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Silva Jr, Paul (2023). Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1. Towards an Awareness-First Epistemology1) The expression ‘aware of the fact that’ is a commonplace① criticize‘You were aware of the fact that it was wrong, but you did it anyway!’② excuse‘I’m sorry, I wasn’t aware of the fact that you would be hurt by my action.’③ admonish‘You should be aware ..

2024-1 Seminar Epistemology 1. Fumerton’s Inferential Internalism ① The distinction between inferential/non-inferential justification: in general, deduction, induction, and abduction (also known as “inference to the best explanation”) are enumerated as instances of inferential justification. Non-inferential justification, on the other hand, include a justification through sense perceptions, memo..

Richard Fumerton, "What the Internalist Should Say to the Tortoise," Episteme, 12, 2 (2015) 209–217. 1. Introduction① Carroll’s (1895) short piece “What the Tortoise said to Achilles” in many ways anticipates issues that arise in a number of contemporary controversies. One might argue, for example, that initially plausible attempts to deal with the problem of easy knowledge will land one in the ..

Cohen (2002) Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge  1. Basic Knowledge and the KR PrincipleP1 We acquire knowledge of the world through belief sources like sense perception, memory, and induction.P2 Such sources can not deliver knowledge unless we know the source is reliable.P3 But surely our knowledge that sense perception is reliable will be based on knowledge we have about the wor..

2024-1 Wittgenstein #2) Nonsense (Unsinn) (OR sometimes translate “Unsinn” as “senseless”) As mentioned above, nonsense can be defined as the result of failing to comply with the rules of logical syntax (3.325). Unlike a proposition with a sense, nonsense cannot depict (abbilden) any reality, nor can it represent (darstellen) the possibility of reality (2.06, 2.17, 2.201). Since “a proposition i..

2024-1 Wittgenstein #1) Senseless (sinnlos) ‘Senseless,’ or in the original German, ‘sinnlos,’ is one of the three main categories used in the Tractatus to classify propositions (Sätze). The Tractarian concept of ‘sinnlos’ is particularly crucial for understanding the nature of logical propositions (die logischen Sätze). According to Tractarian accounts of language, every proposition belongs to ..

2024-1 Seminar Epistemology Srinivasan’s Radical Externalism 1. What’s going on here? The Overall Picture of Radical Externalism In her paper, Srinivasan presents three epistemologically distinctive cases – ‘Racist Dinner Table,’ ‘Classist College,’ and ‘Domestic Violence’ – in which social hierarchies, discrimination, and power effects are subtly intertwined. She then argues that “externalism h..

2024-1 Seminar Metaphysics 1. IntroductionIn his pioneering paper, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” J. J. C. Smart developed and relied on the so-called Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory, which was once considered the most dominant and promising candidate for shedding light on the nature of our minds. In the present paper, I aim to figure out the reasons why Smart’s type identity theory appealed ..

Stewart Cohen, “Justification and Truth.” Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, vol. 46, no. 3, 1984, pp. 279–95. 1. Introduction Epistemologists generally agree that two components of knowledge are justification and truth. If S believes that P, then S knows that P only if S is justiefied in believing that P and it is true that P. A central iss..

2024-1 Wittgenstein Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (German/English text), 4th Ed. trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Ed. P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Oxford: Blackwell, 2009. In dem Folgenden veröffentliche ich Gedanken, den Niederschlag philosophischer Untersuchungen, die mich in den letzten 16 Jahren beschäftigt haben. Sie betreffen viele ..