acts of individual minds, and so to offend against the first principle (i.e., "always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective").' However, it is not quite clear whether Wittgenstein upholds this principle in the same manner.

(1-1) Does Wittgenstein (as Frege did) think that this principle is necessary to make a clear distinction between the psychological and the logical?

(1-2) Or, are there any other plausible reasons to accept the context principle within the Tractarian framework?

According to Liptow, 'many of the philosophical ideas of the 'Tractatus' are developed in the broader context of establishing logical atomism and the picture theory of meaning. [...] This might also hold for the Context Principle.' Liptow further claims that this common interpretation is mistaken, and the reason Wittgenstein introduces the context principle in 3.3 is driven by a motivation that is quite independent from his picture theory and the ontology of facts. The Wittgensteinian context principle 'is thus meant to be intelligible and justifiable independently of the picture theory of meaning' (Liptow 2018: 228).

(1-3) So, should(n’t) we comprehend the Wittgensteinian context principle as part of the picture theory of meaning?"

(2) Another related issue is providing a proper interpretation of §49 in the Investigation. For instance, how can we understand the claim that “naming and describing do not stand on the same level: naming is a preparation for describing,” and “with the mere naming of a thing, nothing has yet been done. Nor has it a name except in a game”? What is the relationship between this claim and the Fregean context principle? In other words,

2-1) why does Wittgenstein say that this was what Frege meant too when he articulated the context principle?

And

2-2) what is the fundamental shared claim when Frege, the early Wittgenstein, and the late Wittgenstein argued this principle? Or, are their differences significant?

 (3) The final question is related to a more general issue concerning the context principle. It is sometimes claimed that the context principle is incorrect due to counterexamples found in daily life. Furthermore, one might argue that 'it is incompatible with the Principle of Compositionality' (Liptow 2018: 224). Then, how can the Fregean and Wittgensteinian context principles be defended against these challenges?

 

The Tentative Bibliography

1) Papers on Wittgenstein’s Context Principle

Liptow, J. (2018) “Wittgenstein’s Argument for the Context Principle in the Tractatus.” Grazer philosophische studien 95, pp. 224-244.

Morris, K. J. (1994) “The `Context Principle’ in the Later Wittgenstein.” The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), 44 (176),  pp. 294–310.

Ruffino, M. A. (1994) “The Context Principle and Wittgenstein’s Criticism of Russell’s Theory of Types.” Synthese, vol. 98, no. 3, pp. 401–14.

Falcato, A. (2014) "How far does Wittgenstein go with the Context Principle?" Wittgenstein-Studien, vol. 5, no. 1, 2014, pp. 89-100.

2) Papers on the general accounts of Fregean Context Principle

Joongol, K. (2011). “Frege's context principle: An interpretation,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):193-213.

Costreie, S. (2010). “Frege‘s Context Principle: its Role and Interpretation.” Logos and Episteme 1 (2):287-301.

Linnebo, Ø. (2009). “Frege’s Context Principle and Reference to Natural Numbers.” In: Lindström, S., Palmgren, E., Segerberg, K., Stoltenberg-Hansen, V. (eds) Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism. Synthese Library, vol 341. Springer, Dordrecht.

Linnebo, Ø., (2019) “The Context Principle in Frege’s Grundgesetze,” in Philip A. Ebert, and Marcus Rossberg (eds), Essays on Frege's Basic Laws of Arithmetic (Oxford, 2019; online edn, Oxford Academic, 21 Nov. 2019).

Bar-Elli, G. (1997). Frege's context principle. Philosophia 25 (1-4):99-129.

Bogucki, Krystian (2022). Frege’s View of the Context Principle After 1890. Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (1):1-29.

Ruffino, M. A. (1991) “Context principle, fruitfulness of logic and the cognitive value of arithmetic in Frege,” History and Philosophy of Logic, 12:2, 185-194.

Ricketts, T. (2010). “Concepts, Objects, and the Context Principle.” In Michael Potter Tom Ricketts (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Frege. Cambridge University Press. pp. 149-219.

3) Papers on a defense of Fregean Context Principle

Janssen, T. M. V. (2001) “Frege, Contextuality and Compositionality.” Journal of Logic, Language, and Information, vol. 10, no. 1, pp. 115–36. 

Barth, A. (2012). “A Refutation of Frege’s Context Principle?” Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):26-35.