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2024-1 Wittgenstein Final Exam#2) Philosophy of Psychology §257 257. Es erhebt sich nun die Frage: Könnte es Menschen geben, denen die Fähigkeit, etwas als etwas zu sehen, abginge a und wie wäre das? Was für Folgen hätte es? —– Wäre dieser Defekt zu vergleichen mit Farbenblindheit, oder mit dem Fehlen des absoluten Gehörs? a Wir wollen ihn “Aspektblindheit” nennen a und uns nun überlegen, was da..

2024-1 Wittgenstein Final Exam #1) Philosophical Investigations § 80 80. Ich sage: “Dort steht ein Sessel”. Wie, wenn ich hingehe und ihn holen will und er entschwindet plötzlich meinem Blick? —– “Also war es kein Sessel, sondern irgend eine Täuschung.” —– Aber in ein paar Sekunden sehen wir ihn wieder und können ihn angreifen, etc. —– “Also war der Sessel doch da und sein Verschwinden war irgen..

2024 UIGPS Conference Comments on “Responding to Cyr’s Challenge: A Defense of Historicism” Hyeongyun Kim (The University of Iowa) In the paper, the author engages in a debate between the structuralist and historicist accounts of moral responsibility and defends the latter against Cyr’s three challenges. Structuralism, according to the author, claims that facts about an agent’s internal conditio..

Silva Jr, Paul (2023). Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1. Towards an Awareness-First Epistemology1) The expression ‘aware of the fact that’ is a commonplace① criticize‘You were aware of the fact that it was wrong, but you did it anyway!’② excuse‘I’m sorry, I wasn’t aware of the fact that you would be hurt by my action.’③ admonish‘You should be aware ..

2024-1 Seminar Epistemology 1. Fumerton’s Inferential Internalism ① The distinction between inferential/non-inferential justification: in general, deduction, induction, and abduction (also known as “inference to the best explanation”) are enumerated as instances of inferential justification. Non-inferential justification, on the other hand, include a justification through sense perceptions, memo..

2024-1 Seminar Metaphysics 1. A Fundamental Issue in the Philosophy of the SelfOne of the fundamental issues in the philosophy of the self is to elucidate what ensures the continuity of personal identity. Put differently, the specific question would be as follows: What criteria determine that a person at time t1 is numerically the same as that person at time t2? This is because (1) we perceive o..

Richard Fumerton, "What the Internalist Should Say to the Tortoise," Episteme, 12, 2 (2015) 209–217. 1. Introduction① Carroll’s (1895) short piece “What the Tortoise said to Achilles” in many ways anticipates issues that arise in a number of contemporary controversies. One might argue, for example, that initially plausible attempts to deal with the problem of easy knowledge will land one in the ..