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2024-2 Frege and Russell(A) One of the main differences between the Principles Era (1900-1908) and the Principia Era (1909-1917) is that only the former adopted the ontology of propositions while the latter abandoned it. In other words, there are no propositions in the Principia. This requires the meticulous and subtle reading of Russell’s works from the Principles Era, since the notation Russel..

2024-2 Frege and Russell Final Exam #1) Give a sketch of the ideas of the three main eras of Russell’s work and the main differences in the ontological and philosophical positions he held in each. The eras are: Principles Era (1900-1908), Principia Era (1909-1917), and Neutral Monist Era (1917---). It should be noted that in all the eras, Russell held a specific view about what Philosophy (as a ..

Kutz, Christopher (2000). Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 4.1 IntroductionWe turn now to the central issue: individual moral accountability in the context of collective action. The most important and far-reaching harms and wrongs of contemporary life are the products of collective actions, mediated by social and institutional structures. Th..

Kutz, Christopher (2000). Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  3.1 IntroductionTwo partners plan to rob a bank. The first recruits a driver while the second purchases a shotgun from a gun dealer. The driver knows he's taking part in a robbery, although not a bank robbery. The gun dealer should have checked his customer's police record before th..

Kutz, Christopher (2000). Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2.1 Introduction our practices of accountability are both positional and relation. I focus upon what I have called the retributive or desert-based model of individual accountability, which is relationally and causally solipsistic. I will analyze the shortcom ings of this model by com..

Irwin, Terence H. (2000). Ethics as an inexact science: Aristotle's ambitions for moral theory. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral particularism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 100-29. 9. Perception and PrudenceSo far I have suggested that Aristotle thinks of perception primarily as a means of applying general rules to particular cases, so that we recognize all the rel..

Irwin, Terence H. (2000). Ethics as an inexact science: Aristotle's ambitions for moral theory. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral particularism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 100-29. 7. Particulars and Inexactness  In Book II Aristotle tells us more about the practical aims of ethics, and adds a new claim about inexactness. Before presenting his general account of vi..

Irwin, Terence H. (2000). Ethics as an inexact science: Aristotle's ambitions for moral theory. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral particularism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 100-29. 4. Ethics and Variation When Aristotle claims that ethics provides usual generalizations, does he primarily have in mind mere frequencies or natural norms? Does he recognize ethical prin..

Irwin, Terence H. (2000). Ethics as an inexact science: Aristotle's ambitions for moral theory. In Brad Hooker & Margaret Olivia Little (eds.), Moral particularism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 100-29. 1. Modesty in Ethical Theory At the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics,' (hereafter EN), Aristotle warns that we must not demand too much exactness in ethical inquiry (1094b11-14). The ..

Aristotle (2024). Nicomachean Ethics. Second Edition. Translated With Introduction and Notes By C. D. C. Reeve Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company 1.5 Three sorts of livesBut let us take up our account at the point where we digressed. For peo ple seem (which is not unreasonable) to get their suppositions about the good—that is, happiness—from their lives. Ordinary people, indeed, ..