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2024-2 Frege and Russell Midterm Exam#3)(A) It is widely known that Russell’s paradox of classes had fatal consequences for naive set theory. Suppose {z: z ∉ z}, i.e., the set of all objects that are not members of themselves, exists. We then immediately encounter a contradiction, as follows:Call this set A, and ask “is A a member of itself?” If A ∉ A, then A meets the entrance requirement for A..

2024-2 Frege and Russell Midterm Exam#2) Explain why so many interpreters have held that Frege’s formal work breaches the distinction between term and wff. Find passage(s) in “On Sense and Reference” that suggest that Frege held that a declarative sentence names a truth-value. Explain how one can save Frege from this breach by interpreting his view as introducing characteristic functions for pro..

Kripke, Saul A. (1980). Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 22-70 The way I approach these matters will be, in some ways, quite different from what people are thinking today. Some of the views that I have are views which may at first glance strike some as obviously wrong. My favorite example is this (which I probably won't defend in the lectures-for one thing it doesn't ever convince ..

Landini, Gregory (2012). Frege's Notations: What They Are and How They Mean. London and Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan. [1-14]  ※ Author’s Note on the Use of Modern Logical NotationsThe book endeavors to explain Frege’s notations in terms of modern notations. It is therefore worth making a few comments on the modern notations used in the book that might not be familiar to readers. In addition t..

1 비트겐슈타인의 에서 중요한 것은 “말할 수 없는 것”이다. 여기에서 말하는 중요성이란 두 가지 의미를 지니고 있다: 한편으로, 논고의 가치론의 측면에서 말할 수 없는 것은 말할 수 있는 것보다 더할 나위없이 중요하다(가치 있다). 다른 한편으로, 논고에서 규명하려 하는 중심 질문은 “말할 수 있는 것이 어떻게 가능한가?”이며, 이런 의미에서 논고는 말할 수 없는 것, 즉 뜻을 결여한(sinnlos) 명제와 무의미한(unsinnig) 명제의 근본 성격을 규명하는 일에 많은 지면을 할애하고 있다. 따라서 우리는 그 비중의 측면에서도 말할 수 없는 것이 말할 수 있는 것보다 논고 안에서 더 중요하게 다루어진다고 파악해볼 수 있다. 2 반면 말할 수 있는 것에 관해서는, 우리는 이것에 대해 대개 더 구체적인..

2024-1 Wittgenstein Final Exam#2) Philosophy of Psychology §257 257. Es erhebt sich nun die Frage: Könnte es Menschen geben, denen die Fähigkeit, etwas als etwas zu sehen, abginge a und wie wäre das? Was für Folgen hätte es? —– Wäre dieser Defekt zu vergleichen mit Farbenblindheit, oder mit dem Fehlen des absoluten Gehörs? a Wir wollen ihn “Aspektblindheit” nennen a und uns nun überlegen, was da..

2024-1 Wittgenstein Final Exam #1) Philosophical Investigations § 80 80. Ich sage: “Dort steht ein Sessel”. Wie, wenn ich hingehe und ihn holen will und er entschwindet plötzlich meinem Blick? —– “Also war es kein Sessel, sondern irgend eine Täuschung.” —– Aber in ein paar Sekunden sehen wir ihn wieder und können ihn angreifen, etc. —– “Also war der Sessel doch da und sein Verschwinden war irgen..

2024-1 Wittgenstein #2) Nonsense (Unsinn) (OR sometimes translate “Unsinn” as “senseless”) As mentioned above, nonsense can be defined as the result of failing to comply with the rules of logical syntax (3.325). Unlike a proposition with a sense, nonsense cannot depict (abbilden) any reality, nor can it represent (darstellen) the possibility of reality (2.06, 2.17, 2.201). Since “a proposition i..

2024-1 Seminar Metaphysics 1. IntroductionIn his pioneering paper, “Sensations and Brain Processes,” J. J. C. Smart developed and relied on the so-called Mind-Brain Type Identity Theory, which was once considered the most dominant and promising candidate for shedding light on the nature of our minds. In the present paper, I aim to figure out the reasons why Smart’s type identity theory appealed ..

2024-1 Wittgenstein Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (German/English text), 4th Ed. trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Ed. P. M. S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, Oxford: Blackwell, 2009. In dem Folgenden veröffentliche ich Gedanken, den Niederschlag philosophischer Untersuchungen, die mich in den letzten 16 Jahren beschäftigt haben. Sie betreffen viele ..